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A PREFATORY OVERVIEW
Yet this gratifying progress is small in 
relation to the critical short term 
financial position of the country and 
the long term needs of the people 
for a better quality of life.
- National Development Strategy and 
Programme 1 9 8 7- 1 9 8 9 , 'Foreword' by 
Second Vice President and Minister of 
National Planning, Major General 
Hussain Kulmiye Afrah
We must look our mistakes squarely in the face,
Lest we fall into repeating them.
- Rui Balthasar Santos, Rector Eduardo 
Mondlane University, sometime Minister 
of Finance, Mozambique
Such being the nature of our subject and such our 
way of arguing in our discussions of it, we must 
be satisfied with a rough outline of the truth, 
and for the same reason we must be content with 
broad conclusions.
- Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 
one of earliest political economic 
studies)
Out of Africa there is always something new.
- Pliny, the younger
This study concludes that - especially for children and mothers - very real 
problems of basic service access and of poverty exist in Somalia today and 
that in some respects the situation is deteriorating and marked by high levels 
of vulnerability. It further finds that these human problems - or priorities 
for action - are integrally related to structural and institutional aspects
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and dynamics of Somalia's macro and sectoral political economy. To that 
extent and at that degree of abstraction its findings are fairly conventional 
wisdom for Somalia or for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) more generally.
But the parameters of deprivation and vulnerability, the structures of 
production, incomes and distribution, and therefore the potentially viable 
strategies for reducing poverty (especially of basic service access) and 
enhancing child and mother survival in Somalia diverge substantially from the 
stylised conventional wisdom - e.g. of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund - and from the stylised counter conventional wisdom - e.g. of 
UNICEF and/or IDS (Sussex) - applicable, or at any rate applied!, to SSA as a 
whole. Somalia simply has not had any of the standard subtypes of SSA 
national economic history since 1960s
a. it has not had relatively good growth to 1970, a 1970-73 lull followed by 
a 1974-75 external crisis of adjustment leading to recovery to high 
growth over 1976-79 and a subsequent deeper, more prolonged and more 
intractable external balance based crisis since 1980 (as, e.g. have such 
diverse political economies as Tanzania and the Cote d'Ivoire);
b. nor has it endured prolonged economic stagnation and per capita decline 
since the mid-1970s (or even 1960s) as have several SSA economies for 
diverse reasons (e.g. Ghana 1973-82 absence of policies; Chad continuous 
internal conflict; Zambia secular mineral price decline since 1974; 
Uganda and Zaire, a combination of the above; Mozambique, external 
aggression);
c. most emphatically it does not show improved access to basic social 
services running well ahead of economic growth over most of the period 
1960-85 as is the case in many SSA economies;
d. even its drought shocks have been different as to timing and nature of 
impact from those of many other SSA countries;
e. there is little evidence of the secular decline in per capita food 
availability (or even production) which has characterised SSA as a whole 
and many (by no means all) of its constituent economies since the 
mid-1960s.
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Levels of absolute poverty and of malnutrition appear to be markedly lower in 
Somalia than in most other low income SSA economies. Further there is no 
evidence of secular deterioration - except in respect to basic services - nor 
of worsening income distribution in the sense of growing grinding poverty 
co-existing with extravagantly flaunted private and public conspicuous 
consumption and accumulation. Several factors explain this:
a. GDP seems to have been on a 3 to secular growth trend since 1970 with 
fairly secondary deviations;
b. GNP has grown markedly more rapidly - probably on a 6 to 7Í trend -
because of burgeoning remittances as a result of migrant labour earnings
especially over 1976-1982;
c. remittance incomes have been fairly widely distributed and together with 
intra extended family transfers have limited growth of abject poverty;
d. domestic public sector revenue has shrunken in real terms since 1979 and
officially channelled real exports have risen very little while real per
capita gross public resource transfers (external grants and loans) have 
fallen since 1975 (and net ones after debt service actually paid have 
fallen even more) creating massive constrictions on the public sector and 
on productive sector (as opposed to consumer goods) imports.
In such a case two dangerous temptations confront the analyst and/or policy 
advisor. One is to stick with the conventional (or counter conventional) 
wisdom and to chop and stretch Somalian reality to fit its procrustean bed. 
The other, more subtle one, is to embrace iconoclasm for its own sake and to 
argue that everything in Somalia is the inverse of what it is elsewhere, that 
basic economic principles and policies have little or no relevance - in short 
that like Alice in Wonderland one has gone "through the looking glass" into a 
totally new and non-comparable reality. This too is incorrect.
To illustrate, to evaluate Somali weather in terms relevant to most other 
African economies is unsound. Somalia is drier than most (not all, cf 
Botswana, Namibia, Mauritania, Cape Verde) and also more vulnerable to swings 
in rainfall level and distribution (regionally and seasonally). But to assert
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that drought is the norm and rain the exception in Somalia is at least as 
grave a misperception. Somalian production and consumption patterns are 
adapted to particular contextual levels, distributions and variabilities of 
rainfall (and river levels). With these levels and swings, which are normal 
for Somalia (or for particular regions), they can cope. Radically worse 
seasons, especially several in a row, do create severe hardship and in extreme 
cases like the 1973-74 "long-tailed" (because even the long-tailed wild 
antelope died) drought bring massive dislocation, deprivation, destitution and 
death.
Even the most basic empirical data, analysis and conceptualisation in Somalia 
are scanty, fragmentary, apparently inconsistent and with what appear to be 
arithmetic and measurement, logical and conceptual errors. In this context to 
be precisely right is rarely a realistic goal; to be precisely wrong an ever 
present danger. What this study has sought is to achieve approximate 
correctness at the levels of conceptualisation, of orders of magnitude and 
interactions and of policy and programme direction and to begin laying a base 
on which future work can build to narrow the ranges and sharpen the focus of 
approximations and policies.
In that context several crucial features of Somalia political economy in 
relation to UNICEF's focus on children, women and vulnerable groups (or human 
being oriented development more generally) emerge:
1. Private prosperity - albeit modest - building up steadily over a decade, 
openly visible in urban consumption levels and fairly widely distributed.
2. Pockets - not an all-engulfing sea - of personal and household poverty, 
which nonetheless must be of real concern to Somalians and those working 
with them, but which probably require specific more than macro-economic 
approaches.
3. Volatile vulnerability - to drought and to several aspects of the 
external economic environment - at household and national, seasonal and 
medium term levels, only partially now tackled in terms either of damage 
limitation or risk reduction.
4. Steady pauperisation - no other word is strong enough - of public sector
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econoraic and social services since 1979 directly linked to shrinking 
domestic real resource mobilisation and to real per capita resource 
transfer levels, and especially makeup, provided by external cooperating 
governments and agencies (usually termed donors albeit over half the 
transfers are loans which lie at the basis of the very real external debt 
service problems).
In the context of these paradoxes it is not easy to chart a general course 
forward, albeit certain elements can be identified, e.g. greater linkages with 
community-based mobilisation of personnel and of voluntary user fees for basic 
services. Nor can a complete range of programmes be specified in any detail. 
But some can, as can parameters within which others can be articulated more 
precisely if the will, the conceptual energy, the openness to consultation 
with poor and vulnerable groups to gain insights and ideas and the material 
resources are forthcoming.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE UNCONVENTIONAL ECONOMY OF SOMALIA
Overview
Each economy has its own contextual characteristics which define fundamental 
magnitudes such as production and distribution and ultimately human welfare 
and levels of living. The economy of Somalia exhibits certain characteristics 
which qualify it as an "unconventional" economy in relation to other economies 
in sub-Saharan Africa.
The economy of Somalia is unconventional in the sense that key sectors of 
economic activities take place outside the aegis of the national accounts. A 
great part of the national income arises from remittances of Somali workers 
abroad, sent in through informal channels; the majority of imports - partly as 
a result of the remittances - and a significant proportion of exports are 
transacted outside the purview of the customs authorities and at essentially 
free-market exchange rates; and, as a result, a great part of the internal 
trade in manufactured goods also escapes official control. This is in 
addition to the standard SSA pattern of shaky estimation of small scale 
domestic production and trade and by-passing of nominally single channel grain 
corporations whenever their prices are below actual market prices. Moreover, 
the social structures in Somalia are such that there are no clear-cut 
divisions along occupational lines such as, for example, wage earners, 
traders, etc.; rather, most extended families are composed of
multi-occupational groups. These distinctions render most officially recorded 
macro-economic magnitudes such as gross domestic product, balance of payments 
and wages highly deceptive if taken by themselves as reflections of the
performance of the economy, or of the real welfare of the people.
To all this, one must add the one overwhelmingly and relatively distinctive 
characteristic about the Somali economy: that it is an economy in which up to
one-half of the population depends directly or indirectly on nomadic
pastoralism for its livelihood, a proportion not significantly exceeded in any 
other country in the world and matched in relatively few. Not much is known 
about the production possibilities in the nomadic sector and the - usually
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exaggerated - pictures of starvation during periodic droughts contribute to 
the analysis of the economy in doomsday terms. Pastoralism engenders not only 
uncertainties about statistics, but also serious conceptual problems about the 
meaning of income figures in Somalia.
The unconventional nature of the economy also conditions certain fundamental 
economic flows in Somalia. Remittances not only contribute to the basic 
prosperity of urban areas, but the manner in which they are are remitted - at 
essentially free-market exchange rates in the form of consumer goods - 
provides a great part of the explanation for the inflationary process in 
Somalia. Export transactions on the free market, without the intervention of 
marketing boards, as in other SSA countries, obviate some of the usual 
arguments for exchange rate manipulations, while similar - informal - 
marketing arrangements for food crops detract from the hypothesised SSA type 
"urban bias" model (albeit in respect to domestic food crops this absence or 
evasion of official channels is, in fact, conventional. If there is urban 
concentration we have to look beyond the usual surplus extraction mechanisms - 
over-valued exchange rate, export taxes, effective price control on food crops 
at the producer end - for an explanation. Ultimately, the unrecorded as well 
as uncontrolled flow of goods - especially exports and imports - increasingly 
circumscribes the resources available to the government (or at least the 
plausible means of tapping them) to provide basic services to the population
in the form of health, education, water etc.
Thus, understanding of the welfare of the population of Somalia - the 
objective of this report - requires an understanding of the nature of 
Somalia's economy. The second section of this Chapter is devoted to this, 
most of the discussion being focussed on showing the basic differences of the 
Somali economy compared to other African countries, the patterns in measuring 
the standard of living of differing Somali population groups, and the 
different perceptions of trends in the national economy that emerge from such 
an alternative view. This discussion provides the basis for the subsequent
estimations of poverty and nutrition levels (Chapter 2) and for related topics
such as income security augmentation (Chapter 5) and policy perceptions 
(Chapters 6 and 7). The reason for spelling out in detail the nature of the 
economy is not only to lay out the analytical framework, but more important to 
fill a gap. Only recently has this kind of analysis begun to be done. Most 
previous analyses of the economy - whether in assessing economic performance
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or estimating poverty levels - has taken the conventional route of describing 
GDP growth rates and measuring incomes in conventional terms. This sort of 
analysis is practically useless, either as an explanation of the observed 
welfare trends or as a guide for determining policy - in particular state 
fiscal and expenditure allocation. Our analysis of this "unconventional" 
economy we believe contributes in important ways to an understanding of the 
constraints and possibilities of the Somali economy.
In other parts of this report we look at the situation with respect to the 
provision of public services. Chapter 3 is concerned with health and water 
and Chapter 4 with education. Chapter 7 deals with the broad programmatic 
conclusions. Several annexes show the details of problems with estimation 
procedures in Somalia.
Macro-Economic Framework
There are five respects in which Somalia's economy differs from those of other 
SSA countries:
(1) Different population groups have distinct production/consumption bundles;
(2) Most family units undertake multiple economic activities;
(3) Extended family transfers are important in practical as well as 
ideological terms;
(4) Remittances are the largest source of cash incomes;
(5) Most external and internal transactions are effected under free-market
conditions (albeit this is less unconventional than most recent writing
on SSA might suggest).
These differences render the problem of measuring performance and welfare in 
Somalia qualitatively different compared to most other African countries. 
They also determine in important ways, some of the major macro-economic 
relationships in the economy, such as the inflationary process, the exchange 
rate as well as income distribution. Table 1 sets out in a schematic fashion, 
the most important distinguishing features of the economy of Somalia compared 
to SSA countries.
TABLE 1
Problems of Measurement in the Somali Economy
Peculiar to Somalia or Unusually
Common to S3A countries
Livestock (nomads small proportion 
of population in most 
SSA countries)
Crop production valuing 
subsistence production.
Smuggling of exports
Smuggling of imports
Foreign Exchange Flows various 
forms of capital flight
Standard of Living measuring 
subsistence and informal 
activities
Important in Respect to Somalia 
High macroeconomic importance of:
1. Difficulty of surveying
nomadic sector,
2. Difficult in separating
consumption and saving,
3. Problem of measuring herd size and
and changes in herd size,
4. Problem of estimating milk
production.
Very large annual variations in area 
planted.
Substantial Proportion of 
Smuggling due to:
1. Nomadic disregard for national 
boundaries.
2. Nomadic isolation from and 
avoidance of officialdom.
"Franco valuta" system - extreme of 
"no forex" licence" approach.
Remittances from Gulf States
1. Comparing different types of 
subsistence "incomes",
2. Remittances exceed total 
non-agricultural GDP,
3. Multi-occupational groups within 
families,
4. Intra family transfers scale.
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In all SSA countries there is a self-provisioning and local exchange 
(subsistence) element of rural production which is hard to measure in official 
statistics. However, rural production in most involves crops as the most 
important element and the output of combining land and labour is relatively 
unambiguous. In Somalia there are two types of rural production - pastoralism 
and farming. Both have measurement and conceptual problems significantly 
different from most other African countries. The problem in measuring 
pastoral output is the fact that there are at least two conceptually different 
types of output, each with its own problems. The first involves the net 
change in herds. Even if estimated accurately, herd changes are virtually 
impossible to allocate between present and future consumption and fixed 
investment with any accuracy. Net additions to herds can represent any ratio 
of current consumption and stock accumulation; even negative values are 
possible when herds fall. Short-run stock changes cannot be approximated by a 
set of technical coefficients or extrapolation from the past, as they depend 
overwhelmingly on the exogenous factor of weather and anticipated changes 
therein and except in (unusual) uniformly very good or very bad years vary 
sharply from province to province and even district to district.
Second, there are products derived from living animals. Milk is the most 
important in Somalia. Along with meat it is the main staple of the 
pastoralist diet. When the difficulty in identifying output is combined with 
the further difficulty of conducting surveys among people repeatedly shifting 
their location and markedly unwilling to allow outsiders the power of knowing 
their herd sizes, measurement is extremely problematical and precision 
i m p o s s i b l e . T h u s ,  to cite the most glaring example, milk output has been 
consistently understated in all national account estimates. Indeed, in at 
least one, milk is not even included.2/
Given such problems, it is not possible to say with any confidence whether in 
any particular year ''pastoral GDP" went up, remained the same, or fell. Since 
livestock output is perhaps two-fifths of the total GDP, the implication is 
that one must use aggregate GDP estimates with extreme caution, particularly 
when the different authorities produce diametrically different statistics. It 
is also the case that the role of the livestock sector is probably 
considerably understated in the balance of payments. For generations Somali 
pastoralists have marketed their animals with minimal regard for customs and 
excise prodcedures, let alone national boundaries, and what appears in the
I
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official external accounts may have limited bearing on the true levels and 
changes in levels of commerce.3/ This is true both for payments received by 
exporters and the number of beasts exported. At various times one or the 
other factor dominates; at present, the first is thought to be more important 
than the second.
Even in the crop sector, the problems of measurement are different from most 
other SSA countries. Elsewhere in the region, the amount of land planted 
varies relatively little from year-to-year: if land is suitable for farming
under prevailing technology and population levels, it is usually planted. 
Therefore, variations in crop output can be approximated reasonably closely by 
variations in yields. In Somalia, the extreme variability in annual rainfall 
and the timing pattern of rains results in a corresponding variability in area 
planted. If the year is extremely dry, large areas away from the rivers may 
not be planted at all whereas in several other East African countries planting 
with low, nominal or nil yields is a more common pattern in drought years. It 
appears that year-to-year changes in the area planted have been as much as 30 
percent in the 1970s and 1980s albeit these may be overestimates. This 
variation makes accurate measurement of crop output extremely difficult, for 
one must estimate both yields and area planted. Further there are great 
differences in yields for different qualities of land. As elsewhere total 
hectarage and yield per hectare are supposedly aggregated from field hectarage 
and yield estimates by districts, but there are distinct doubts as to the 
accuracy of the underlying local estimates from which they are aggregated. As 
the discussion in the next section demonstrates, the large potential variation 
in crop output is reflected in considerable differences in estimates by 
different agencies.
Secular trend estimates - which cross cancel erratic annual fluctuation 
whether linked to weather or to non-systematic errors of estimation - may be 
more reliable. They appear to suggest a fairly stable 1970-85 growth of 
livestock output (strictu sensu of herds, but there is no reason to suppose 
radical reproduction, natural death or offtake rate shifts) at 1.5% to 2% a 
year and of crop production over the same period at 3Í a year (perhaps with 
two subtrends - see Annex 2 to Chapter 2 on Secular Nutrition Trends).
Up to this point the discussion has referred to gross domestic product - 
production which arises within the boundaries of the country. A fundamental
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characteristic of Somalia is that its Gross National Product (basically GDP 
plus net remittances) differs considerably from its gross domestic product. 
This is because of remittances from Somali workers and businessmen abroad.
The numbers involved as well as the level of remittances are matters of 
considerable uncertainty (see Annex 2 to this Chapter). Thus, both the total 
national income accruing to Somalis and the foreign exchange accounts of the 
country are in considerable doubt. And as a result of the particular way 
remittances enter the country, official estimates of imports are grossly 
understated. During the late 1970s and early 1980s a system called the 
"franco valuta" was in operation. Although discontinued for some time, its 
essential features persist. Under this system, Somalis working in the Gulf 
States exchange the currency in which they are paid into Somali shillings to 
be transferred to their designated recipients. The foreign exchange obtained 
by the intermediaries is then used to import commodities into Somalia. 
Secondarily workers bring in goods when they return home on visits. All 
observers agree that these transactions go virtually unrecorded in the offical 
balance of payments. More importantly the systematic up-bidding of the 
foreign exchange in the hands of the Somalian workers abroad contributes 
greatly to the inflationary process in Somalia, all the more so since the 
country has become almost totally dependent on imported consumer goods. At 
each period imported goods arrive in Somalia at a higher shilling price which 
then spills over in the other sectors. Another major source of remittances is 
from the large Somali communities in East Africa who view Somalia as their (or 
at any rate their extended family's) home. These remittances - given the 
nature of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania exchange and trade control - are 
necessarily in the form of extra-legal exports to Somalia - whether for use 
there or in the form of gold, gems and parallel market convertible currency to 
be utilised to finance third country imports.
The most comparable economy to Somalia in this regard is that of Lesotho where 
the although true import and - to a lesser extent - migrant remittances data 
are somewhat better. That economy, however, differs significantly because 
there is a negligible domestic productive sector base but a much sounder 
fiscal one as contrasted with Somalia.
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Assessing macro-economic performance
The problem of assessing performance at the aggregate level is quite difficult 
given the measurement problems discussed above. This is illustrated in Tables 
2, 3» and 4. They contain relevant GDP data from three sources - the
Government of Somalia (and ECA), the World Bank and the IMF.
Starting with the GDP figures (Table 2) it may be noted that according to the 
IMF, Somali's GDP was almost forty percent greater in 1985 than in 1978, while 
the World Bank's estimates suggest that the level was virtually the same. 
Further, the ordering of the estimates in any given year changes. At the 
outset, the World Bank has the largest absolute real GDP, followed by the 
government, then the IMF. In subsequent years the IMF shifts from last to 
first place, with the other two agencies alternating for second place. 
Looking at growth rates, in three of the seven years the estimates do not 
agree among themselves as to whether GDP went up or down or remained the same. 
We also note another important characteristic of the Somali GDP: large and 
violent fluctuations in the growth rate. Taking the last three years of the 
GDP series, estimated growth rates fluctuated from minus 16 per cent to plus 
18 per cent. Such violent fluctuations should caution us about using 
Somalia's annual GDP figures as any basis for assessing welfare. Even if such 
drastic observations can in part be due to underlying economic factors they 
may - and in Somalia's case do - not directly affect consumption or public 
services fully in the year in which they are recorded. Actually as Table 3 
shows these movements are largely due to changes in livestock herd size.
Both the World Bank and the IMF show a steady upward trend in livestock value 
added from 1980, while the government index shows a somewhat lower trend. The 
difference reflects a largely subjective judgement on the relative importance 
of exogenous weather factors (evidently weighted more heavily by the Somali 
government) and trend coefficients seeking to reflect natural increase under 
normal conditions.4/ The variations for any given year are enormous. 
Particularly out of line is the IMF estimate.5/ Growth rates are worlds 
apart; in no year is the highest growth rate less than double the lowest, and 
in 1983 the IMF shows a robust rate of expansion of 6 percent for the sector, 
compared to the Somali government judgement of a 50 percent decline, 
apparently related primarily to the IMF estimate being virtually an offtake 
estimate without regard to opening and closing herd size.
TABLE 2
Various Estimates of GDP for Somalia, 1978-1985*
1978 Growth rate (%) 1985 Index
value 
(Sh m)
1978/
79
1979/
80
1980/
81
1981/
82
1982/
83
1983/
84
1984/
85
value 1985 
(Sh m)(1978=100)
MNP 62*13 -10 3 9 6 -16 6 18 7303 117
World
Bank 6805 -13 -14 7 6 2 -2 7 6938 102
IMF 6118 -1 2 5 11 2 2 10 8398 137
* GDP at market prices. Constant 1977 prices for Ministry of 
National Planning (MNP) and World Bank. IMF gives its figures in 
1976 prices; here adjusted by 1977-1978 inflation rate of World 
Bank to render the three series comparable . All growth rates 
rounded to nearest whole number.
Sources: Somali Democratic Republic, Ministry of National
Planning, General Directorate of Statistics, National Account 
Aggregates, 1977-1984 (8 5 est) (Mogadishu, 1986); Ministry of
National Planning, National Development Strategy and Programme, 
1987-1991 (Mogadishu, 1987); World Bank (February 1987); and 
statistical tables provided by the IMF, Washington.
TABLE 3
Estimates of Livestock Value Added, 1978-1985
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1978 Growth rate (%) 1985 Index
value 
(Sh m)
1978/
79
1979/
80
1980/
81
1981/
82
1982/
83
1983/
84
1984/
85
value 
(Sh m)
1985
(1978=100)
Somalia 2155 -30 13 19 7 -51 35 19 2406 112
World
Bank 2392 -46 9 20 13 4 6 2 2574 108
IMF 2457 -5 -1 10 16 6 1 11 3537 144
Note: See Table 2 for sources and notes.
Estimate of Crop
TABLE 4 
Sector Value jAdded, 1978-1985
1978 Growth rate (,%) 1985 Index
value 1978/ 1979/ 1980/ 1981/ 1982/ 1983/ 1984/ value 1985
(Sh m) 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 (Sh m) (1978=100)
MNP 646 1 2 22 4 -4 6 43 1376 213
World
Bank 575 1 0 4 2 -11 8 29 798 139
IMF 588 1 3 6 30 -11 8 23 1183 202
Note: See Table 2 for sources and notes.
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There is considerably more agreement among the three authorities with regard 
to the crop sector (Table 4): at least here there is no year in which one
estimate indicates an increase and another a decline. However, the large 
difference between the Somali Government and IMF estimates for 1981 and 1982 
is quite striking. Further, we note that in 1985, the World Bank considered 
the crop sector to have generated over 40 percent less value added than the 
government did.
The problem in assessing the performance of the crop sector is not so much the 
disagreement among the estimations as the credibility that can be attached to 
the enormous increase all three judge to have occurred in 1984 and 1985 s 1) 
from where did the resources come to achieve this? 2) what motivated people 
to allocate additional resources to crop production?
The increase in official producer prices in 1984 and 1985 - albeit largely 
nominal both because of levels of domestic inflation and the fact that farmers 
regularly by-passed official channels if others offered better prices - could 
explain why farmers might wish to increase marketed production, but not how 
they might realise that wish. In order that production should increase, 
either yields have to improve or more land has to be cultivated (or both); 
both would require a larger labour input. As in other matters, the 
authorities disagree as to whether the increased production was the result of 
more intensive or more extensive use of land.6/
Again, for GDP and for crop outputs trend estimates should be more reliable 
and informative than annual. Using the - admittedly shaky - Somalia 
government/ECA data suggests a 1970-85 GDP growth trend of 3 to 4% a year. 
The 1970's were somewhat below trend - a very severe, two year drought and the 
events of 1977-78 provide an adequate explanation - and the 1980's somewhat 
above - partly because of recovery from the mid to late 1970's setbacks noted 
(see Annex 2 to this Chapter).
What we have demonstrated so far is that what the GDP account measures is 
measured haphazardly and in a way not necessarily bearing any very close 
relation either to consumption or fixed investment levels and changes. The 
major problem, however, is not what they do measure and how, but what they do 
not measure - remittances and, presumablly, consequential commercial sector 
GDP. Remittances are so pervasive and important in the cash flows that any
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analysis that fails to take account of them will have missed the essence of 
the economy. To give just one example of this: at a time when all GDP
accounts showed falling per capita income and implied increasing poverty in 
the early 1980s, the perception in the urban areas was of relatively good 
conditions and lack of visible signs of widespread poverty. More strikingly, 
at a time when the average real wage has fallen to under a fifth of its
previous levels and can hardly buy more than 10 days' supply of food for an 
average family, wage earning households are not in general living in abject 
poverty. There are reasons other than remittances for this apparent 
contradiction. Allowances (unrecorded in aggregate data and also untaxed) 
have risen as a share of employer payments. Most public sector employees 
(including e.g. bank tellers, postal clerks, receptionists, drivers) collect 
user fees from customers/clients in cash or kind to augment their incomes. 
Many households have non-wage income sources. However, the dominant 
additional income source for many (probably a majority of) urban wage earning
households is remittances. Annex 2 to this Chapter gives our estimates for
the number of Somalis regarding Somalia as their home abroad and amount of 
remittances. The order of magnitude is quite staggering.
Remittances probably exceed 20 times the Somalia-based wage bill, exceed a 
third of total GNP (GDP + Remittances - External debt service paid), and are 
about the same as or somewhat larger than non-agricultural GDP. The last 
comparison shows the importance of remittances in the monetary flows in the 
country since subtracting agricultural GDP from total GDP strips out the self 
provisioning (subsistence) and intra-sectoral trade valuation problem. It also 
shows the importance of remittances in the urban economy, for, although it is 
recognised that not all remittances flow to the urban population, most 
apparantly do.7/ On this basis remittances constitute a major part of the 
monetary economy, more than doubling the urban-based consuming power. The 
final two comparisons we have to note in the table are with official 
remittances and government deficit. Remittances channelled through the banks 
totalled only $35 million in 1985. This figure is correct for what it shows - 
officially recorded remittances. However, if this were the total amount of 
remittances coming in, nothing about the basic dynamics of the Somali economy 
could be explained. Finally the comparison with government recurrent deficit 
shows the sheer magnitude of the monetary flows implied by the remittances 
compared to the government deficit - a comparison not necessarily indicating 
how the former could, in fact, be used to resolve the latter.
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The most important type of remittances is undoubtedly that coming from the 
Gulf countries. It is of recent origin at least on a large scale. In 
magnitude it surpasses all other categories of remittances, and the way it is 
transmitted has had profound consequences on the economy. While the other 
types of remittances have been more or less 'traditional* to the Somali 
economy, remittances from the Gulf countries in significant amounts date 
mostly from the mid-1970s. The channel through which they are transmitted - 
the franco valuta system, and its less open ancestors and descendants - in
which traders buy foreign exchange from workers abroad to finance the return
flow of consumer goods with payment going to the workers and relatives in 
shillings, explains not only the obvious signs of a consumer boom in
Mogadishu, but also the Gulf market exchange rate and through that the
inflationary process. The rising incomes from remittances have increased 
urban purchasing power and therefore the case of selling imported goods. It 
has been easy for traders to raise prices and margins. As a result they have 
secularly bid up the price of the Saudi riyal relative to the Somali shilling 
and then raised shilling prices in Somalia to correspond. This is especially 
true as the 'free market' (intra-foreign currency bank account) and auction 
rates are now approximating the Gulf rate and the official rate will probably 
be more or less unified with them.
Conclusion
The vast numbers of problems discussed above indicate that there is a wide gap 
between the Somali economy as it is measured and the Somali economy as it 
functions. To distinguish between the two, we shall use the term the 
"official" economy to refer to the former and the term the "total" economy to 
refer to the latter. What the official statistics and those of outside
agencies, which may be included under the terra "official" measure will be
called the "recorded" or "official" economy.
Pursuing the analysis of the Somali economy the hypothesis cannot be rejected 
that the relationship between the total economy as it actually functions and 
the official one as it is measured is a purely random one in any given year.
At least since the emergence of the "remittance economy" usually little
relationship can be found between the two. This is illustrated in Table 5*
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TABLE 5
Remittances and Domestic Incomes 1984
Remittances from Gulf workers ($m) 250-325
others ($m) 200-225
total ($m) 450-550 of which ca 300 financed imports.
S Sh equivalent at Gulf Rate of 
Remittance Financed Imports
Wage bill in Somalia 
GDP
Non agricultural GDP 
Recurrent budget deficit
9
Total government financing requirement
(Sh m) 45» 000
(Sh m) 2, 184
(Sh m) 74, 350
(Sh m) 29, 182
(Sh m) 3,819
(Sh m) 5,361
Excludes extra budgetary PIP expenditure financed from external 
sources. Converted at Sh 150 = $ these would have added 43»875 m 
shillings.
Source: Ministry of National Planning (wages, GDP, non-agricultural GDP,
budget deficit, financing requirement), Annex 2 this Chapter 
(remittances).
TABLE 6
Economic Structure and Performance, 1970-1987
Structural
Characteristics
Period
1. Controlled economy: 
prices, imports.
2. Livestock exports 
stagnant substantial 
price increase.
4. Migration grows 
rapidly from 1975.
5. Catastrophic drought 
1973-74 and refugee 
inflow 1978-79.
1. Migration to Gulf 
States over 150,000 
workers; franco 
valuta import system.
2. Export boom for 
livestock sector.
3 . Major drought.
4. Stagnation in urban 
formal sector.
5. War in the Ogaden.
1. Reduction in number 
of employed migrants.
2. Drop in demand for 
livestock exports 
(Saudi restrictions).
3. Weather on average 
more favourable than 
previous period 
(until 1987).
4. Liberalisation 
affects urban and 
crop sectors.
Official Accounts Show 
1970-1976
1. GDP per capita 
moderate increase.
2. Inflation moderate.
3. Wages sufficient 
for family needs.
1977-83
1. Per capita income 
stagnant.
2. Livestock export 
proceeds rise slowly.
3 . Remittances US$40 
million a year.
4. Deterioration in 
current account of 
balance of payments.
5. Formal sector wage 
declines dramatically.
1984-1987
1. Per capita income 
increased.
2. Catastrophic decline 
in livestock exports.
3 . Remittances US$50 
million a year 
(increase over 
1977-81).
4. Massive deterioration 
in current account of 
balance of payments.
Apparent Actual Behaviour 
of the Economy___________
No significant divergence, 
GNP growth probably 
moderately higher.
1. Per capita National 
income rose.
Remittance financed 
imports $300-400 
million.
2. Pastoralist income 
rose dramatically.
3 . Massive increase in 
consumer goods 
imports not visibly 
financed.
4. Sharp falls real urban 
wages, real manufac­
turing output, constant 
price government expend­
iture; boom in construc­
tion and commerce; rapid 
urban informal sector 
expansion. Wages/ 
salaries become second­
ary income source for 
most formal sector 
employee households.
1. Per capita National 
income growth declines.
2. Pastoralist income 
from exports 
stagnant or fell.
3 . Current account of 
balance of payments 
weakened - apparent 
shift in consumer 
import makeup.
4. Urban commerce sector 
intact, construction 
declines, real wages 
and constant price 
government expenditure 
collapse.
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The period 1970-1976 was nominally marked by stringent control over the 
economy. Producer and retail prices of foodstuff were fixed by government and
generally adhered to up to 1973/7^ and the great drought. Nationalisation
took place in respect to financial institutions and plantations. Inflation 
was kept below or only slightly above the double-digit level. With wages 
recording periodic increases, decline of the real wage was kept within limits 
and the wage remained sufficient to purchase an average family's basic needs. 
Basic consumer goods industries were established behind high tariff walls, 
albeit even then smuggling made the effectiveness of that protection somewhat 
problematic.
In the next period the character of the economy completely changed: the armed 
conflict in the Haud and Ogaden, the drought of 1978, and the loss of
financial and personnel flows from the USSR were three of the causes, but the
most important - and in the opposite direction - was undoubtedly emigration to 
work in the Gulf countries. With rising oil prices of 1973-7** and the ensuing 
boom in the Gulf economies emigration turned from a trickle into a flood. 
Remittances began to arrive as suit-case imports with visiting workers, and 
more and more as large scale commercially intermediated flows. With the
growing shortage of official foreign exchange because of the 1977-78 events 
and the drought, the government sought to use the migrants as a pool of
foreign exchange. In 1978 the ban on private imports was removed, allowing 
importation to occur with self-financed foreign exchange. To all intents and 
purposes - and despite various chopping and changing of official practice - 
that remains the basic channel for consumer goods imports other than grain and
oil. Remittances created the broad gap between the official economy as it is 
measured and the total economy as it is perceived. In the period 1977-1983 
per capita GDP supposedly - and possibly really - fell, yet this was the
period of a great boom in imports and construction. Over 1 9 8 3 - 8 7 per capita 
GDP is shown to have increased, yet during this period, with growing
unemployment among migrants contingent upon the slump in oil prices, the flow 
of remittances if anything slowed down and the construction boom subsided to 
significant but lower levels. Visible commercial activity however continued 
to rise probably because of formal prohibition and actual sharp reduction in 
imports of q'at (a mildly narcotic leaf).
On a trend basis GNP has probably risen 6 to 7Í a year (including an 
adjustment to commercial sector GDP to cover margins on unrecorded imports)
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over 1970-1985. Because initial levels of remittance were very low, their 
modest growth over 1970-75 probably did not raise GNP growth at that period 
above 556. 1975-1983 GNP growth probably exceeded 8‘/, while post- 1 9 8 3  it may
have fallen back to 5%. A complicating factor, as noted, is that in 1984 q'at 
was banned. The ban though not totally effective did reduce import levels 
significantly (possibly by over $50 million a year) thus freeing purchasing 
power for visible (in shops and on barrows) consumer goods imports, even if 
the true total import level was relatively stagnant.
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Notes to Chapter 1
For example, annual herd size is based on adjustments to a total 
derived from a census of livestock in the mid-1970s. Not only is this 
baseline total in dispute and subject to successive re-estimation 
exercises, but the annual adjustments are made using informed guesses 
as to the impact of the year's weather on fertility and survival of 
animals as variation from equally informed guess "normal-year"
estimates. Aerial surveys have been used to verify estimates (though 
not on a regular basis), but even the accuracy of these has been 
questioned on the grounds that a significant portion of the "national" 
herd may have been in Kenya or Ethiopia at the time of the survey (or 
vica versa of course!).
IMF data, as given in Washington in April 1987.
To quote from a World Bank report, "A calculation by the IMF from 
partner country trade data shows that, in 1984, Somali exports were 
valued at $62 million by Somalia and $123 million by importers [e.g., 
Saudi Arabia]. The difference of $61 million, as large as declared 
exports, was presumably transferred abroad for capital flight or 
remittance via the parallel market." What "transferred" means is less 
than clear - "paid in Saudi in convertible currency" would seem a 
clearer statement of the process.
Some officials of the government and outside agencies (though far from 
a majority) argue that the remittances have now been largely induced 
into the national banking system and appear in official statistics. 
We give reasons for doubting this at other places in this report,
doubts which appear to be fully shared by the Central Bank.
"Value added in the livestock sector was defined as the net natural 
increase in the herd during a given year. Net growth rates for
different categories of livestock... were assumed to have continued in 
1983 at the same rates as in 1978..." IMF, Somalia: Recent Economic
Developments (Washington, 1 9 8 7), P 96 (Appendix IV)
The IMF estimate is in fact even more divergent from the others than 
the indicies in Table II.3 suggest. Careful reading to of the IMF 
procedure reveals that its estimate for livestock value added includes 
neither camels nor milk production, which accounted for 35 percent of 
the Somali Government figure for the sector in 1 9 8 5 (and apparantly a 
similar proportion for the World Bank). Ministry of National
Planning, 1986, pp. 8-10; IMF, 1987, p. 96.
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The following tabulation shows Ministry of Agriculture's (Food Early 
Warning System) and World Bank's perception of how maize was produced 
in 1984 and 1985s
Ha Qty Yield
COCO) (Mt) (100kg/:
1984 M of A 189 270 14.0
WB 350 270 7.7
1985 M of A 234 382 16.3
WB 350 382 10.9
1986 M of A 245 336 13.7
In other words, in 1984 the Ministry's yield per hectare estimate was 
almost twice as high as the World Bank's. The 1984-85 increase came 
from both area and yield increases according to the Ministry but, from 
yield increases only according to the Bank. The Ministry's estimates 
appear more plausible albeit a 2556 ha increase in one year is not 
possible (because of seasonal labour constraints) unless prepared but 
unplanted or planted but nil yield land is excluded from ha estimates.
Sources; Ministry figures from worksheets provided by the Food Early 
Warning System project. World Bank figures from World Bank, 
Agricultural Sector Review (Washington, 1987).
It is known that many of the migrants come from the nomadic sector. 
In fact it is worth recording that much of the construction labour 
force in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s was provided by nomads going 
directly from the nomadic sector of Somalia. This happened after and 
because of the 1973/74 drought as well as after and because of the 
1973/74 oil price increases. However, in view of the nomads' limited 
need for cash income, the remittances frequently go to - as well as 
via - extended family members in the urban areas or are invested by 
the nomads themselves in housing. At the micro level the main 
exceptions are remittances used to rebuild, start or expand household 
and/or family herds. However, sectorally these micro purchases 
increase other household's cash balances for investment in, or 
transfer to, the urban sector.
A
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ANNEX 1 CHAPTER 1 
NOTE ON POPULATION
Reasoned estimates of the population of the Somali Democratic Republic range 
from under 5 million to 12.5 million (excluding refugees in UNHCR administered 
camps). The detailed results of the 1975 Census were never published and 
those of the 1985 Census and 1987 followup are not yet available. A recent 
official estimate - subject to correction - is 8.5 million, albeit a later
quasi official one is reported to be 5.8 million. Because the 8.5 million
figure is preliminary and has not been articulated by district, age or sex and 
because historic data is based on much lower estimates and cannot be adjusted 
on available data to fit an 8.5 million 1986 total, a population estimate of
5.5 million is used in this report unless otherwise specified (again excluding 
registered refugees). The underlying population growth rate is probably of 
the order of 3% a year, but in the 1970s and 1980s substantial increases in
the numbers of Somalia citizens working abroad probably reduced the rate of
growth of resident population.
The main results of using a higher population estimate would be to reduce 
estimates of GDP and GNP per capita as well as the ratios of school 
enrollment, access to pure water, immunisation, etc. It would not, given the 
methods of estimation, significantly affect infant mortality rate or life 
expectancy estimates. Because it would reduce income and calories per capita 
estimates, such a change in population estimates, would increase estimates of 
malnutrition.
The probable population distribution is 30Í urban (1.65 million, of which at 
least 0.75-1 million live in greater Mogadishu including its exurbs); 30% 
agriculture and settled agro-pastoral (largely in Lower and Middle Shabelle 
and Juba plus Gedo and Bay provinces in the South and to a lesser extent West 
Galbeed, Audal and Sanaag in the North) and 40Í nomadic or mobile pastoral.
The proportion of nomadic population is falling because these communities are 
the chief source of migration to the cities and (directly or via the cities) 
to migrant work abroad. The agricultural proportion is probably relatively 
stable with less out-migration. Despite efforts following the 1973-74
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drought, settling nomads has not taken place on a significant scale (with the 
possible exception of women who set up their own agricultural households, or 
married cultivators). This suggests that the population growth rates may be 
5—6% urban, 2-3Í settled agricultural, 1-2Í nomadic.
The reality is more complex and less static than these three categories 
suggest. Agricultural - but especially nomadic - households frequently send 
younger members to cities to live with relatives while studying or seeking 
work (in Somalia or abroad). During droughts dependent members of nomadic 
households (children and women) often move to cities temporarily to receive 
interim extended family support before returning to their households. 
Similarly, almost by definition, nomadic population by district varies 
seasonally, annually and during drought cycles. Undated nomadic population 
estimates by district or province (and to a lesser extent for Somalia as a 
whole, since significant migration is trans-frontier) are neither comparable 
nor aggregatable. This is exacerbated because neither good weather nor 
droughts are normally national. For example, the 1987 drought affected 10 to 
12 provinces (not the entire country) and within them was severe in one-third 
to one-half the districts, apparently in several cases different ones from 
those most severely affected in 1983/84.
Settled agriculturalist/pure nomadic is a range, not a dichotomy. The 
proportion of crops to livestock varies widely by district and by income (with 
the richer settled agriculturalists tending to have a larger share of 
livestock in total production). Among the nomadic population some groups do 
grow crops, including even grain, on a significant scale (e.g. West Galbeed, 
Audal, Bay) and seem to have - as a consequence - rather different seasonal 
(climatic) migration and household division patterns. Others (e.g. Mudug) do 
seek to grow quick harvest crops (beans and watermelon) but as a subsidiary 
activity. As in numerous other socio-economic fields, fuller analysis is 
limited because serious surveys are scant and differences among them are hard 
to allocate among secular, seasonal, drought cycle and/or erroneous 
observation/interpretation factors.
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ANNEX 2 CHAPTER 1 
EMIGRANTS, REMITTANCES, EXTERNAL ACCOUNTS AND GNP: 
SOME ESTIMATES
The question of emigrant workers and businessmen and their remittances to 
family members in Somalia are crucial to understanding the dynamics and 
estimating the parameters of the economy. Because most of the remittances and 
many of the emigrant workers are extra-legal or illegal - or suspect they may 
be - in respect to Somalia or host country law, or both, hard data are 
precisely and massively incomplete, while estimates - even based on a range of 
micro information and opinion - are, at best, approximations.
For the purposes of this Annex emigrants are defined as Somalis living/working 
abroad whose extended family's basic home lies in the Somali Democratic 
Republic. This excludes the Somali families and family groups whose basic 
home is perceived by them to be in Northern Kenya, the Haud, the Ogaden or 
Djibouti. However, it includes households - notably in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania - whose initial arrival in their present domicile dates back as far 
as the last quarter of the 19th Century. The definition is not based on 
passport (or, frequently, passports) held and has no political meaning per se.
It is a working economic definition tied to the extended family relationships 
which largely determine flows of remittances.
How Many, Where, What Doing?
Emigration from Somalia for economic (and perhaps self-proving) reasons is as 
old and as endemic as from the hill county of the Lebanon. It is particularly 
prevalent among - though not limited to - nomads, the urban community 
households of nomadic origins, and fishermen. The earliest migrants recorded 
(other than pilgrims who maintained themselves en route and merchants who were 
usually based in Somalia) appear to be seamen. They were employed by the 
British East India Company (and probably its European counterparts) from the 
18th Century. Their literal or occupational descendants remain significant, 
albeit overtaken in numbers by the East African and Gulf migrant groupings. 
Many seem to be based in the UK (and probably in other port cities around the
-28-
North Sea as well as Italy) and are fairly ubiquitous in the North Sea and 
Mediterranean coasting trades.
The next wave was of traders and workers to East Africa beyond the (now) North 
Kenyan part of the Somali speaking core area. These communities - at least on 
any scale - appear to date to 1875-1900 (i.e. predating European colonisation 
beyond coastal towns but postdating the Omani conquests/sultanates/trade 
routes and the Portuguese trading imperium). Their present numbers in 
Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya probably number between 100,000 and 150,000. They 
do see themselves as Somalian with homes in Somalia, even if they are members 
of the third or fourth generation of their family to work and - sometimes - to 
be born in East Africa. Trading (including dominance in the rural livestock 
and hides trade), artisanry and service occupations predominate. A secondary 
focus of the 1960s and 1970s - long distance lorry driving - has declined, 
with drivers scattering to Southern African, Gulf and Middle Eastern routes. 
Somali communities in these countries are closed - i.e. not integrated with 
other population groups. Some family members do return to work in Somalia. 
Similarly some seek marriage partners there, albeit most marry within their 
own East African communities.
The largest migrant community - especially in terms of remittances - is the 
Gulf one (predominantly Saudi Arabia, secondarily North Yemen but also South 
Yemen, Oman, the Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait. Total numbers are probably 
150-175,000. In small numbers this emigrant group is quite old (and probably 
originates in pilgrims working their way on the Hejira). It began to grow 
with the Saudi economy's growth in the 1950s after the discovery of oil but 
the main spurt came after the 1973/74 OPEC oil price increases. Most Somali 
sources identify 1977-82 as the period of maximum growth, with a slackening 
(or stagnation) of employment to 1984 and some decline since.
Work pursued varies from unskilled construction and service labour through 
semi-skilled government (e.g. storekeeper) and enterprise (e.g. soap powder 
production worker) to semi-professional or professional (e.g. nurse, teacher, 
secretary, translator). Short term work and unemployment now appear to be 
increasingly common.
Other locations of significant migrant communities include Djibouti, Egypt 
(fairly recent), Italy (dating to the colonial period but now growing
especially with respect to domestic service), Western Europe (dominantly 
self-asserted students or refugees whose actual status is less than clear) and 
North America (similar to Western Europe). Handfuls appear to be present on 
all continents, except Antarctica, and in most countries. The total numbers 
clearly exceed 300,000 and are likely to be at least 375,000. Only in the 
case of East Africa are balanced, complete households common so that the total 
may be made up of 200,000 male workers (or job seekers), 25-30,000 female 
workers, 65-70,000 wives not working outside the household and 60-70,000 
children.
Remittances
Remittances vary with community and occupation. Only the $25-40 million 
annually now being remitted via the banking system is fully visible. 
Restrictions on transfers (notably from East Africa), lack of understanding of 
or contact with banks, inadequacies of banking facilities (e.g. no bank 
operates both in Somalia and in the main emigrant domiciles; Somali external 
accounts are relatively ponderous and entail official service charges and 
ubiquitous user fees privatised to bank employees) and doubts by emigrants as 
to the legal status of domicile, employment and remittances combined with 
Somali merchant desires to secure foreign exchange for direct imports, add up 
to suggest there is no reason to expect massive changes in this position of 
unofficial channelling of remittances.
Remittances are largely intra extended family via, and in part to, urban 
extended family members. These take three main forms:
a. money remitted via merchants and paid in shillings in Somalia;
b. goods (and external currency) brought back personally by immigrants on 
home visits;
c. goods smuggled as a means of evading exchange control (dominant in the 
case of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda).
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Uses are also multiple. At recipient level these include:
a. direct family support (e.g. a woman factory worker in Saudi supplementing 
an employed brother's income in Mogadishu and supporting her own children 
and their grandmother/aunt who cares for them in Kisamayo);
b. herd acquisition, expansion, rebuilding (especially important in the 
aftermath of the great drought of 1973/74);
c. acquisition of assets such as urban housing (presumptively the 1978-83 
residential construction boom was financed in large part from remittances 
or trading profits made by merchants buying their forex counterpart to 
import);
d. external investment (e.g in housing in Cairo and - probably - Italy, bank 
accounts).
A problem in defining remittances arises because reinvestment in place of 
domicile (now reportedly significant in both trade and transport in Tanzania 
and Uganda where the Somali communities foresee economic revival) is not 
strictu sensu remittance and both third country investment and external travel 
payments may be made direct without transiting Mogadishu.
From an economic point of view the chief uses are: consumer goods (including 
vehicles and spares) imports into Somalia, purchases of invisible imports 
(basically external travel) and purchases of external assets.
The economic dynamics - sketched in the main text - involve the purchase of 
forex (on the Gulf market or via the "free" inter bank account market in 
Mogadishu), the importation and distribution of goods, the financing of
housing and of shifts in livestock ownership. The share of these flows
acquired by the state is effectively limited to import duty/sales tax on
imports (if and when collected) and taxes on property/property rentals. The 
interests of revenue generation - maximum visibility of imports and thus no 
licensing restrictions on 'self financed' imports - and Fund/Bank attempts to 
rechannel remittances through the banking system - backed up by import 
licensing - conflict. As the latter simply renders visible goods imports
literally invisible for tax and other control purposes, its chief effect is to
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erode the revenue base.
A global ballpark estimate of remittances and direct external investment is 
$500 million a year since the early 1980s. Of this perhaps $300-350 million 
finances visible and $50-75 million invisible imports while $75-150 million 
represents external investment. The largest source - at least 60Í - is the 
Gulf and the second - perhaps 20Í - East Africa. Seamen and emigrants in 
Italy, the UK and Egypt are probably also significant, but much smaller, 
sources.
This estimate is - at gross level - of the order of 335& of 1985 Somali GDP as 
estimated by the World Bank or 20 to 23Í if one limits the comparison to the 
$300-350 odd million of visible imports. In addition it is reasonable to 
assume that commercial and transport GDP is underestimated by - say - 25Í of 
the value of these imports or $75-87¿ million. Thus in 1985 Remittance 
Adjustments might be of the following orders of magnitude:
GDP and GNP, 1985
TABLE 7
($ million) ($ per capita)
GDP (per World Bank) 1,516 (276)
Remittance Financed Imports 300 - 350
GDP Adjustment 75 - 87.5
'Domestic' GNP 1,891 - 1,953.5 (344-355)
External Services and
Investment from Remittances 150 - 200
GNP 2,041 - 2,153.5 (371-392)
* On 5-5 million population estimate.
The difference in per capita 'Domestic' GNP at $350 odd from GDP at $275 odd - 
together with the very low tax take and the under-estimation of milk 
production - goes far toward explaining the contrast between apparently low 
GDP and visible moderate private prosperity. (The % increase in GDP adjusted 
for milk under-estimation would be lower but its direction and significance 
would be unchanged.)
The foreign investment estimate radically alters the recorded estimate for
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savings out of GDP as - probably - does the increase in incomes related to 
imports and commerce. Instead of being 0 to negative, national savings are 
probably of the order of 10? of GDP (say 50-67? external investment and the 
rest dominated by residential and rental or speculative housing).
One puzzle is the perceived increase in consumer goods imports and 
establishments trading in them over 1985-87» despite remittances' stagnation 
or modest decline in real terms since 1984. Two possible explanations are:
1. the speculative and rental property boom peaked in 1984 and has since 
declined sharply as unlet or unsold properties have piled up on the 
market;
2. in 1984/85 q'at, the mildly narcotic leaf which until then was 
ubiquitously and visibly consumed by male Somalis, was banned. At least 
in respect to imports and open consumption (e.g. in q'at houses) this ban 
has had an impact. Up to 1984 q'at imports may have risen to $50-75, or 
even according to some conjectures $100 million, whereas as of 1987 it is 
doubtful that they reach $25 million.
Both of these shifts in consumption would tend to result in greater demand for 
and availability of consumer soft goods, electrical appliances (notably video 
and sound equipment) and automobiles.
Related Parallel Market Activities
Smuggling (of exports and return imports) and under-valuation of recorded 
exports (with return smuggling) are not related to remittances per se. 
However, they have a similar impact on GDP/GNP, import supply and external 
accounts.
Perhaps 20-25? of total livestock exports (by value) are extra-legally 
exported - to the Yemens and to Kenya in particular. This suggests an order 
of magnitude of $20 million. Frankincense and myrrh as well as hides and 
dried fish are also exported in parallel markets - perhaps up to $5 million.
Under-recording of official livestock export value has - per the IMF - run as 
high as $60 million odd. With minimum export proceed remittance requirements 
and the convergence of the Gulf and official "free" market rates the incentive 
to undervalue has declined markedly over the past two years but a substantial 
amount probably remains (particularly for external investment, luxury import, 
external travel purposes). This may be of the order of $25-35 million.
The import side of these markets cannot be differentiated from that of the 
remittance market. In East Africa both are illegal (and often multi stage 
with, e.g., Tanzania cattle dealing profits exported as cattle to Kenya and 
thence as washing powder, squashes and juices, tinned butter, etc. to Somalia) 
while elsewhere most of the transactions are legal on the export side.
If the total additional imports financed are $50 million and exports $60 
million with $12.5 million trade and transport uplift on the imports a final 
revision of national accounts (per World Bank) for 1985 might be:
TABLE 8
Recorded GDP, Estimated GNP: A Reconciliation
GDP - World Bank
Trade/Transport Sector 
Adjustments: Remittances
Parallel Marketing 
Exports
Adjusted GDP
Total 
($ 000,000) 
1,516
75 - 87.5 
12.5
60________
1,663.5 - 1,676
Per Capita 
( $ ) 
(276)
302 - 305
Remittance Financed
Imports  350 - 400
*'Domestic1 GNP 2,013.5 - 2,076 365 - 377
Remittance Financed
External Services and Investment 150 - 200
GNP 2,163.5 - 2,276 394 - 414
* Excluding invisible imports and external investment financed 
out of remittances.
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Trends: GDP, Domestic GNP, Personal Consumption
These data go far toward explaining the sharp contrast between officially 
recorded GDP levels and growth trends and observable levels and trends of 
private consumption. The former are low and slow; the latter amount to 
moderate sufficiency in the rural and modest and modestly rising prosperity in 
the urban (especially Mogadishu) sectors.
GDP has probably grown at a trend rate of 3 to k% on the government/World Bank 
coverage. 1970-79 was near or below the bottom end of this range and 1982-85 
perhaps slightly above it. The additions to GDP consequential on the 
commercial operations related to imports financed by remittances and 
production channeled to parallel exports probably grew about 6% a year - 
probably about 5% to 1975; over 8% 1975-82; under 5% 1982-85 (but with a 
makeup shift from q'at trade to more standard imports).
The remittances embodied in imports have probably grown on the order of 11Í a 
year over 1970-85. This implies 10Í a year to 1975; 12¿% or over to 1982; 5Í 
(on rising remittances per capita or rundown of short term savings abroad 
rather than on increased numbers) since 1982.
Roughly speaking this suggests that in 1985 prices the magnitudes were (in $ 
million):
1970 1985
A. Official GDP 850 1515
B. GDP Adjustment 70 160
C. Remittance Imports 80 350
D. Total 1000 2025
In terms of territorial purchasing the increase would have been somewhat less 
rapid, especially since 1975, because real (constant price) net financial 
inflows have grown under 3Í a year over 1975-85 and perhaps U to 5Í over 
1970-85. However, commodity aid has grown and fixed investment finance fallen 
within that total so that total national consumption probably has also had a 
trend growth rate of 5% a year.
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Out of that government consumption - after rising sharply over 1970-79 has 
fallen in constant price terms, collapsing in 1984 and recovering very 
partially in 1985. Therefore, private consumption has probably been rising at 
around 6% a year both for 1970-85 and over the past few years when the rise in 
the share of commodity aid and the fall in that of government consumption have 
been most marked. A 6% consumption growth rate - i.e. at least 1% per capita 
- is consistent with visual observation, the broadly perceived upward trend in 
the size and affluence of Mogadishu and the interim results available from the 
Mogadishu Household and Urban surveys.
External Accounts, Import Supplies
The 1986 external accounts (per the Somali government) show visible imports of 
$382 million, visible exports of $94 million, invisible imports of $56 
million, remittances of $35 million and factor income (interest) payable of 
$63 million. The preceding notes suggest that a substantial set of 
adjustments are needed as set out in Table 9«
The current account balance difference would be offset in the capital account 
by external investment so that the financing requirement remains unchanged - 
the remittance and parallel export economies' external transactions are 
basically balanced. The changes are in the volume of imports and the ratio of 
self (i.e. Somali) financed to total.
Excluding staple food, petroleum and aid financed investment official imports 
were of the order of $118 million. These were basically consumer goods 
(including automobiles) and contruction materials with other intermediate 
goods a small share. The remittance and parallel trade financed total - for a 
comparable range of items - totalled $350-400 or 74Í to TJ% of total imports 
of these goods. This does explain the gross discrepancy between recorded 
consumer import levels and even a casual inspection of Mogadishu shops, stalls 
and barrows.
Similarly, out of recorded visible imports of $382 only $94 million or 25% 
were financed out of official visible exports. Out of the adjusted total of 
$732-782 million, $434 to $484 million or 59Í to 62Í were financed from 
official and parallel exports and from remittances.
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TABLE 9
1986 External Current Account; Official and Probable Actual
Visible Imports ($ 000,000)
Foreign Exchange Financed - Official 103
Remittance Financed 300 - 350
Parallel Trade Financed 50
Adjusted 453 - 503
Commodity Aid Financed 140
PIP (Aid Financed Investment) 139
Total Visible Imports 732 - 782
Invisible Imports
Non Factor Services - Official 
Non Factor Services - Remittance and
Parallel Financed
56
60 - 80 
116 - 136
Total Imports Goods/Services 848 - 918
Exports
Official 94
Parallel Traded - Smuggled 35
Undervaluation 25
Adjusted Exports 155
Remittances - Official 35
Unofficial 465
Adjusted Remittances 500
Interest - Payable 63
Receivable (2)
Net interest 61
Current Account Balance - Official -370
Adjusted -205 - 275
Notes; 1. May in part be direct between external countries not 
transiting Somalia.
2. Includes external investment made in foreign country of 
domicile without actual remittance to and from Somalia 
as well as items covered in Note 1. These may total 
$100 million.
Supplementary Table: Emigrants and Remittances, Mid-1980s
TABLE 10
Location Male1
Workers
(000)
Female1
Workers
(000)
2Unemployed
(000)
Total
Workers
(000)
3Dependents
(000)
Total
(000)
Remittance Per 
Employed Workers 
( $ )
, 4 Remittances
($ 000,000)
Gulf 100 - 110 15¿ - 17¿ 30 - 40 145¿ - 162¿ 10 - 12J 155 - 175 2,500 300 - 325
East Africa 55 - 60 5 - 60 - 65 90 - 95 150 - 160 2,000 120 - 130
UK5 15 - 17¿ 21 9 17¿ - 20 7¿- 10 25 - 30 1,500 30 - 40
Italy 5 - n 2¿ 9 7¿ - 10 7¿- 10 15 - 20 1,500 12.5 ~ 17-5
Egypt 5 - n 7 9 5 - 7¿ 5 - 7¿ 10 - 15 1,500 7.5 - 12.5
Other^ 10 - 12¿ 1 - 2¿ 2¿ - 5 13¿ - 20 6¿- 10 20 - 30 750 7.5 - 15.0
Total 190 - 215 26 - 30 32¿ - 45 248¿ - 280 126¿ - 145 375 -■ 425 2,250 477.5 - 540.0
Notes:
1. Includes those employed or self-employed part (but substantial) time on a regular basis.
2. Includes fully unemployed, between jobs, adult students without substantial work income, self styled refugees.
3. Wives 65-75,000; Children 60-70,000.
4. Includes allowance for some remittances from those unemployed at any given time but not for whole year and those 
receiving refugee or other social relief in Europe/North America.
5. Includes seamen estimated at 7¿-10,000.
6. Largely Western Europe, Canada, USA.
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Supplementary Note
The 1980 Population Survey data contained in the Government of Somalia’s 1984 
Analytical Volume at first glance do not confirm the hypothesis of a large 
emigrant community dominantly (except East Africa) made up of single male 
workers. Indeed they show more males than females resident in Somalia.
Closer inspection reverses this first impression. For the age groups in which 
single male migration would be expected to be concentrated females do 
outnumber males.
If one excludes these age groups to determine the average female % in the rest 
of the population (slightly over 48¡6) and applies that to the categories 
affected to estimate net absent males the results are:
Urban 
Nomadic 
Settled Rural 
Total
23,000
53.000
35.000 
111,000
This figure again on the face of it is inconsistent with any estimate of
375,000 to 425,000 migrants. However, a rough reconciliation suggests the 
divergence is not by any means as wide as it appears to be.
Male Workers 190 - 215
Male Unemployed 21h- 40
Total Adult Males 2171- 255
Female Workers 26 - 30
Female Unemployed 5
Wives 65 - 70
Total Adult Females 96 - 105
Excess of Adult Male Migrants 1211- 150
At least the lower end of the range is of the same order of magnitude as the
111,000 1980 estimate. After 1980 (largely over 1980-82) migrants rose by 
perhaps 15/6 so that the adjusted net absent adult male estimate would be of
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the order of 127,500 which is within the range suggested by the Supplementary 
Table.
Why the population of Somalia - as surveyed - should be only slightly over k8% 
female is unclear. Because the proportion of females (except for the 
migration affected groups) is broadly stable, e.g. 48% in the 0 to 1 age 
group, higher infant and childhood mortality for females appears ruled out as 
an explanation. That - contrary to any other recorded experience - only 48% 
of Somali births are female seems very unlikely. The most plausible 
explanation would appear to be that there is systematic under-reporting of 
females (of all ages) to population survey officials - presumably for social, 
cultural or religious reasons.
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ANNEX 3 CHAPTER 1 
REFUGEES IN SOMALIA: A NOTE
The Setting
The internationally recognised and supported refugee sector in Somalia has 
deliberately been excluded from the scope of this report. This is not because 
they are not people; they assuredly are. Nor is it because they are few in 
number; the lowest quasi-official estimate is 750,000 or on the order of 15/6
of the population of Somalia excluding refugees. Nor are they foreign in the
sense of not being Somali; almost all are Somalis from the Haud and Ogaden or 
closely culturally and historically linked Moslem Oromo from the hill country 
inland of the southern Ogaden. The justification for exclusion is partly
structural and partly pragmatic:
a. the refugee camps individually and as a system are administered and
financed totally separately from Somalia;
b. the basic service and nutrition provision levels of the camps are at
least minimally satisfactory and are in any event virtually totally
separate from those of Somalia proper institutionally and in terms of 
finance;
c. the interaction between the camps and the refugees and Somalia proper and 
citizens of Somalia are broadly analagous to external border trade rather 
than to parts of the same economy.
That said, there are interactions. Because the camps have basic medical 
services and rural Somalia in many districts does not, Somalis do avail
themselves of camp facilities. To a lesser degree this applies at primary 
school level, but at secondary level the camps use (and pay for) places in the 
Somali state secondary school system.
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Truck And Barter
The nature of the goods provided to refugee households results in substantial 
"border trade" - as evidenced by shops and markets adjacent to camps and by 
refugee possession and use of goods not distributed to them. The number of 
food rations distributed probably exceeds the number of refugees. On the 
other hand, the clothing and basic household goods issued would - by 
themselves - be quite inadequate. Further the food distributed, while 
calorifically and nutritionally sound and containing items Somalis do eat, is 
not a diet any Somali household (let alone a nomadic one) would choose to eat. 
For example, it does not (for evident logistical reasons) contain milk.
Refugee households do drink milk and do store it in standard Somali artisanal 
containers. They do have torches, transistor radios, Somali caps, etc. 
Non-refugee Somalian do eat grain (especially wheat, rice), sugar, cooking oil 
initially distributed to refugees. This "border trade" - however 
bureaucratically messy - serves everyone’s interests. It allows a 
logistically handy but hardly ideally need related basket of goods for 
refugees to be part exchanged with nationals of Somalia. All parties to the 
trade perceive themselves as better off and both the UNHCR and donor 
bureaucracies have a much easier life than if they literally sought to provide 
the actual refugees' consumption basket. In this case at least, Adam Smith's 
dictum that people were rarely more innocently engaged than when they were 
busy with small scale truck and barter is applicable.
Enclaves Or Base Camps?
However, there is one respect in which the refugee camps are more integrated 
into the nomadic social and economic dynamic than is commonly realised. For a 
number of households they are a modern version of the base camp with assured 
water and food at which women and young children can be left while adolescents 
and adult males go out to earn a livelihood.
The evidence in favour of this interpretation turns on the stability of camp 
population makeup. Ten years ago and today it is dominated by married women, 
young children and the infirm or aged. Older children and adult males are 
markedly under-represented. That was a predictable pattern in 1979- Its
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continuity implies either household members linked to but living outside camps 
or large scale parthenogenesis combined with a very high 10-14 year old 
mortality rate for males and suspended animation for females from 10 to 18. 
The second alternative clearly is both implausible and counterfactual.
Apparently on the order of 250,000 adult males and older children of both 
sexes who are part of households whose other members are registered refugees 
live and work outside the camps.
What is unclear is not so much the answers to where but to how many in each 
place. The main occupations and locations are:
a. nomadic pastoralism in the Haud and Ogaden (which certainly does persist 
and feeds beasts into, e.g., the Hargeisa-Berbera distribution axis);
b. nomadic pastoralism in Somalia - perfectly feasible and known to exist 
for those refugee households whose extended families or broader social 
groups historically live in the rangelands of Somalia as well as in the 
Haud and Ogaden;
c. urban Somalia (notably Mogadishu) in wage employment. Again enough cases 
are known to suggest this is significant;
d. "over the water" in the Somali migrant worker sector of the Saudi 
economy.
To the extent the second and third places are important issues of income, 
poverty, health and education for this community have been subsumed in the 
text. This is so because, when in the rangeland or Mogadishu economy, refugee 
household members are basically indistinguishable from other Somalis. To the 
extent they are in the Haud and Ogaden or the Gulf states they do fall outside 
Somalia and Somalian public service or nutrition issues and programmes.
This analysis does not imply that the refugee population is fraudulent or 
undeserving of international support. The household members outside the camps 
do support themselves and augment camp residents' living standards. Forcing 
them to return would raise the refugee support bill and block any dynamic of 
integration into Somalia. Even more clearly forcing the 750,000 to rely
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wholly on the earnings of the 250,000 would virtually double the numbers of 
people living in absolute poverty in Somalia. Neither alternative can 
plausibly be viewed other than as grossly inferior to the status quo.
_H4-
CHAPTER 2
POVERTY IN SOMALIA
Conceptual Issues
Given the special characteristics of the Somali economy, most conventional 
types of poverty studies fail to yield meaningful results. Unfortunately past 
studies of rural poverty in Somalia fall in this category. The table below 
shows the sort of conventional approaches that will not work in Somalia and 
the sort of things we should want to see included:
TABLE 11
Poverty Estimation in Somalia: Some Constraints
Cannot Do Why
GDP in purchasing power terms Problems with estimation of
(Kravitz ratios) GDP ; GDP vs GNP
Livestock GDP 1 . Livestock stock charge is
("income”) vs crop GDP not closely linked to 
consumption or non-herd 
investment.
2. Milk underestimated
3. Valuation problem
Household budget 1 . Valuation problems
survey/common 2. Seasonal and cyclical factors
poverty line 3. Different diet and other 
consumer good use patterns
Solutions Limitations/problems
Urban: household Should capture remittances
budget survey/poverty line on income side
Rural: production Valuation problems - standard
streams plus milk/cereal and divergent crop/livestock
exchange calories prices
Should include/allow for
1. Overlap of occupational groups (within 
households/families)
2. Intra-family transfers
3. Seasonality
4. Cyclicality (drought)
GDP figures provide no clear guide to welfare or poverty levels because of the 
myriad problems discussed previously as well as because they reveal little 
about inter-household income distribution. The inclusion of herd changes
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which are not like other current income in impact on consumption or 
non-livestock investment, the undervaluation of milk production and the 
omission of remittances are major elements. Livestock GDP cannot be compared 
with crop GDP as a short-cut for comparing relative consuming power of 
pastorlists and peasants because of the above problems plus the additional one 
of the "valuation inconsistency" (see below). Any household budget survey 
also is plagued by valuation problems in comparing urban with rural areas if 
what is to be measured is either prevalence of poverty or relative consuming 
power more generally.
In urban areas a household budget survey can be used along with a properly 
defined poverty line to arrive at the per cent of poverty in the 
"conventional" manner. Even here modifications on the income side would have 
to be made for Somalia to take account of intra-urban as well as rural-urban 
intra family transfers. However, the assumption that low income households 
could not in general spend above their actual incomes would allow operating on 
the expenditure side only.
In the rural areas conventional household budget surveys will not yield 
meaningful results, unless very carefully treated, because of the 
incomparability of income figures in rural Somalia and indeed more generally 
in SSA. The reason for this is two-fold: (i) a great part of rural
consumption (and income) is household self-provisioning (subsistence) and (ii) 
different rural groups produce and consume different types of food. 
Urban/rural comparisons are bedevilled by self-provisioning alone because for 
poverty purposes - but not for normal budget studies and especially not for 
national accounts - one kilo of maize bought as maizemeal in a Mogadishu shop 
is identical to one kilo of maize grown and processed within a peasant 
household. Maizemeal costs more than maize and the "farmgate" price of maize 
is not over half the urban retail price of maize, so that equal "income" 
levels in urban and rural areas as conventionally measured imply different 
welfare levels. This can be allowed for by using a price differential.
The intra rural comparability problem in Somalia arises from the simultaneous 
existence of two factors: self-provisioning and diet differences. If’
self-provisioning (subsistence) was minimal income figures could be used for 
comparisons. If production/use patterns were similar then again income
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figures could be used. In rural Somalia both self-provisioning and different 
diet patterns are present. A numerical example should help clarify:
Nomads Farmers
Product Milk Maize
Calories 13,200 13,200
Equivalent Output 171 litres 38kg
Unit Price (Sh) 45 50
•Income1 (Sh) 7 6 5 190
We have a nomadic family and a farming family each producing just sufficient 
calories for themselves. Since milk is an expensive source of calories (4 
times as expensive as maize in the above example), nomads emerge as much
richer than farmers whereas in reality both are getting an equal number of 
calories from their production. The "valuation inconsistency" (animal 
calories cost more than cereal) becomes a "valuation fallacy" if we actually 
say that nomads are four times as rich as farmers, a mistake made in some 
studies of Somalia. A household budget survey would normally contain figures 
in shillings and if all output has been counted (self-provisioning is often 
omitted), would pose severe valuation problems. If self-provisioning output 
has been omitted, the figures would make no sense at all for estimating
poverty. The problems it is worth pointing out are encountered in virtually 
all SSA household budget survey based work. In Somalia with the
crop/livestock valuation problem superimposed on a massive scale they assume 
even greater importance.
The solution proposed is to measure production streams from nomadic and to 
farm assets (livestock and land), to value them in terms of calories and
compare that against a standard calorie requirement. As not all production is 
self-consumed allowance has to be made for the part sold or bartered. Finally 
the estimation procedure has either explicitly to take account of, or at least 
allow for, fused occupations (semi-nomads, farmer-pastoralists), intra-family 
transfers and seasonal and inter-temporal variations. The transfer problem is 
taken into account if the survey is from the consumption side. Table 1 shows 
past attempts at measuring poverty in Somalia, summarising the source of data 
and poverty line, the major problems, patterns and results.
Estimates vary so widely - from 0Í for the nomads to 70^ and to 7 5% for
the farmers - that the usual reaction would be to throw up one's hand and say
. •
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"nobody knows" or that "data are poor". The problem with poverty estimates in 
Somalia is not primarily data limitations per se, but erroneous 
conceptualisation. In the earliest studies (ILO/JASPA, IBRD) a mechanical 
procedure was used whereby an urban based poverty line was scaled down by 
assumed price differentials to apply to nomads and farmers. This is the usual 
procedure adopted in most developing countries, but, as we have been at pains 
to show, is not applicable to Somalia because the different population groups 
consume different types of foods, especially the nomads whose diet is based on 
milk. The ensuing poverty lines were then applied to a particularly 
inaccurate budget survey among nomads, farmers and townsmen._1/ The particular 
survey used is a data problem, but the conceptual problem is prior to it. In 
a later study (IFAD) the same conceptual problem is encountered in an even 
more pronounced form, where in assigning money value to nomadic and farm 
production, it was concluded that nomads were several times richer than 
farmers. This happens as we by now know, simply because nomads' diet (mostly 
milk and meat with cereal supplements) is more expensive than farmers' diet 
(mostly cereals). In Tyler's study, survey estimates of livestock numbers and 
data on acreage were converted to output (milk, meal, cereals, etc) and then 
to shillings. An attempt was made to counter the valuation problem by setting 
different poverty lines for nomads and farmers which in principle could allow 
comparability for poverty estimation purposes. In practice the adjustment was 
much too small, given the difference in diet, and the valuation problem 
remained.
Jamal steered away from putting any monetary unit values on nomadic and farm 
output. What mattered for estimating position relative to a food poverty line 
was how many calories the nomads or farmers obtained from their assets, either 
in the form of household self-provisioning or through barter or cash exchange. 
Livestock numbers were converted into milk (and meat) using production 
co-efficients and yields for lactating animals (see Annex 1 to this Chapter). 
Similarly land was converted into cereal output. Allowance was made for 
livestock owned by farmers. The figures showed that on a self-provisioning 
basis, i.e. if there was no trade or barter, the national nomadic herd was 
able to produce just enough calories for the nomads. For the farmers, cereal 
ouput in fact afforded them surplus calories. Account was then taken of the 
possibility of exchanging livestock products for cereals.2J Since the rate of 
exchange (in terms of calories) is favourable to the nomads, they could attain 
sufficiency with a much smaller herd than on a purely subsistence basis,
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especially in the South where nearby farmers have a surplus of cereals to 
sell. The modified poverty line was applied to regional herd figures. 
Similarly the farm poverty line was also applied to regional figures. Lacking 
inter-regional distributions a normal distribution was assumed. A figure of 
33% poverty was obtained among both nomads and farmers. In the North fewer 
nomads were in poverty while in the South fewer farmers fell below poverty. 
The regional distribution of food poverty among nomads was estimated as 
follows:
Among the farmers, the southern agricultural regions - Lower Shabelle, the 
Jubas and Bay - on the average lie above the poverty line. Three other 
southern regions which are basically nomadic also fall above the poverty line, 
in their case because of supplementary subsistence from livestock. Middle 
Shabelle is the only important agricultural region below the poverty line. 
What field surveys there are do raise questions, e.g. at least in drought 
periods Bay (whose agriculture is rainfed not riverain) appears to be 
distinctly worse off than other southern regions.
It is in the North that one would expect more poverty among the crop farmers; 
however most of them own large herds of animals to augment their calorie 
supplies, or are (e.g. W. Galbeed) nomadic households with a substantial crop 
component. Nonetheless, farmers in the North East (Sanag, Nugal) and North 
West (W. Galbeed, Togdheeer) comprise the largest poverty groups.
The Jamal analysis has been favourably received by subsequent authorities^/ 
with one notable exception.4/ The claim is not that it is accurate to the 
last digit or even last two digits, but that it contains conceptually the most 
meaningful way of defining food poverty in a context in which different 
sections of the population produce and consume different types of foods mostly
North
Mudug, Bari, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiraan
Sanag, Vagoeyi, W. Galbeed
Nugal
Togdheer
South
Bay, Bakool, Middle Shabelle, both Jubas 
Lower Shabelle
5%
25%
50%
75%
40%
75%
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on a household self-provisioning basis. There are many assumptions that go 
into this kind of analysis and hence only orders of magnitude should be 
scrutinised. The two findings that stand out from the Jamal study are: (i)
there is similar amount of poverty among farmers and nomads in normal years, 
(ii) poverty among both is much lower than previously estimated. The Jamal 
estimates, it may be noted, were in terms of food poverty. If anything, they 
are higher than area sample survey malnutrition data; but at least they are 
closer to reality than any higher estimates.
Some of the critical assumptions made in the study may be noted:
(i) Coefficients used in converting from livestock numbers and acreage 
to production streams;
(ii) Intra-regional livestock and crop distribution;
(iii) Distribution of livestock and crops between nomads and farmers;
(iv) Extent and terms of exchange.
No "data" are available on any of the above, so it is pointless to claim the 
figures are "right", or to look for evidence to prove them "wrong" albeit 
collection of sample data to produce better estimates would be desirable. The 
only test is whether the assumptions made were realistic and that the story 
they tell is consistent with qualitative observation and sample studies using 
different approaches to estimating malnutrition.
A discussion of the coefficients used in arriving at milk production, the 
critical rural output, appears as Annex 1 to this Chapter. Intra-regional 
distribution had to be assumed. As for nomad/farmer breakdown, the assumption 
made was that agricultural families owned one third as much livestock as 
nomads. This is a fairly standard assumption but moderate alterations in the 
ratio would not significantly alter the broad conclusions. Many nomads also 
grow crops on a regular or intermittent basis and it is believed that the 
extent of this is increasing. In the Jamal study no allowance was made for 
nomadic cultivation. This is a shortcoming of the study in that overlap of 
sectorally defined occupational groups is not fully taken into account. 
Similarly intra-family transfers were not accommodated because of lack of any
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basis for estimation and because they do not usually literally take the form 
of food. Given the state of knowledge and the lack of baseline surveys, 
rough-and-ready figures are all that are possible. To pretend to exactitude 
is likely to result in being exactly wrong. Later an attempt is made to 
indicate in which direction the estimate would go if other factors were 
brought into consideration.
Perhaps the most crucial factors - excluding weather - in nomadic poverty are 
the extent and terms of exchange of livestock products for cereals. Trends in 
these have implications of seasonal poverty as well as for inter-temporal 
poverty. In most normal years nomads market around 25% of their small stock 
in addition to lower proportions of cattle and camels. With part of the 
proceeds they buy grains and basic consumer goods. The terms of exchange are 
extremely and increasingly favourable to the nomads. From information 
gathered in Baidoa in April 1987 one goat could buy around 100 kg of cereals. 
Thus a rate of exchange is 1 meat calorie for 9 cereal calories.5/ Fourteen 
goats over the year should buy enough cereals to feed an average size family 
(6 members) on cereals alone. Thus animals represent a great store of wealth 
for the nomads.
The other form of exchange the nomads participate in is milk against cereals. 
This exchange may be transacted for cash or in kind. Again the terms of 
exchange are favourable for the nomads: 1 milk calorie for 5-10 cereal
calories, depending on the season. Thus data collected in Baidoa and Kisimayo 
markets in April 1987 (dry season) suggested that \ litre of milk will buy 1 
kg. of maize. This is a calorie rate of exchange of 1:9. During the wet 
season the price of milk drops to one-half of its dry-season level, whereas 
the price of cereals declines much less - by one-quarter or so: a rate of 
exchange of 1:6. The nomads then have much less need for cereals but exchange 
is still heavily weighted in their favour. What is important, however, is to 
notice the counteracting trends in the terms of exchange and in milk 
production. In the dry season milk output falls to one-third of the peak 
season output. At the same time the terms of trade improve, partially 
counteracting the output decline. However, with the fall in milk output, the 
nomads are less able - or willing - to part with their milk, because of their 
innate preference for a milk-based diet. Thus milk/cereal exchange, more 
favouable though it is in the dry season, would not fill the calorie gap. At 
this time the nomads increase their sale of animals to bridge the hungry
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season.
The asymmetrical nature of the livestock-grain exchange has an important 
bearing on the limits of exchange. As each livestock calorie buys several 
grain calories, the nomads would in theory always be willing to exchange. In 
practice they would do so only within the confines of their basic preference 
for milk. The farmers on the other hand could afford to exchange only if they 
have more grains than their basic calorie needs as otherwise they would be 
pushing themselves into a food deficit. This discussion assumes all nomadic 
milk sales are to farmers and none to urban areas. Altering this assumption 
does not affect the conclusions as to nomadic household food availability. It 
does increase the residual farmer calorie (grain) surplus available for sale 
to urban areas.
This suggests a regional pattern to seasonal poverty: in the south farms are 
bigger and yields higher, hence farmers usually produce a surplus of grains 
above their requirements. Thus southern nomads have a better chance of 
finding partners in the milk/cereal exchange than their northern counterparts. 
However here we recall that the northern nomads have bigger herds (and at 
least in W. Galbeed/Mudug more undertake cereal production), so that their 
need for exchange is more limited. In the North-West (W.Galbeed, Nugal and 
Togdheer) herds are smaller than elsewhere in the North, but at the same time 
farming is well established, thus creating both a greater need and greater 
possibility of exchange.
A different form of anti-seasonal measure is for nomads to buy up grain with 
their suplus milk during the wet season. The potential for this should be 
great both on the nomad's and farmer's sides. This probably happens, again 
more in the farming areas than in the Central and North Eastern regions. 
However, the carrying capacity of nomadic household's camels does limit the 
potential for holding seasonal grain reserves. A further constraint may be 
that nomadic households on the wet season pasture and water frontier may not, 
in practice, be close to farmers.
The discussion above suggests that the dry season for nomads within reach of 
farming areas may not spell the catastrophe that is suggested by casual 
reading of the coefficients of milk production of one-third their peak level. 
And mobility - or the search for survival - being the definition of nomadism,
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nomads must always try to position themselves near sources of grain as well as 
of water and pasture during the dry season. While not minimising the real 
hardship suffered by the nomads during the dry season, these points need 
bearing in mind.
Over the years it would appear that the terms of exchange have moved further 
in favour of the nomads. Among the reasons for this are the divergent trends 
in livestock and farm outputs - livestock output per capita has been falling 
nationally and per nomadic household has probably been stagnant, while grain 
output per capita has been constant or increasing (see Annex 2 to this 
Chapter). Other factors have reinforced these trends. The livestock sector 
went through boom conditions following the oil price boom. This affected both 
export and domestic prices. In the grain market, correspondingly, grain 
imports - especially from 1983 on - depressed domestic prices. While the 
earlier year grain price figures are often somewhat unreal, being official 
ones (when most grain by-passed these channels) correcting would in fact 
increase the trend terms of trade shift in favour of the livestock and milk 
sellers.
The upshot of these trends was that although the nomads' calorie production 
per household was stagnant or declined their terms of trade and - thus - real 
incomes improved. Increase in grain production facilitated these trends and 
was indeed a necessary condition for them. Thus nomadic diets now are 
believed to include substantially greater proportions of cereals than was the 
case in the past. Exchange ratios and growing familiarity with grains have 
been factors responsible for this.
Urban Poverty
Jamal had also made estimates of urban poverty in 1975, using adjusted figures 
from the household budget survey of that year. Here we shall update these 
estimates using preliminary results from the household budget survey of 
19 8V 8 5 . The procedure is to establish a poverty line and apply it against 
the consumption distribution in the household survey.
As the greatest part of poor people's consumption consists of food, the most 
important category in a poverty line is the weight given to food expenditure.
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Table 13 shows the costing of two food baskets providing 2,200 calories per 
day, the FA0/WH0 requirement. Basket A is composed of 75 per cent of the 
calories from cereals and beans, and the rest from oil, sugar, etc., no 
allowance being made for livestock products, while basket B is somewhat less 
austere, with livestock being substituted for some of the cereals and beans. 
The more austere basket probably corresponds to that most likely consumed at 
the bottom end of the urban market, while basket B would correspond to what 
may be called the "average consumption pattern" in urban Somalia. The 
apportionment among the three major cereals and beans is by and large in 
accordance with relative prices and preferences, with wheat in the dominant 
place, rice second, and maize and beans third. The costing is based on 
average prices prevailing in Mogadishu in 1984/85 as obtained from the 
household budget survey.6/
The daily cost of the minimum diet (basket A) for an average person would come 
to Sh. 26.41. For a family of 6.3 (the household budget survey average) on a 
proportionate basis, the cost would be Sh. 166. Basket B shows the cost of 
readjusting the diet, as one would do at higher income levels. By increasing 
livestock intake in place of cereals and beans an extra expenditure of Sh. 16 
per day would be incurred. In the opposite direction savings could be made by 
including even more cereals in place of fruit and vegetables. Still, the 
limits are clear. A basket costing Sh. 26 per capita per day probably defines 
the barest minimum basket at 1984/85 prices and the Sh. 43 one an average 
basket. For purposes of estimating poverty we shall use the costing of basket 
A.
In addition to food, the family would have to incur certain other 
non-discretionary expenditures. Estimates are shown below (Sh. per family per 
month):
TABLE 12 Urban Poverty Line Estimate, 1984/5
Clothinga Rentb Fuel, light, water0 Food Total
400 850 750 4,990 6,990
a. Equivalent to 2\ yds of cloth per month
b. 3-4 room house in outlying areas
c. Three bags of charcoal plus kerosene and water charges
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Costing of Two Food Baskets at Household Budget Survey (1984/85) Prices
(2,200 calories per day: Shillings)
TABLE 13
Price Calories Price Per Basket A Basket B
per kg. per kg. 1,000 Composition Cost Composition Cost
calories
Wheat
Flour
/—* 
'%
o 
o 
• 
•
o 
o
11.40 25 6.27 25 6.21
Rice 11.40 20 5.02 15 3-76
Maize
)
29.7 ) 
)
27.0 )
3,500
8.49 15 2.80 5 0.93
Beans 7.71 15 2.54 10 1.70
Meat 100.0 2,000 50.00 - - 12 13.20
Milk 31.3 775 40.32 - - 8 7.10
Oil 91.0 8,750 10.40 12 2.75 12 ' 2.75
Sugar 40.0 3,545 11.28 9 2.23 9 2.23
Fruit 
and veg. 30.0 550 54.55 4 4.80 4 4.80
26.Ml 42.74
Note: Based on prices as revealed in the Mogadishu household
budget survey of 1984/85
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Average Wage, Cost of Living Index, Real Wage 
and Minimum Food Basket Cost, Selected Years, 1970-1986
TABLE 14
£
1970 1974 1977 1978 1980 1984 1986
Average wage (Sh.p.a.)
1Industry 3 900 4 800 6 168 7 272 8 000 20 000 30 000
2Government 5 160 6 000 5 640 6 600 7 300 14 000 18 000
3Average 4 284 5 160 6 000 7 068 7 790 18 200 26 400
iiCost of living index ' 100 120 184 202 399 1 854 3 470
Real income (1970 terms)
Wage earner nominal 4 284 4 229 3 261 3 499 1 952 982 761
Wage earner take-home 3 984 3 876 2 863 3 041 1 645 575 440
Memo item (Current Prices)
Minimum food basket cost
requirement (Sh.p.a.)^ 2 170 3 200 4 826 4 290 6 220 48 000 65 030
* Coverage of allowances partial to negligible.
1 Includes industries run by autonomous agencies and private firms in
industry and commerce. Private sector data coverage, accuracy 
problematic.
2 Based on data provided by Ministry of Finance, civil service lists.
3 Estimated by giving a weight of 0.7 to industry group.
4 Based on national sources, with splicing.
5 Calculated by applying prevailing tax rates to the average wage (see
Jamal 1981, table E.1).
6 1984 basket set at Sh 48,000 based on 1984/85 basket (Table 13).
Other years obtained by applying the food price index.
Sources: 1970-1980 from Jamal 1981, table 17. 1984 and 1986 wage, mission
estimate, government wages based on trends in civil service pay. Cost
of living index from official sources.
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This minimum income is set against the income distribution of the household 
budget survey. A simple calculation shows that 17Í of the population fell 
below the poverty threshold. Although this figure is higher than that 
estimated in Jamal for 1977, it must still be considered remarkably low, 
compared to other African countries, and vindicates our visual impression of
limited incidence of abject poverty in urban Somalia.7 / Slum areas are
limited in extent and obvious signs of malnutrition even more so.8/ The
estimates are corroborated by preliminary results from a CIIR-UNICEF-OXFAM 
study of urban poverty conducted over 1 9 8 6 - 8 7 by a team headed by Rick Davies. 
Using the same food poverty line as here (basket A) it was estimated that in 
the Waaberi district of Mogadishu, 7% of household had income below the food 
poverty line in Nov. 1 9 8 6 .9/ Adding the nonfood needs would push the figure 
to the 17% level estimated here for 1984/85.
These findings are surprising because of the "wage puzzle". Wages have fallen 
drastically in real terms over the last 16 years yet the per cent of 
households in poverty remains low. This paradoxical situation constitutes 
additional circumstantial proof of the extent of remittances in the economy.
Between 1970 and 1986, the overall average wage increased at the most,
sixfold. Enterprise sector wages did somewhat better, increasing 7.7-fold. 
In the meantime prices increased 35-fold. The average real wage fell to 18Í 
of its level 16 years previously. Most of the decline came after 1978. Up to 
then, prices only doubled (annual inflation rate: 9.2Í p.a.). The wage was 
then still sufficient to buy the minimum basket (set at 1.4 times the food 
basket). After that (1 9 7 8-8 6 ) prices increased about 17-fold while the wage 
increased 3 .7-fold. In 1986 the average wage - at least as reported - would 
have bought just around 30Í of the minimum needs (food as well as non-food, 
again set at 1.4 times the food basket) of an average family - or to put it 
even more dramatically just 12 days supply of the most basic food. Even this 
comparison is substantially better than the actual situation, because it is 
based on using gross pay. At the level of income shown for 19 8 6, a wage 
earner was expected to pay by way of the development levy and ordinary income 
tax something like 50 per cent of his income in taxes. Most wage earners in 
the private sector almost completely escaped this; the civil servants were not 
so lucky. Per contra both sectors received substantial cash allowances 
neither included in the wage statistics nor taxed.
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Such wage trends should on the face of it have affected the "informal 
sector"10/ incomes, too, as wage earners are usually the best customers of the 
petty traders. We should, therefore,have expected to see a massive increase 
in poverty. This did not happen because (a) wages became a small part of 
total family income and/because (b) remittances increased. Most wage earners 
themselves have moved into secondary jobs in their spare time, while most 
families have become multi-occupational families. Without remittances this 
kind of diversification would not be enough to explain the poverty paradox, 
because given stagnating formal urban sector incomes, an increase in 
"informal" activities would have largely signified work-sharing. Thus the 
answer to the poverty puzzle in Somalia is not provided by the vitality of the 
informal sector per se, but rather by the injection of remittance money. 
Remittances fostered the increase in informal sector activities and ensured 
its viability.
Perspectives
We have in the foregoing estimation and analysis disputed several previous 
analyses of the Somali economy. The conclusion we reach is that most Somali 
households are better off than hitherto believed. This is a relative position 
- relative to past estimates of welfare. One should not jump to the 
conclusion that most of the Somali people are absolutely well off. The 
argument can be set out in a tabular form (see Table 15).
In the previous analyses of poverty in Somalia the nomads and farmers were 
judged to be extremely poor. This result arose from comparing town-based 
poverty lines, or more specifically from trying to compare income levels in 
towns versus countryside. Carefully done this is a valid procedure; 
mechanically done it yields spurious results. By measuring consumption levels 
attained by the various sections of the population we find less poverty than 
previously estimated. Yet the fact that we find one-third of the rural 
population likely to be in food poverty must be cause for great concern. 
Moreover, there is the seasonal factor for nomads and the ever-present danger 
of drought for both nomads and farmers.
Estimates of Poverty (Late 1970s/Early 1980s
TABLE 15
Source of data Poverty line Problems Poverty incidence %
Nomads Farmers Urban
ILO/JASPA, 1978 
(Hopkins)
Middle Shabelle 
Survey and JASPA p.l.
JASPA's Urban- 
p.l. scaled down 
for rural price 
differentials.
Middle Shabelle 
survey flawed.
Urban p.l. cannot 
be applied to rural
49 67 42
IBRD, 1978 (Hicks) Same as ILO/JASPA JASPA As with ILO/JASPA 70 70 42
IFAD, 1979 (Haaland 
Keddeman)
Livestock census 
and acreage data 
converted to Shs.
Single monetary 
poverty line 
for nomads and 
farmers.
Valuation fallacy 0 75 no est.
Jamal, 1981 
(ILO/JASPA)
L/s census and acreage 
data plus national 
accounts converted to 
calories. 1977 HBS 
for urban.
Calorie poverty 
line for nomads 
and farmers. Urban 
on minimum basket.
Co-efficients used. 
Does not address 
seasonality.
33 34 5-7
Tyler, 1 9 8 3  
(WCARRD)
Micro-level livestock 
and acreage data 
converted to products 
and then to Shs.
Monetary poverty 
lines partially 
based on dietic 
differences.
Co-efficients. 
Poverty lines 
inappropriate as 
baskets and prices 
eccentric.
51 40 no est.
i
Ui
00
1
Hopkins, M. J. 
Hicks, N. L. 
IFAD
Jamal, V. 
Tyler,
Somalia and Basic Needs; Some Issues, World Employment Programme Research Working Paper No. 
3-32/WP.8. ILO, Geneva.
Poverty and Basic Needs in Somalia (mimeo)
Alternative figures based on using the Middle Shabelle Survey are also available: 39-72Í 
poverty among nomads, 30-70JÍ among farmers, depending on whether price differential is 
applied or not and whether first or second round of the survey is used.
Nomads, Farmers and Townsmen: Incomes and Inequality in Somalia. ILO Working Paper, JASPA, 
Addis Ababa.
Case Study on Rural Poverty FAO: Rome, WCARRD indepth studies No.7, 1983*
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In the urban areas too we find food poverty to be much less than hitherto 
believed. Even minimum-needs poverty is probably below 20%. Here there are 
no major qualifying perspectives, albeit the seasonal swings in food prices 
may affect calorie intake intra-year. If anything, the qualifications work in 
the direction of less poverty than calculated because of intra-family 
transfers.
We also bring into consideration two perspectives which have a bearing on 
welfare and one by which we may evaluate the current standard of living. 
Welfare consists not only of consumption of material goods, but also of social 
goods - health, education. These contribute to ability to produce, to the 
enjoyment of life as well as to its prolongation. From this angle the 
situation in Somalia must be judged to be extremely poor, even by SSA country 
standards. Worse still, social services are extremely unevenly distributed, 
with Mogadishu the dominant beneficiary. A great part of the private wealth 
too is concentrated here.
The way the latter comes about sheds some further light on the 
non-conventionality of the economy of Somalia compared to many other African 
countries. In the latter, great regional inequality would usually be held up 
as a sign of exploitation. The argument would run as follows: the nomadic 
sector is the driving force of the economy in terms of exports. Government 
has squeezed this sector, extracting surplus through various means, such as 
marketing board surpluses, export taxes and "exchange-rate taxation”.11/ The 
model would be the usual Sub-Saharan African country export-squeeze model. 
The fact is this model does not apply in Somalia. There are no marketing 
boards, limited export taxes, and, with livestock transactions being conducted
at essentially free-market exchange rates, no question of exchange-rate
taxation. There are a number of fees and exactions - perhaps 20% of export 
value - but this is low by SSA standards. Given that perhaps two-thirds of 
livestock sales are domestic, any attempt to achieve a tighter squeeze would 
divert sales from the export to the domestic market (as well as increasing 
smuggling). It is difficult even to establish exploitation by the domestic 
middlemen - the dilaals. The notion that Somali nomads might be exploited by 
unscrupulous dealers comes from another "model” from elsewhere in SSA, that at 
least on the face of it does not apply in Somalia. This is the model of the
nomad as an ignorant and innocent being whose plight for survival is
constantly exploited by a small group of powerful dealers. Those who know
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Somali society well do not subscribe to this model of the nomad, nomadic 
plight or nomadic economy. From visits to the rural areas and discussion with 
knowledgeable people one could find no evidence of nomads involuntarily 
liquidating their stocks of animals to secure their supplies of grain, even 
during the height of droughts. Indeed, if anything, animals which could have 
been sold were held until they died - presumably either by misjudgement of 
short term pasture prospects or a belief that the death rate would be 
independent of the number of beasts kept so that a larger initial herd would 
result in more survivors. Neither could one establish any evidence of 
exploitation. The nomads bring their animals to the market and sell them to 
one of the many dilaals present. For a camel costing Sh 35-35,000 the dilaal 
keeps a commission averaging Sh.400. The commission is always per animal and 
not ad valorem. In return the dilaal provides an important service - quick 
sale. The nomad can take his money, buy his essential goods in the market and 
get on his way, leaving the dilaal to locate his own customer in his own time.
The actual exporters probably do make large profits. These however would 
appear to be largely on the use of the proceeds to import consumer goods 
primarily for sale on urban markets. Therefore, arguably even this does not 
represent urban exploitation of nomads. The real question here turns on how 
high a proportion of true export receipts are "hidden" by under-declaration. 
If it is over 20% revision of the view that the export (as opposed to the 
domestic) market for livestock is free of oligopsonistic exploitation would be 
required.
There is no doubt that most nomadic surplus has been invested in Mogadishu and 
other towns. But this has happened not through exploitation but voluntary 
action. The mechanism should not be too difficult to understand. The nomads 
by definition have a limited need for money, mostly to buy food, clothing, 
utensils and a few other portable goods. When the boom came in livestock 
prices, they did not respond (indeed could not) by increasing their off-take 
(the classic supply-response model) but rather took the boom as a windfall 
gain, marketing their animals as need arose. The surplus of liquid assets was 
largely invested in urban real estate. The benefits of this went to nomads' 
children and relatives in the short term and to themselves when they move to 
the cities which is a frequent end result. Thus we get quite a different 
perspective to the question of regional distribution. This takes some sting 
off the usual demand for redressal of the situation. Certainly the Government
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should do much more to provide basic services to the nomads, but we should not 
expect to see across the board narrowing of the visible goods consumption 
gaps.
Finally, we restate the concept of "economic development". The real tragedy 
of Somalia’s recent experience is that while the country - and especially 
Mogadishu - went through boom conditions, it did not develop, either in the 
sense of building up new production sectors or of strengthening public 
services. The vital statistics, e.g. infant and child mortality rate, 
prevalence of infectious diseases, at best barely improved and many have 
worsened; the infrastructure decayed; the industrial sector declined. The 
country went into a private consumption spending spree, and one based on 
genuine incomes not household borrowing, but unfortunately spending sprees 
never provide the basis for long-term development, especially when they are 
largely limited to private consumption including urban residential housing and 
passenger vehicles.
Different Approaches to Nutrition Estimation
As shown in Annex 2 to this Chapter, national production and import grain data 
are the least shaky general data available in respect to nutritional levels in 
Somalia. Unfortunately, as indicated above they cannot measure (as opposed to 
help allow reasonable hypotheses about) intra-rural trade and diet patterns, 
nutritional distribution around mean levels (by household, let alone or for 
children and mothers) nor be used to estimate seasonal and cyclical (drought) 
fluctuations around national averages. These are, to be blunt, grave 
shortcomings. Equally grave, existing direct nutritional survey micro data 
are very far from plugging the gaps, although some suggestive evidence exists.
A Survey of Existing Evidence
Estimates of probable malnutrition levels in Somalia range from 25% to 75% 
nationally and from 0% to 100% for most major groups (i.e. nomads, settled 
agriculturalists, fisherfolk, and urban residents). All appear to be based 
either on national calorie estimates, pure conjecture, or small samples. 
Estimates based on extrapolation from surveys suggest 15% to 20% rural and
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TABLE 16
Borama District Nutrition Estimates 
Daily Calorie Intake Based on Standard 7-Pay Diet in the Dry Season
Pastoralist Agriculturalist
Male 2,000 cal. 2,500 cal.
Adult
Female 1,400 cal. 1,800 cal.
Male 1,300 cal. 1,500 cal.
Child
Female 1,000 cal. 1,300 cal.
Source: Borama District PHC Programme Dietary Survey
Debraweyn Area, (1983), p.2.
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somewhat lower urban child malnutrition rates, of which not more than 5% would 
fall in the severe category (third degree). These are quite low by SSA 
standards, even if in absolute terms they are distressingly and unacceptably 
high. Anthropomorphic data appear consistent with these estimates. Small 
sample measurements suggest not over 20/£ evidence of malnutrition. However, 
one WHO study diverges radically, estimating wasting in 12 to 23 month old 
children in 1983 at 62Í, by far the highest in SSA, and one and a half times 
that estimated for Ethiopia - a result which appears rather unlikely.
A standard problem with anthropomorphic data in SSA applies to Somalia. There 
is no reference group of well fed Somali children from which to measure 
deviations. As Somalis can readily be seen to be relatively tall, slim 
people, the reference groups used may result in exaggerating weight-age 
shortfalls, underestimating height-age shortfalls and significantly 
overstating weight-height shortfalls.
Under normal conditions most nutritional related diseases are notably rare in 
Somalia. They do appear in significant numbers during severe droughts, e.g. 
1987 in seriously affected districts. These include scurvy, kwashiorkor, 
marasmus and night blindness. Vitamin A deficiency and riboflavin deficiency 
symptoms are only moderately more common. However, anaemia among pregnant 
women and nursing mothers is widespread, affecting a majority and jeopardising 
mother and child immediate and long term health, and in some cases, life.
It is reasonable to suppose that there are significant seasonal fluctuations 
in calorie intake - especially for nomads (whose basic food - milk - is much 
less plentiful in the dry season) and secondarily for urban residents who face 
seasonally higher food prices (exacerbated now and for about 15 years to come 
because Ramadhan comes during the long dry season). The scanty evidence 
available apparently bears out this hypothesis. For example, a 1983 
dry-season calorie intake estimate in Borama District in Audal Province (then 
part of West Galbeed) for nomadic households shows 2,000 calories for adult 
males and 1,400 for adult females and 1,300 for male and 1,000 for female 
children - very significantly under the 2,000 plus calorie per person average 
usually specified as the "food poverty line". For settled agriculturalists, 
the respective intake figures were 2,500 and 1,800 for adults and 1,500 and 
1 , 3 0 0  for children, suggesting an average much closer to, albeit still 
somewhat below the "food poverty line". The main problem with this survey is
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that while it attempted to record actual food intake, experienced UNICEF 
personnel present in the district at the time believe it under-estimated milk 
consumption of nomads.
Similarly it can be predicted that drought will increase malnutrition. A 
USAID study's preliminary results for two nomadic provinces and one rainfed 
agricultural and nomadic province in 1987 show 19$ to 26Í malnutrition (not in 
fact radically above most other survey data albeit much of that relates to 
1 9 8 3 which was also a drought year in some provinces, though not West 
Galbeed). It is important to note that the rainfed agricultural districts 
showed the highest levels of malnutrition. The USAID survey also showed 
markedly higher levels of nutritional related disease symptoms - especially of 
Vitamin A deficiency (likely in Somalia to be associated with low milk intake) 
- than most other studies. Incipient scurvy, marasmus, night blindness and 
kwashiorkor were all present - not massively but at higher levels than in 
previous WHO and other normal weather period surveys. Premlinary results of a 
UNICEF 1987 study in Middle Shabelle suggest significant - but probably under 
25% - malnutrition among riverine agricultural community children but
significantly higher rates among nomadic household children. These results 
may arise from two factors pertaining to the period of the survey: the
Shabelle River had been full for months from transborder flows so that the 
late rains probably did not significantly affect agriculture; and most of the 
nomads in the sample were camping near roads, exhausted and dispirited after 
long migrations having lost all or most of their animals. These nomads would 
be expected to exhibit high rates of malnutrition and to be atypical of the 
nomadic population as a whole.
These data on balance would seem to confirm that malnutrition - especially of 
children - is significant but not at catastrophic levels in Somalia. The most 
serious general condition is anaemia among pregnant women and nursing mothers. 
They also seem to confirm that significant seasonal and cyclical fluctuations 
exist with both pastoralists and rain fed agriculturalists significantly 
affected. That is the most that can be said with any confidence because the 
data are sketchy, incomplete and not always adequately dated as to month or 
specific weather context.
Secular nutrition trend estimates are even more problematic. Over 1970-86 
Somalia's per capita calorie production has fallen perhaps '[% a year - largely
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in milk and largely at the expense of those who purchase or barter to obtain 
it. On the other hand grain and sugar imports (and domestic fish consumption) 
have risen more rapidly than population so that overall calorie availability 
has, if anything, improved. Because consuming power per capita has risen - 
especially since 1977 - through the influx of remittances, it appears unlikely 
that food poverty incidence has increased, and plausible that it has fallen. 
In the short term this secular stability seems likely to persist. In the 
medium term it may, but the sustaining of domestic output and commodity aid 
food imports, is more problematic beyond the early 1990s.
Toward Baseline Data
The bottom line of the problem of assessing nutritional adequacy, inadequacy, 
seasonality, cyclicality and distribution in Somalia is that no baseline data 
exist in reliable, comparable, comprehensive form. To collect them would 
require a major exercise involving perhaps 21,000 observations over a week 
period for seven specific groups at three specific times, i.e. 1,000 per group 
per time.
The seven groups are pure nomadic (e.g. Mudug), nomadic with substantial 
associated crop production (e.g. West Galbeed), settled agricultural or agro 
pastoral in a riverine setting (e.g. Middle Shabelle), rainfed agricultural 
and agro pastoral (e.g. Bay), small town (e.g. Baidoa or Jowhar), secondary 
city (Hargeisa or Kisamayo), and metropolis (Mogadishu). Each sample should 
be limited to households of the type specified - mixed samples will not 
produce reliable differentiations among diet, average nutrition levels or 
distribution of nutrition among different groups. A desirable eighth sample 
would be fisherpeople - preferably from an isolated village or small town, 
e.g. Hobyo or Brava because those of Kisamayo, Berbera and Mogadishu are 
probably almost all above the poverty and especially the food poverty line. 
Few, if any, areas are pure examples of any of these categories (see Table 
17). Thus district surveys cannot yeild estimates for any of them and if so 
interpreted will confuse users.
Family
Type of 
Population
Population P 
Population PU
Population PA 
Population PAU 
Population A 
Population AU 
Population U
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TABLE 17
Economic Production Styles in the Northwest, 1980 
(West Galbeed/Audal)
Definition
Families living exclusively from 
pastoral nomadism: stock breeding
Families partly living from pastoral 
nomadism but with certain members 
permanently resident in town
Families living from pastoralism 
and agriculture
Families living from pastoral nomadism, 
agriculture and urban activities
Families living exclusively from 0.5%
agriculture
Families living from agriculture 0.5$
and urban activities
Urban families, having neither agricultural 66% 
nor stock breeding interests
Population
Involved
10$
6%
1%
Source: Northwest Region Agricultural Development Project;
Feasibility Study & Technical Assistance Report No. 9, p. 29, 
Ministry of Agriculture, (Mogadishu, 1981).
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The observations are needed for each group for: a.) a plentiful food season 
period (probably August or September); b.) a 'hungry month' before the main 
rains in a year in which the previous fall rains did not fail (i.e. April);
c.) a 'hungry month' after poor or failed fall rains and failed or late main 
rains (i.e. May or June). The first two should give a basis for assessing 
seasonal nutritional factors and the third for getting some grasp on the 
cyclical (drought) impact.
Two sets of observations either "b" or "c" plus "a" can be taken in year one 
and the other - given typical weather patterns - in year two (although it 
might need to be delayed to year three if two good or two bad weather years 
come in succession). The basic observations needed are week long recording of 
actual food consumption of households and their members. In addition it would 
be desirable to collect anthropomorphic data and perhaps simple observational 
medical data on probable nutrition related diseases.
Such an exercise would require careful pre-planning, including examination of 
the most appropriate feasible sampling techniques (possibly stratified random 
cluster sampling), means of recording, precise questions/observations and 
means of training, supervising and remunerating the Somali enumerational staff 
(ideally from or with some knowledge of the communities they are to observe).
The total cost of design, training, materials, mobility (transport), 
remuneration, processing, analysis and reproduction would probably be over 
$500,000 and possibly up to $1,000,000. This is a large sum but not larger 
than the total already sunk in ad hoc surveys which do not and can never add 
up to a systematic baseline.
Absolute Poverty Level Estimation
Estimation of broader absolute poverty levels and incidence in Somalia is even 
more difficult for several reasons. First the number and accuracy of income 
and consumption sample studies is limited (and again many are not dated 
precisely enough to assess seasonal or cyclical impact). Further, life styles 
differ markedly among the settled agricultural, nomadic and urban groups.
The settled agricultural group's life styles do not appear to be radically
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divergent from those elsewhere in SSA. They may therefore be comparable
relatively easily. However, the nomadic community uses very few soft and
almost no hard consumer goods (e.g. torches, improved containers, radios)’ even
when households clearly could afford them (and do invest in urban houses and
gold jewellery). In part this relates to the problems of frequent moves and
the carrying capacity of camels, but, even within the limits this imposes,
there appears to be a certain degree of chosen simplicity and austerity.
Paradoxically, this does not represent any aversion to consumption as such.
Nomads do invest in cities - including in houses to which they presumably
intend to retire. They send family members to relatives in cities and
*
themselves move to them to set up urban households. Once in an urban context 
their consumption - and housing - patterns become urban.
The urban consumption pattern - especially in Mogadishu - is not quite typical 
of SSA. It includes more imported and less domestic consumer goods (partly a 
reflection of availability), a more limited range of hard consumer goods, less 
alcohol, rather different (for historic and climatic reasons) styles of 
housing. But the prominent place held by clothing, shoes, electrical goods, 
automobiles, cigarettes and amenity foods appears fairly standard. Fuller 
data will be available when the Mogadishu Household Budget Survey and the 
Oxfam-CIIR-UNICEF Mogadishu poverty study are fully analysed, revised and 
available for use.
Transfer Payments
A final complication is transfers within extended families and within broader 
kinship or social groups. These are substantial, complex and virtually 
unquantified. They appear to be much more significant and enduring (even 
growing) than in most other SSA economies and societies.
The most important is remittances from family members outside Somalia. These 
are in large part within households. But a substantial proportion go beyond 
that to extended family members, e.g. a woman working in a Saudi factory who 
remits regularly to her brother in domestic service in Mogadishu (but not to 
two better-off brothers and a married sister), and to her mother (aunt?) for 
herself and for the remitter's children who live with her in Kisamayo.
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Remittances tend to have a built-in rural to urban transfer effect. Most are 
initially to relatives in urban areas (to whom the merchant/broker can readily 
deliver them) and when transmitted to ultimate rural beneficiaries a 
proportion usually remains with the urban relative. Other rural to urban 
transfers include housing investment (and putting in urban relatives as free 
tenants/caretakers) and other savings. Less important ones include dried meat 
and ghee.
Urban to rural transfers take two main forms - cash to the rural family member 
in the rural area (the less important) and moving of rural household members 
or households to urban areas where they receive housing, cash, food, clothes 
and/or employment from already established urban relatives. Similar transfers 
exist among extended family members with sharply divergent income levels 
within urban areas but are probably less quantitatively significant.
Two particular types of urban to rural transfers within urban areas deserve 
special mention. The first is that children of nomadic households (and to a 
lesser extent settled agricultural households) live with urban relatives to 
attend school. Indeed this must account for the bulk of nomadic group 
enrollment which is thus mixed up with urban. The majority (perhaps 80%) of 
this group are male as (perhaps less markedly) are the majority of rural older 
children and young adults living with urban relatives while seeking urban or 
'over the water' employment opportunities.
The second is a response to cyclical disasters. During and after severe 
droughts, large numbers of nomadic women and younger children (as well as, 
probably, older girls) are placed with urban relatives to reduce demands on 
limited food and water supplies. When the rains return - or in extreme cases 
when savagely depleted herds have been partially restored - most revert to 
their nomadic households.
There is some evidence of a similar pattern in respect to households whose 
women and young children live in refugee camps (as do aged and crippled 
members of households) but whose adult male and older children are 
economically active elsewhere. Some may be pursuing nomadic pastoralism (in 
Somalia or in the Haud and Ogaden areas), a number are clearly living/working 
in Mogadishu and others 'over the water'. In one real sense this is an 
adaptation of the nomadic life and production style - the refugee camps serve
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as permanent base camps for married women and young children while adult males 
and older children work outside them. (See Annex 3 Chapter 1.)
In the case of emergency needs - major illness or injury, burial, wiping out 
of herds or other assets cr, less clearly, weddings - cash collections are 
taken up by kinship and social groups to meet the immediate and some of the 
livelihood rebuilding cost (e.g. for purchasing a new nucleus herd) of the 
afflicted households.
These transfers are all private sector and traditionally based. They are 
widely practised, substantial and supported by social sanctions for 
non-compliance. Evidently - as demonstrated by Gulf remittances and placing 
of children with urban relatives for educational access - they are living 
systems quite able to adapt to new contexts and opportunities. Such transfers 
do not eliminate poverty nor are all poor persons within the transfer 
networks. They do substantially reduce inequality levels within extended 
families and provide interlocking security systems based on diversity of 
income sources and mutual solidarity. Viewing the Somali extended family as a 
miniature TNC (as the Boston University study does) may be a distinct 
overstatement but a perception of Somali society as made up of isolated 
nuclear households with single sources of income and negligible effective 
claims on more fortunate relatives for supplementary income transfers would be 
a far greater error.
All transfers - except urban investment by nomads - are in the form of gifts. 
However, they are gifts within a context of mutual social obligations. 
Obligations do arise for the recipients. If they become better-off and/or 
their relatives suffer disasters, there is a clear and clearly recognised 
social obligation on them to make transfers in their turn. To term them 
’gifts1 in a raised eyebrow manner is - rightly - resented by Somalis, but to 
view them as isolated, one-off transactions is equally inappropriate.
Toward Identifying Poor and Vulnerable Households and People
Six - and perhaps seven - groups afflicted by high levels of absolute poverty 
can be identified. Three are urban (and especially prevalent in Mogadishu) - 
street children and their families, women headed households with no
-71-
remittances from absent male members, and residents of unorganised areas. 
Three are rural: riverine cultivators (or ex-cultivators) with defective, 
unrecorded or otherwise low status titles to the land they till (used to 
till); nomadic households whose herds have been wholly or nearly wiped out by 
drought, and rain fed agriculturalists in years of low rainfall (e.g. in the 
Bay Region). A seventh was - and may still be - fishermen located in villages 
not near the main ports (Mogadishu, Berbera, Kisamayo) and therefore lacking 
adequate market access.
Some street children come from households where ill health, disability or 
unemployment has so reduced family income that they - the children - have 
become the principal or co-principal breadwinners. They engage in petty trade 
(e.g. single cigarettes and matches), car-watching, washing and door opening, 
shoe shining and similar service occupations verging into begging. Their 
incomes are very definitely on average well below the food and absolute 
poverty lines. Further, they are losing their chance for education and are 
thus locked into low income work for life. The vast majority are boys and the 
minority of girls usually dress as boys. There may be several (less than 5) 
thousand households so situated.
However, at least these children do have homes and only work on the street. 
Even more deprived are the children - usually from broken homes - who also 
live on the streets sleeping in verandahs, arcades and mosques. Their incomes 
may be comparable, but they have no family support system nor access to 
sanitation, washing or health facilities (nor of course to education). They 
are and perceive themselves to be insecure (most carry knives or razors). 
Despair, combined with lack of a social context, has driven many into habits 
such as glue sniffing.
Female headed households with no remittances from an absent male member (e.g. 
a migrant worker abroad or a polygamous family head residing with another 
wife) also have a high tendency to be below absolute and food poverty lines. 
Most heads are divorced (very common in Somalia), widowed or deserted. Most 
are illiterate and a majority have neither access to formal sector jobs nor to 
the skills and minimum capital needed for economic self-sufficiency above the 
poverty line in the informal (or self-employed) sector.
They engage in casual labour, domestic service, the petty end of food and mat
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trading and household production ranging from mat making to food preparation 
to dividing up retail sized food packets (e.g. of spices) into single use 
newspaper-wrapped pinches. Some of the activities seem to yield as little as 
Sh 30 a month; of necessity these women engage in several such activities. In 
consequence they have little or no time to follow vocational skills or adult 
education courses even if suitable ones are available which they usually are 
not. Nor do they have the capital resources - despite self-help savings and 
loan groups - to buy stocks adequate to trade at more adequate levels or 
durable capital goods - e.g. sewing machines - to advance to higher value 
productions. These households are numbered in fives of thousands. It is 
necessary to stress that not all female headed households are in absolute 
poverty. Many have remittance or other transfer incomes and some have 
significant retail trading or small scale production incomes and/or formal 
sector employment.
The largest number of Mogadishu households in absolute poverty live in 
"unorganised areas", (variously termed "squatter", "informal" or "zongo" areas 
elsewhere in SSA) especially the newer ones, and in ex-urban resettlement 
areas for those displaced from former inner unorganised areas by urban 
redevelopment. In most other SSA capitals areas of "squatter settlements" are 
easily visible by spatial differentiation. In Mogadishu, such enclaves of 
very poor housing are dotted in most quarters. Smaller clusters are in a 
badly decayed quarter of the old town and in mixed areas with both affluent 
and slum housing. Their lack of access to adequate/employment and even the 
most minimal public services is acute. It is people in the remoter 
unorganised or re-settlement areas who may need to pay a water carrier Sh 40 
for one litre whereas the piped water rate is 40 litres for one shilling. 
Housing conditions are usually inadequate but vary widely from moderately 
substantial mud plaster over wattle frames, to temporary shacks of odds and 
ends and nomadic tents clearly ill adapted to permanent urban use. These 
areas and enclaves- even the exurbs inhabited by refugees from the drought who 
have lost their herds - are neither large nor particularly poor compared to 
those of Nairobi, Lusaka, Kinshasa, Lagos, Accra or Dakar/Pekine. But they 
are in urban Somali terms inhabited by the poorest of the poor and many do 
live in absolute poverty and - given the absence of health, water and 
sanitation services - in ill health, discomfort and environmental squalor.
It is important to underline that these groups and especially the members of
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them in absolute poverty are a minority - probably under 20Í of the 
inhabitants of Mogadishu. But their plight is no less real or requiring 
action; indeed because they are a minority it may be more soluble. More
details on the parameters of Mogadishu poverty will be available when the 
1984/85 Budget Survey and 1985/87 Oxfam - CIIR - UNICEF poverty study become 
available.
In the riverine areas a land boom has built up in the past few years. Market 
opportunities for certain crops have improved, new areas have been made 
irrigable (agro pastoral potential has increased through tsetse fly control). 
However, for many cultivators the results have been disastrous. A number held 
user rights - often for several generations - and had previously had
undisturbed possession. Unfortunately technically the land was state land
until a formal title was issued. Being of low status and illiterate, these 
cultivators were slow to understand or to act on the need to secure formal 
title. As a result in many cases - moré established Somalians have asserted 
historic or other claims, secured legal title and evicted the prior 
cultivators even when they were second or third generation occupiers. Their 
plight is often desperate. Most have achieved access - possibly on an equally 
precarious user right basis - to new land, but it is unirrigable, and, being 
further away from the rivers, has a lower water table and is more vulnerable 
to drought. Those who have retained their houses have to walk long distances 
through the often flooded fields of their disposessors to their new land with 
consequential health (e.g. schistosomiasis) and effort problems. Their access 
to water is very poor especially as drawing water from rivers - even for human 
and animal consumption - is sometimes limited to registered irrigation right 
holders. There are no real estimates of numbers actually or potentially 
afflicted. 5,000 to 20,000 guesstimates have been mentioned but do not appear 
either to prepresent a consensus or to be based on even the sketchiest of 
systematic observation.
Nomads who lose their herds to drought are by definition absolutely poor. In
UNICEF’s 1 9 8 7 Middle Shabelle survey their nutritional levels were the poorest 
and their women members appeared the most exhausted. They remain very poor 
until time, effort, saving every lamb and every shilling and - with luck - 
migrant remittances or intra family transfers allow basic herd rebuilding. In 
1987 it would appear that perhaps 20,000 to 25,000 households (half of those 
UNDP's emergency survey estimated needed emergency food aid) have been forced
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into this category.
Rainfall dependent (as opposed to riverine) farmers are very vulnerable to 
drought - perhaps more so even than nomads. In 1987 the Bay Region (not 
listed by the government of Somalia or found by the UNDP field survey to be 
severely drought affected - at least in respect to livestock) showed the 
highest malnutrition on preliminary results of a three province (the other two 
unambiguously drought affected nomadic ones) rapid survey by USAID. The 
apparent reason was the failure of the fall 1986 rains (and crops) and 
exhaustion of food reserves before the delayed 1987 spring rains. As crops - 
unlike milk yields - do not arrive within weeks of rains, the recovery of 
their nutritional intake levels will necessarily be deferred to July-August as 
is not the case for those nomadic households whose basic core herds survived 
with milk yields rising from mid-May. Because the present evidence is limited 
to one region any estimate of numbers nationally is problematic - 10,000 to 
20,000 households may be a likely range.
It should be emphasised that citation of the last two categories of households 
in poverty does not constitute endorsement of April-June 1987 world press 
reports predicting mass starvation. However, that rejection equally should 
not cause the 25,000-50,000 households who - at least for 1987 - probably have 
lost almost all their income to be forgotten, especially as thousands of 
households will be plunged into these categories every 3 to 4 years as 
Somalia's drought cycle comes round. (See Chapter 5.)
Public Service Household Incomes
Another apparent poverty (present real wages) and vulnerability (real wage 
trend) group, the public service, is not uniformly in that position. It is 
quite true that wages and salaries are largely in the Sh 600 to Sh 2,500 a 
month ($4 to $17) range. But that is not the whole picture because of five 
other sources of income:
a. allowances (rather uneven, and with two major ones, housing and access to 
transport limited in coverage);
b. supplementary payments either from the government or outside funding
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agencies for officers whose services and abilities are considered of 
special importance;
c. private business incomes (including shares in family enterprise profits);
d. remittances from family members working abroad;
e. an extensive system of user fees collected at most levels of the public
services (e.g. doormen for entry, clerks for stamps and ensuring
effective posting of letters, operators for phone calls, drivers for 
petrol purchases, mechanics for repairs) collected in cash or kind.
The last element is not usefully called corruption or bribery. On the part of 
well paid expatriates that characterisation is at best naive and at worst 
grossly insensitive or hypocritical. Employees not paid a living income by 
the state because of its financial exigencies collect user fees from those 
persons who wish to use their services. The motivating force is not greed, 
but need. The system is highly decentralised, flexible, market related and 
privatised - albeit not perhaps in the way the World Bank usually advocates in 
respect to public service user fees. However, it is also rather uncertain as 
to application and amount, inequitable in terms of those covered and open to 
abuse. In respect to poverty its problem is that many employees who are - or 
should be - engaged in providing basic services (e.g primary school teachers, 
subordinate rural health staff) cannot afford to do so. Community income 
supplements - e.g. via Parent Associations paying teachers up to Sh 100 per 
pupil per month - may help to provide an acceptable user fee structure to 
permit public servants - especially in health and education - both to deliver 
services and to escape poverty, but to date do so only to a very limited 
extent.
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Notes to Chapter 2
1. The Middle Shabelle survey, discussed further in the IFAD (1978) report. 
Taken at its face value the survey seemed to imply that the nomads sold 
or slaughtered a great deal of livestock - 200 per cent of the herd if 
continued on an annual basis (p.38) - yet meat production amounted to the 
equivalent of one goat (p.40). The nomads lost, on an annual basis, 40
per cent of sheep and goats (p.39). The price of hides shot up from Sh.
3 per unit in the first round to Sh. 40 later (p.41). None of these 
figures make any empirical sense. On top of that, self-provisioning 
production/consumption was not even included.
2. Seasonally this is also a necessity as milk is not storeable and over the 
four driest months milk ouput is well below calorie needs.
3. See: in particular Allen Hoben et.al., Somalia: A Social and
Institutional Profile. Also Ashwani Saith, "Employment Issues in 
Somalia: A selected review", Addis Aaba: JASPA (mimeo) 1986; A joint
MNP/UNICEF study (Women and Children in Somalia: A Situation Analysis, 
Mogadishu 1984) has endorsed Jamal's study as the most rigorous.
4. Tyler, 1983.
5. Price of goat (20 kg) Sh 2,000; price of maize Sh 25/kg; sorghum Sh 
18.75. Meat calories 2,,000 per kg, cereals 3,500.
6. A conceptual point may be made. Since household budget survey
expenditures are tied to the prices as captured in the survey, the same
prices have to be used in constructing the poverty line.
7. Strictly speaking the poverty line and the poverty estimates apply to
Mogadishu only as the household budget survey was conducted there. Our 
impression from field visits is that because of a more equal distribution 
of primary income, stronger links with rural areas and stronger kinship 
ties, poverty situation elsewhere may be even less severe. However, this 
may be offset - especially in small towns such as Brava and Jowhar by the 
much lower average level of income of the urban area.
8. Somalis, being of nomadic origin, are naturally tall and thin and 
measured against international norms may appear in the category of the 
mal- and under-nourished. Yet they may be getting adequate numbers of 
calories - and nobody has suggested their diet is protein-deficient, with 
highest per capita consumption of meat in urban areas in SSA and very 
high milk consumption in the rural areas.
9. Private communication by Mr. Rick Davies, the principal author of the 
study.
10. Problems arise in defining "formal" and "informal" sectors in Somalia.
If the definition is on the basis of size a fairly standard pattern 
emerges for enterprises. However, a high proportion of the larger 
private ones appear to engage in both "open" and "parallel" trading 
activities and "parallel" economy activity is not usually classified as
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"formal" sector. Equally important is the fact, by no means unique to 
Somalia that wages (particularly in the public sector) are far too low 
for household survival. Therefore secondary "informal" sector incomes 
(whether user fees, remittances, trade or other) are a standard part of 
the budgets of households headed by persons who are "formal" sector 
employees.
11. The conceptualisation of exchange-rate taxation is that by holding to a 
fixed exchange rate, the farmers' terms of trade worsen compared to the 
country's terms of trade. In the Somalia case, as livestock exports are 
now largely transacted at the Gulf-based free-market rate there is not 
heavy exchange-rate taxation. Admittedly if transactions had been 
carried out wholly at the official rate in the past there would have 
been significant taxation but at that time undervaluation of exports on 
official declarations was rampant with the balance paid "over the water" 
at the Gulf rate and brought back as franco valuta or smuggled imports.
*
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ANNEX 1 CHAPTER 2 
FOOD SITUATION IN SOMALIA
This Annex gives estimates of the food situation in Somalia. As in other 
areas, statistics are deficient, particularly with respect to milk production. 
The basis for our corrections are shown explicity.
Table 18 presents a "food balance sheet" based on national data and national 
estimate of population showing the amount of food available from local 
production and imports. As per the FBS procedures, deductions are made for 
output retained as seed and animal feed and for output wasted. From the unit 
calorie value of foodstuffs and the population, figures of calories available 
per capita are obtained. Breakdown is available in terms of major foods - and 
can be grouped according to cereal foods, protein foods, providing a summary 
of the amount and type of calories available.
The calculations from official estimates show food availability at 2,397 
calories per capita (after exports are deducted). Imports (as recorded, an 
understatement except for cereals)provided about 30? of this, with the import 
ratio being 44% for cereals, 36? for oil, 37? for sugar, and 0 or negative 
(exports) for fruits and meat.
With domestic production (for domestic use) at 1,631 calories per capita per 
day, national figures imply that the country itself produces around two-thirds 
of its food supply. This figure is incorrect because of serious 
under-estimation of milk production. National figures show milk production as 
equivalent to 518 calories per capita per day. For the nomadic population 
this would mean total calorie availability of only 900 calories per capita. A 
thorough inspection of the data and national estimation procedures shows that 
national estimates of milk production (as well as FAO's) are far below what 
might be expected from the national herd under Somali conditions. In the 
national data, additionally, calorie content of milk is underestimated. 
Finally, there is also an undestimate of meat production in the national 
statistics compared to FAO, albeit it is not clear which series is less 
unreliable - probably the Somali one. Correcting for these three sources of
Food Balance Sheet: based on national data for crops and amendments for livestock output, 1 9 8M 
('000 mt, except as indicated) (population 5.223 million)
TABLE 18 .
Crops Livestock
Cereals, Oil Sugar Fruits, Total Milk Meat Total Grand Total
pulses vegetables,
roots
Output 510.3 53.4b 52.2 342 1,425
SFWc 55.0 4.3 32
Net 455.3 49.1 310
Imports 359.6 28.7 3 0 . 8 -48
Total 814.9 78.8 82.2 262
Kg p.c.p.d. 0.35 0.021 0.035 0.112
Cals/kg 3 021 , d 8 750 3 545e 515e 693
- Cals
p.c.p.d. 1295 225 152 71 1743 518 136 654 2397
o.w. imported 572(44?) 82(36?) 56(37?) ( )f 766(44?) ( )f 766(32?)
Memo Item 
National 
estimate 
Cals.p.c.p.d 423f 111
Amendments
Output 2180g
cals/kg 775h
cals p.c.p.d. (1743) 886 210i 1096 2839
Alternate cals p.c.p.d. (1743) 886 111J 997 2740
a. Practically all cereals; pulses are included together as calorie value is similar to cereals.
b. Converted from oilseeds assuming 48 per cent extraction rate.
c. Allowance for seed, feed and waste.
d. Composite figure, estimated to conform to national estimate of 1295 cals. per p.c.p.d.
e. FAO's figure from 1980-82 food balance sheet computer print-out.
f. Not allowing for fruit and meat calories exported.
g. Based on national herd and estimated production co-efficients (see later)
h. Normal figure for calorie value of milk.
i. From FAO 1980-82 figure (includes milk). j. Using Somali national estimate.
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underestimation, the additional calories we obtain are as follows: milk 3 6 8 ;
meat 74; total 442. Total calorie availability increases from 2397 per capita 
to 2740 to 2839, i.e. to an average level 25? to 29? above national 
sufficiency. More important, animal calories increase from 654 to 997 to 
1096, i.e. by one-half to two-thirds. With these corrections for livestock 
calories the import content of the food supply drops to around 25?. The milk 
figures have been derived from production coefficients. They also make sense 
from the point of view of the visible fuctioning of the Somali economy and the 
malnutrition levels found in sample surveys.
Tables 19 and 20 show a division of home-produced calories between farmers and 
nomads. It is assumed that the nomads own three times as much livestock per 
person as farmers. Assuming the population breakdown to be 1.4:1, this is 
tantamount to an assumption that nomads own 80 per cent of the livestock in 
the country and farmers 20 per cent. The 3s 1 assumption is often encountered 
in writings on Somalia, although with agro-pastoralism (mixed farming) having 
risen the proportions must have changed. With respect to crops it is assumed 
that farmers cultivate 90? of these and the nomads 10?. This assumption takes 
account of nomadic cultivation of crops. Its extent is usually quite limited, 
the main exceptions being in the Northwest and - probably - Bay in which 
nomadic households split up seasonally to enable some members to undertake 
farming.
The derivation of the table is as follows. The first column sets out per
capita calories from home-produced crops and livestock. The division of these 
by population groups is then obtained from the assumptions stated previously 
(10/90; 80/20). Finally dividing by assumed nomadic and farm populations
gives per capita calories produced by the nomads and farmers.
The table enables us to establish some important guideposts into the working 
of the Somali economy. First, contrary to what the import figures might 
suggest (i.e. crop imports provided 44 per cent of the total supply of crop 
calories in the country) Somali farmers produce a surplus of total calories 
(crop as well as of livestock) nearly three-fifths above their requirements. 
The high import ratio, absolutely and compared to other African countries, 
where it is generally under 10?, arises because Somalia has a low proportion 
of crop growers in total population compared to the SSA average.
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The nomads on average produce just about or just under enough to meet their 
calorie requirements. (On the national estimate of milk production, they 
would be short by around 40 per cent.)
The facts relating to the farmers are worth underlining. The Somali farm 
sector is often depicted as unproductive, with abysmally low yields - which is 
true. But, at least in 1984, two Somali farmers managed to produce a surplus 
to feed one non-farmer. While this is not earth-shattering, it is a better 
performance than is typical of other African countries. The point to notice 
here is that Somali farmers comprise only around one-third of the total 
population whereas in most other African countries their proportion is up to 
twice as high. In some of these cases two-thirds of the population cannot 
provide a surplus adequate to feed the remaining third of the population. In 
Somalia a much smaller farm population feeds itself and produces a surplus to 
feed a sizeable part of the non-farm population. Yet the paradoxical 
situation remains that Somalia is food deficient. The reason is not because 
the farmers fail to produce enough for themselves, but because, first, the 
nomads who form a larger proportion of the population fail to produce any 
calorific surplus and, indeed, consume much of that produced by the farmers, 
and, second, because the urban population is equivalent in numbers to the 
farmers.
The second most important thing the table enables us to establish is 
guideposts on the food economy in the rural areas. A consistent picture 
emerges from our estimates whereas the national estimates cannot be reconciled 
with known facts about the rural economy. National estimates imply livestock 
production of around 1200 calories per capita by the nomads. Even after 
allowing for crop calories produced by them, they would still be desperately 
short of calories. Indeed all of them would have to be counted as falling 
below the basal metabolic rate intake level. Barter could not resolve this as 
on that scale it could not be supported by farmers. Assuming a normal year 
exchange rate of 1 milk calorie for 4 grain calories, nomads could make up 
their deficit by placing 300 milk calories on the market (= 0.4 litres per 
capita), expecting to get 1200 grain calories. Farmers in contrast would, if 
they exchanged that much on those terms, reduce themselves from a position of 
comfortable sufficiency to one of precariousness - which they could hardly be 
expected to do. On the other hand, using our estimate of milk production, 
barter makes good sense for both the rural groups. Nomads could expect to
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find takers for 120 milk calories per day. The situation would then look as 
follows:
TABLE 19
Nomadic and Farmer Food Production/Availability
Nomads Farmers
Produced 2194 3520
Minus milk/cereals 120 683
Plus cereals/milk 480 170
Consumed or sold
to Urban Areas 2554 3007
Note: Derived as follows: 120 calories p.c. nomadic population
= 120 x 2.32 million divided by 1.63 million = 170
calories p.c. farm population. Apply rate of exchange of 
1:4 to obtain 683 cereal calories p.c. given up by farm 
population.
TABLE 20
Crop and Livestock Calories: Total domestic production (per day) 
and contribution of nomads and farmers, 1984
Calories Total Shares_____  Per capita
per capita calories(m) Nomads Farmers Nomads Farmers
per day (pop. = (pop.= (pop.=
5.223 m) 2.32 m) 1.63 m)
Crops
Livestock
Total
Memo Items
Imports 
(all crop 
calories)
National
estimate
977
1096
2073
766
5103
5724
510
( 10? )
4579
( 80? )
4593
(90?)
1145
( 20?)
220
1974
2194
2818
702
3520
654 (80?) ( 20?) 1178 417
Source: Based on Table 21 and calculations as explained in the text.
-83-
In terms of nutritional security, what comes through most clearly from the 
above estimates is the relatively secure position of the farmers compared to 
the nomads. They have a surplus of calories available from their own output. 
Moreover, their calorie supply is more evenly spread throughout the year, as 
their ouput can be more easily stored. By contrast, the nomads have a clearly 
sufficient supply of calories for themselves only because of their favourable 
exchange position. Seasonal fluctuations and limits to storing their peak 
season output mean that they may experience considerable hardship during at 
least a part of the year, especially in areas with limited grain production. 
Camel milk will last a month without spoiling; cow, goat and sheep milk spoils 
faster. Excess cow and goat (but not camel) milk can be, and is, converted to 
ghee, but there are limits imposed by nomadic mobility both as to production 
and transport. Thus, while their situation is not desperate, as implied by 
the national estimates, it is still about at the level of sufficiency, with a 
strong possibility of lean periods during the dry season (a near certainty for 
the poorer half of nomadic households) and severe hardship in drought years.
Assuming somewhat different - say 1.3 to 1 - nomadic/farming population ratios 
or a 70 to 75i share of nomads in livestock would affect these calculations 
and conclusions only marginally. Nor would assuming that up to half the 
nomadic population’s sales of milk are to urban buyers - as some proportion 
clearly is - affect nomadic calories availability. It would raise farmer 
household calorie availability for use or sale. Or sale is relevant because 
farm households do not in fact consume 3>000-3>250 (the latter if half of 
nomad milk sales are urban directed) calories per day because they do sell
substantial quantities of grain to urban residents.
Milk Production
There is now lively debate about how much milk is produced in Somalia. We
shall never know exactly (just as we never know how much maize, sorghum, etc.
is actually produced), but reasonable estimates are possible. Confronted by
the national estimate of 1425 ml. for 1984 (and by an FAO estimate of 739 ml), 
we have argued that milk output is drastically under-estimated, since those 
levels imply massive starvation for the nomads. Using production 
co-efficients derived from Tyler, on the authority of Mr. Willby a 
Somalia-based FAO livestock expert, we have arrived at an estimate of 2130 ml.
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- i.e. some times the national estimate and almost 3 times the FAO 
estimate.
Basically milk output can be estimated from the following equation: Milk
output (available for human consumption) = livestock population x lactating 
females (= breeding females in lactation) x yield (net of consumption by 
calves, lambs and kids). The problems with milk estimates in Somalia arise 
from the fact that different authorities have used different figures for all 
the above variables. While some disagreement is possible, some of the figures 
are patently wrong.
Table 21 shows the lactation and yield figures used in national accounts and 
FAO sources and by way of comparison our preferred co-efficients (Willby)
We have applied the Willby co-efficients (except for yield of sheep which in 
keeping with the majority of informed opinion, we have reduced to 30 l.p.a.) 
to the present national estimate of 1984 livestock population: cattle 4.2 m, 
camels 6.131 m, sheep 11.2 m, goats 18.0 m. This gives 2186 ml as the output 
of milk in 1984. As we have shown this figure yields a plausible picture of 
nomadic existence - sufficiency of calories averaged over a normal year - 
compared to the endemic starvation implied by the national or FAO estimates.
TABLE 21
Milk Co-efficients: Three Estimates
Lactation %
National Accounts 
FAO
Willby
Yield (l.p.a.)
National Accounts 
FAO
Willby
Cattle
27
11.5
26
300
354
400
Camels
14
6.7
14
600
550
1200
Sheep
50
19
45
50
65
Goats
54
22
48
36
80
65
Source: National Accounts Somalia 1985; FAO from computer print-out
provided by the FAO; Willby from Tyler 1983* Willby's lactation 
co-efficients are not too different from those used in the 
national accounts now; the yield figures differ substantially, 
especially for camels. FAO's lactation as well as yield 
co-efficients are substantially different from the others.
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annex 2 CHAPTER 2
SECULAR DOMESTIC FOOD SUPPLY TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
Over 1970-1986 it would appear that milk and meat production probably grew 
about 1 to 1 4 * a year; food crop production about 3* a year and fish catch for 
the local market significantly over 3* a year. Compared to a population 
growth of the order of 3% this implies a 1* odd decrease in domestic 
production per capita. This has been more than counter-balanced by commodity 
aid (grain) and commercial (grain, sugar, vegetable oil, amenity) food imports 
so that there is no evidence of secular decline in average calorie 
availability - if anything the reverse.
Livestock
Annual livestock national herd estimates need to be interpreted with caution. 
First a decline in herds is negative investment and a proper offset to 
(deduction from) GDP. However, its impact on food availability in a physical 
sense is largely in years following the decline when milk yields are lower and 
stocks of beasts need to be rebuilt. Second, the Somali method of estimating 
stock changes (previous year plus births less normal plus drought deaths and 
less domestic consumption plus exports) is conceptually correct. However, the 
high death rates (and stock declines) posited in drought years (e.g. 1983» 
1987) and rapid herd growth in other years (e.g. 1984-86) to suggest there are 
empirical problems with both the normal and drought year death estimates used. 
Further the domestic slaughter figure is an informed guess.
The trend figures computed from the Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range 
data are moderately stable and plausible.
1970-85 1975-86 Average
Total Annual Total Annual Annual
Camels 14* 1* 13* 1* 1*
Cattle 10* i% 14* 1*+ 1*
Sheep 19* 1?+ 20* 2*~ U *
Goats 21* 1 4 * 28* 24* 2?
Total 15* 1*+ 20*" 2%~ 14*
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These trends are consistent with the secular rise in the prices of milk and 
meat relative to other food products. In the case of meat the rising price 
could be (indeed partially is) explained by strengthened Gulf market demand 
through 1983 but for milk the explanation needs to be domestic.
The nutritional implications are primarily for settled agricultural and - 
especially - urban communities, i.e. milk and meat buyers. Because of urban 
and overseas labour migration, the nomadic community is probably growing in 
numbers at the rate of 1 to 2% a year (comparable to herd growth) and 
benefitting from relative price shifts in favour of milk and meat.
Crop production estimates suggest a 1970-86 trend growth rate of about 3?» 
This is comparable to or slightly higher than the growth rate of the settled 
agricultural population (and higher than that of nomadic groups who do
cultivate). That is not implausible even if above the SSA average because
that average is dominated by Nigeria, Sudan, Zaire and Ethiopia which are much 
larger than the average economy and have significantly lower estimated food 
production growth rates.
However, the crop production growth trend appears to be an average of two
quite different sub-trends: 1 % a year in the 1970s and 6% in the 1980s. This 
pattern does run parallel to the imposition, relaxation and removal of 
centralised marketing but that very fact raises some questions as to whether 
the estimates do reflect underlying reality.
If centralised marketing was effectively enforced and did decrease grower 
prices relative to import parity then response to price incentives (negative 
to early 1980s, thereafter positive with relaxation and removal of controls) 
could explain part of the shift. However, it would be unlikely to explain as 
much as half of it. At least 2/3 of food crops are consumed in the
agricultural sector or traded directly with the nomadic sector for milk and 
meat and there is no reason to suppose official grower prices would affect 
incentives or output growth of this portion of crop output. Further, in 
1983-86, high levels of food imports parallel with rising domestic production 
levels depressed real grower prices so that by 1985 one might have expected an 
output
stabilisation or decline. Finally, the 1984/5 estimated increase in hectarage
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planted, is so high as to raise doubts as to its possibility (and certainly to 
suggest that no further leeway remains for existing peasant households 
radically increasing output by applying the same techniques). If 1984-86 
output growth is seen as recovery from drought affected 1983 levels either 
because of more hectares plantable and/or because of yield increases with 
better rains and higher river levels, the channges are plausible. But in that 
case, no sustained yield per hectare output increase can be projected.
Alternatively it can be argued that, except for a few years from mid- to 
late-1970s, grain marketing was in fact (and all other crop marketing formally 
as well as in fact) dominantly private despite the nominal existence of a 
single channel agency. In that case, the bulk of the shift may relate to 
problems of perception and estimation. So long as private grain marketing was 
illegal and therefore believed to be minor, undue weight was placed on 
official channel figures and as it was relaxed estimates reverted to more 
realistic levels.
Probably there is something in each explanation. Both, however, suggest the 
underlying trend growth of domestic foodcrop production - in the absence of 
droughts, alterations of perceptions or counterproductive institutional 
aberrations - is about 3% under present circumstances. In itself this rate 
does not create any overall national calorie availability problem. Nor - as 
it is at or above the average population growth of the settled agricultural 
community - need it create any self-provisioning problem for them. On the 
other hand it is not adequate either to raise average or poor rural household 
incomes rapidly, or to counterbalance per capita milk and meat production 
declines. Nor can it substitute for food imports for two reasons: wheat and - 
to date - rice are not growable in large quantities in Somalia and the present 
maize surplus may be a transient phenomenon relating to a run of good years. 
So long as milk and meat prices rise relative to grain (a global not merely a 
Somali phenomenen) and commodity food aid is disposed of at artificially low 
prices (a flaw devaluation would help correct as would import duties on rice 
and wheat), the terms of trade will tend to move against crop producers, 
making their real income stability problematic and increasing 
urban/agricultural community purchasing power differentials.
The medium term domestic food supply prospects seem to be for more of the 
same. There is no evident reason to expect sharp trend changes. That
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argument does run against conventional wisdom and requires elaboration. 
Somalia has been said to be overstocked for at least 50 years. Over that time 
the least implausible hypothesis is that herds have grown 1 to 2? a year 
secularly, i.e. more than doubled. (Higher 1950-1975 growth of estimates seem 
to relate to fuller perceptions of where and how many beasts there were, more 
systematic estimation procedures and perhaps to comparing drought and good 
year herds, rather than to any dramatic secular growth in numbers of beasts.) 
There is simply no systematic evidence of widespread secular deterioration of 
pasture nor of changes in nomadic herding, range and water management likely 
to lead to rapid environmental degradation. There are spot problems 
apparently linked to permanent water points which over-concentrate beasts.
Clearly under drought conditions the carrying capacity of the range is 
inadequate for the survival of herd levels appropriate to more normal weather. 
Deaths do result. But to hold herds at drought-year carrying capacity to 
limit such losses would result in lower average herds, yields and incomes. 
That is clearly an absurd option and one the nomadic population is far too 
intelligent and informed to accept. The present system, despite its very real 
short term vulnerability to drought, does have a resiliency and secular 
stability. It is probably consistent with continued modest trend herd growth 
for up to a decade and perhaps longer.
This is not, however, either to argue that the present system is permanently 
secure or that no positive adaptations can be made. Clearly there is some 
finite limit to the carrying capacity of the Somali rangelands under present 
management techniques and resources. The absence of systemic environmental 
degradation to date and the lack of success of past public sector investments
in capacity improvement do not falsify those contentions.
Limitations on optimal herd size suggest action along five lines:
a. reduction of drought losses by timely provision of veterinary drugs, more
secure water supplies and perhaps supplementary fodder;
b. increasing the value per beast by improved weight and quality - perhaps 
by supplementary feeding before export or slaughter (especially if the 
present sorghum surplus proves more than transitory);
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c. developing new markets - e.g. for chilled kid, lamb and calf carcasses 
and/or cuts and for chilled beef and mutton which would facilitate 
greater offtake and - by enhancing flexibility - allow emergency sale and 
slaughter at better prices than now of animals at risk who otherwise 
perish during droughts and their immediate aftermath;
d. increasing the desired (by nomadic pastoralists) offtake rate by improved
veterinary and drought damage alleviation measures which reduce the 
security imperative for larger herds to withstand larger losses while 
leaving an adequate nucleus for rebuilding.
In respect to crops the situation is more problematic. While most of the 
better river basin land (which benefits from river resupply of the water table 
as well as from local rainfall) is occupied, not all of it is fully cultivated 
and additional (albeit high drought risk) rainfed farming land does exist,
e.g. in the Bay Region. But both tsetse and river blindness limit use of 
riverine lands, and salination has eroded the potential of present irrigated 
hectarage about as fast as new has been brought into use. On present land use 
and technology patterns, therefore, a 3% growth seems to be attainable for 
several more years but with increasing drought vulnerability.
What technical changes are known, tested under present conditions, backed by 
adequate input supplies and economically viable for peasant users (without 
large public sector subsidies) is not entirely clear. However, the answer 
seems to be very few and applicable only to a limited range of crops and areas 
- a situation all too common in SSA. With the exception of large scale 
irrigation, this situation cannot be changed by instant capital-intensive 
projects. A number of components (none very dramatic and most fairly
time-intensive) can be identified:
a. systematic control of tsetse flies and of the flies which carry river
blindness to allow more intensive use of the riverine land including 
agro-pastoralisra (mixed farming) and use of animal drawn implements which 
are now effectively ruled out by tsetse fly presence in some districts, 
especially during the rainy seasons;
b. testing/adapting seeds for specific qualities (e.g. drought resistance,
higher yields at low water and fertiliser input levels) and specific
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locations;
c. testing or developing improved hand and animal implements and soil 
preparation techniques (including ones related to recent research on ways 
of reducing moisture loss).
d. building up a timely commercial supply network (private or public) for 
the supply of those seeds, tools, herbicides (to reduce labour time for 
weeding, believed to be the key labour constraint in some Somalian farm 
management systems) and fertilisers which are of proven value and which 
peasants wish to buy;
e. improving irrigation system management to reduce salination and providing 
extension advice/support to community based small scale irrigation 
schemes;
f. developing farming systems and farm household research (covering crops, 
animals, forestry and related processing activities) to identify areas in 
which changes are likely to be profitable to peasants and consistent with 
their overall resources of knowledge, labour, land and capital.
Of these only the fourth can raise output substantially in the short run, but 
the others need to be begun now to complement and eventually replace the 
growth to date provided primarily by more households cultivating more total 
hectares in about the same way.
Large scale irrigation poses somewhat different problems which are in large 
part beyond the scope of this report. In Somalia, Bardhere Dam on the Middle 
Juba is technically feasible and could irrigate a very substantial hectarage - 
as well as replacing thermal generated electricity dependent on imported oil 
with hydropower. Unfortunately there are several obstacles to realising this 
potential or at least to utilising it effectively to benefit Somali 
cultivators and Somalia's nutritional position:
a. The Bardhere Project (dam, powerhouse, irrigation system) will cost at
least $500 million;
b. water management and utilisation of such a system requires time to build
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up and is dependent for continued success on fairly rigorous flow control 
(to prevent or flush out salination) and prompt maintenance - aspects 
which are weak in present smaller irrigation schemes;
c. no viable crop patterns have yet been identified (or tested) in part
because and/or (e.g. sugar) price and in others (e.g. tomatoes, perhaps 
citrus) marketing problems make identification far from easy.
In no way should this be read as a criticism of the Bardhere Dam multi purpose 
project as such. It is needed before 2000 and - when water and land
use/management problems are resolved - could be highly beneficial to Somali 
agricultural incomes and to Somalia's nutritional base. But it would be 
unwise to count on early, large nutritional or rural income gains from this 
source.
Fish consumption - and presumably production - has increased markedly in 
recent years, especially since 1983. Mogadishu has gone from one to eight 
fish markets. Part of the increase is due to rising meat prices. However, as
the change is not limited to lower and middle income groups part, appears to
represent a shift in tastes. The change is largely limited to coastal cities 
but that includes 20-25Í of the population. Since drying for domestic use is 
uncommon and cold stores absent outside major towns, consumption by settled 
farmers not near the coast and by nomads is negligible.
The potential for increased artisanal production for local use is substantial. 
Wider sales than coastal cities, however, depend either on a taste for dried 
fish developing in rural areas or, less probably, on a domestic market 
oriented fish tinning industry and least probably on an upcountry cold store 
chain's development. The augmentation of protein calories and of the incomes 
of artisanal fishing families (including the women who trade in fish), who are 
a low income group, could be significant if the recent consumption growth 
continues.
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HEALTH, WATER, SANITATION, FUEL: WHAT FEASIBLE ROUTES?
Health Services Today
Statistically Somalia has 80 odd hospitals and of the order of 300 clinics, 
health posts and mother/child health clinics. In addition there are two 
nurses training centres with an annual output of 200. At the Gulf exchange 
rate the 1985 recurrent budgetary expenditure of the Ministry of Health was of 
the order of $1.5 million (under $5,000 per facility). Since then real 
recurrent health expenditure per capita has fallen and is now perhaps $0.2 per 
person per year. Similarly the total nominal nursing staff was of the order 
of 2,000 many of them not readily located.
It can be argued that, as most of the budget goes on wages and salaries plus 
allowances, the Gulf rate is not an appropriate conversion instrument and/or 
that there is substantial foreign financed health expenditure. The first 
assertion is only technically true. To the extent that staff are actually 
present at government health facilities they have next to no equipment, 
bedding, food or - to an only slightly lesser degree - medicines. Further, 
since wages and salaries (at the Gulf rate) tend to be in the $6 - $15 a month 
range, no health worker can afford to be full time without collecting self-set 
(decentralised, privatised) user fees from patients. The number of nurses 
even nominally in the government service is a result of massive leakage, to a 
small extent to the Somali private medical sector (which is small but, in 
Mogadishu, growing rapidly) but dominantly over the water to Saudi and North 
Yemen.
It is true that as of 1984 perhaps $25 million of foreign finance appears to 
have been allocated to the Ministry of Health or to programmes which would 
normally fall under it (albeit not in most cases appearing in its budget). 
Some of this was technical assistance which kept perhaps a dozen hospitals and 
a score of clinics functional. The bulk was for capital projects which merely 
added to the facilities Somali could not supply, maintain or staff.
CHAPTER 3
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TABLE 22
Assisting Agencies for Primary Health Care
Region Estimated Population Assisting Agency
Mudug 311,230 USAID
Lower Juba 272,368 USAID
Bay 450,986 USAID
Togdheer 383,867 USAID
Hiran 219,328 Govt. Italy
Lower Shabelle 570,649 UNICEF/WHO
Middle Shabelle 352,040 UNICEF/WHO
Sanaag 216,539 CAA/Australia
Gedo 235,061 CARITAS/W-Germany
West Galbeed/Audal 654,990 UNICEF/WHO
Middle Juba 147,810 Sweden
Source: UNICEF Plan of Operations, 1983
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More functionally, several agencies (e.g. WHO, UNICEF) and governments (e.g. 
Italy, Finland, USA) each spent more on direct health care/preventative 
services than the Somali government. The total of these expenditures is 
probably of the order of $15-20 million (including some double counting with 
the technical assistance component of the previous paragraph).
A private pharmacy network exists in larger cities and most smaller towns. 
Indeed its existence presumably explains why some out-patient departments in 
otherwise silent government hospitals and some clinics still function. The 
staff - for a user fee - diagnose and refer to a pharmacy to purchase drugs. 
While hardly optimal, this is at least a genuine service.
Similarly there is a private (largely herbal plus traditional birth attendant) 
non-Western medical sector which probably provides more treatments than the 
whole "modern" health sector and attends perhaps 80 to 90? of all births. 
There is every reason to question the adequacy of training (scientific or 
otherwise) of most of this sector, but none to assume that, on the whole, to 
deny that it provides a service the public medical system (even including the 
donor linked primary heath care, tuberculosis and immunisation sub-systems) 
cannot provide because of an abysmal lack of resources.
Somalia today probably has the most pauperised government medical services in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. It also has the most remarkable imbalance between 
recurrent and capital spending - $1 plus million versus about $12 million 
projected for 1 9 8 7 and between government ($1 million) and external capital 
($12 million) and operational programme (over $20 million) spending. If one 
adds very rough guesses as to user fees ($2 to 4 million), pharmacy sales ($10 
to 15 million), private modern sector charges ($2 to 5 million) and 
traditional plus community health worker payments in cash or kind ($2 to 5 
million) the total spending on health is of the order of $50 million or $ 9 per 
capita. If that is even approximately correct, then a combination of 
reallocation and modest increments ought to be adequate to restore - more 
accurately develop for the first time - a plausible nation-wide preventative 
and primary care system.
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Health Situation
Somalia has an estimated life expectancy at birth of 40 to 49. The standard 
UN estimate for Somalia is 43 versus an East African average of 50 and a 
Sub-Saharan African of 48 in 1983* Whatever the exact figure, it is 
indisputably among the lowest in the world and in Africa.
Infant mortality estimates per 1000 live births range from 146 to 180 
(Ministry of National Planning) to 155 to 210 (various UN, WHO, UNICEF 
projections and/or sample studies). The 1983 SSA average was estimated at 120 
and the East African at slightly over 100. Total under 5 mortality estimates 
are in the 175-275 range with the 1983 UN estimate 202 versus an SSA average 
of 143 and an East African of about 120. These figures speak for themselves 
as do those on life expectancy: the present situation in Somalia is neither 
inevitable nor humanly acceptable. Given the costs of illness - in time lost 
by sick persons and family members, high dependency ratios and the necessity 
(from a household perspective) of high birth rates - they are just as 
inconsistent with raising human productivity or macro economic growth rates as 
with improving the quality of life.
The figures also suggest that the main excess mortality is in the 0-5 (and the 
over 50) age group so that mother/child health care, immunisation and basic 
primary health care can be the keys to sharp reductions in early mortality and 
in raising life expectancy.
The dominant cause of neo-natal (under one month) mortality is tetanus 
(preventable by maternal immunisation) which takes the lives of about 40 of 
every 1000 live births. Thereafter up to 5 diarrhoea (45 deaths) and measles 
(25 to 30 deaths) are dominant. BCG, DPT, Polio and Measles immunisation of 
young children and tetanus toxoid immunisation of pregnant women would be 
directly relevant to about 50>E of infant and child deaths and oral rehydration 
to another 22% with tetanus, oral rehydration and measles the apparent 
priorities in that order judging from admittedly imperfect and incomplete 
sample data.
There are significant year to year and - apparently - regional variations. 
For example, neo-natal tetanus deaths have been surveyed at 4.2 per 1000 live
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TABLE 23 
Health Indicators, 1975
Health Indicators Somali Statistics Low-income Country
Infant mortality 
age 0-1
per 1,000 births
146-180 130
Child death rate 
age 1-4
per 1,000 children
28-30 22
Life expectancy 
at birth 
both sexes
45-49 48
Crude birth rate 44-45 45
Crude death rate 13-15 18
Fertility rate 7.1 -
Note; More recent estimates suggest a deterioration, e.g. to
174-210 on Infant Mortality.
Source; Analytical Volume, Census of Population:1975, Ministry of
National Planning, Mogadishu 1984.
TABLE 24
Estimated Death Rates for Specific Age Groups in Somalia, 1975
Age Group Urban Rural Nomadic Tota!
0-1 153 180 n/a 169
1-5 29 30 n/a 30
0-14 15.8 14.1 14.2 14.6
15-49 4.8 5.8 9.4 9.3
50 + 37.4 36.7 28.8 25.7
All Ages 12.5 12.3 13.6 1 3 . 2
Source; Analytical Volume, Census of Population:1975,
Ministry of National Planning, (Mogadishu 1984) and 
Table 23.
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Cause of Death for Children in Two Urban Areas, 1977
T A B L E  2 5
Res-
Tetanus Diarrhoea piratory Measles Other Total
Age_____ No. % No. % No. % No.______% No. % No. %
Neonatal 174 19.1 31 3.4 19 2.1 127 13.9 351 38.4
1-11 mth 83 9.1 20 2.2 64 7.0 83 9.1 250 27.4
1-4 yrs 75 8.2 25 2.7 47 5.1 112 12.3 254 28.4
5 yrs 12 1.3 2 CVJ•o 15 1.6 24 2.6 53 5.8
Total 174 19.1 210 22.0 66 7.2 126 13-8 346 37.9 913 100.0
Source: A Study of Child Mortality in Mogadishu Somalia by Asli Aden 
Sigrid Birk in Journal of Tropical Pediatrics, Vol.27, No.6, 
December 1981, p.283
and
TABLE 26
Nutritional Diseases in Somalia, 1980-1982
Diseases
Male 
No. per 1,000
Female 
No. per 1,000
Total 
No. per 1,000
Anaemia 516 32.7 801 48.3 1,317 40.7
Goitre 10 0.6 35 2.1 45 1.4
Riboflavin
Deficiency 22 1.4 18 1.1 40 1.2
Marasmus 17 1.1 9 0.5 26 0.8
Night Blindness n.a. n.a. 6 0.2
Rickets 3 0.2 1 0.1 4 0.1
Kwashiorkor n.a. n.a. 1 0.03
n.a. = not available
Note: These data do not appear to include a severely drought affected
period/population. USAID 1987 preliminary survey data show higher 
incidence notably of marasmus, night blindness and kwashiorkor.
Source: National Morbidity Survey in Somalia, 1980-1982, WHO, (1984), p. 37.
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births in Bay Region versus 49.8 per 1000 in Middle Shabelli and at 5.2 per 
1000 and 19.1 per 1000 in 1982 and 1981 respectively for the Benadir/Mogadishu 
region - albeit the latter diversity may be an example of the fragility of 
data for Somalia more than of violently fluctuating death rates.
Maternal death rates (in pregnancy and childbirth) are probably of the order 
of 5 per 1,000 (versus less than one half per 1,000 in OECD member States).
The available data are for UNHCR refugee camps with much above average health
and birth facilities and - even under these conditions - show 3*8 per 1,000.
The apparent - interacting - reasons are:
a. severe anaemia affecting over 50? of women of childbearing age (versus 
40? of the total population);
b. inadequacy of traditional birth attendant training (and lack of access to 
any other birth care);
c. the universal practice of a particularly stringent form of female 
circumcision resulting in the need for a minor operation and/or severe 
bleeding to allow birth; and
d. the deliberate reduction of eating during pregnancy to hold down infant 
size to ameliorate the problem noted at "c”.
With anaemia, even minor loss of blood will result in severe debilitation and 
can prove fatal. The results of female circumcision and the limited training 
of traditional birth attendants make loss of blood common. Both debilitation 
of mothers and low birth weight increase infant mortality.
The major causes of morbidity (illness) in Somalia are: anaemia, tuberculosis, 
non-communicable respiratory diseases (especially bronchitis), diarrhoea, 
measles, residual poliomyelitis, malaria, eye diseases, schistosomiasis and 
parasitic infestation. Of these, anaemia (affecting 40? of the population), 
tuberculosis (over 30? among children of 5 to 9 in one survey and .02? in the 
whole sample on another - the former probably overstating, the possibly 
comparable Sudan rate is 18?, and the latter almost certainly grossly 
underestimating) and parasitic infections (47.5?) are common throughout 
Somalia. Poliomyelitis estimates - like those for tuberculosis - vary sharply
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from 0.24 to 1% but are not region specific. Malaria’s national average is 
about 2% but in the riverine provinces it has been estimated at up to 7-2% 
(Gedo) and in the north-western ones at 2.7%. Similarly schistosomiasis 
estimates are as high as 19.6% in the riverine provinces (Lower Juba) versus
6.3% nationally and not over 5.1% in non-riverine provinces (West 
Galbeed/Audal). It is unclear whether specific eye diseases are also 
regionally concentrated albeit river blindness is likely to be.
Beyond oral rehydration education and immunisation the major programme 
specifically relevant to any of these diseases is the Finnish tuberculosis 
project with 800 beds plus links to primary health care out-patient treatment 
and referral systems in four regions and to dispensaries and direct access in 
Mogadishu.
Primary and Community Health Care: A Way Forward?
Ten provinces (of 18, counting West Galbeed and Audal as two programmes albeit 
historically and operationally they have been one) have external 
donor/community financed primary health care programmes. Two more had them 
but these have been turned over to the Ministry of Health which (not 
surprisingly given its fiscal and other constraints) is not proving able to 
continue them.
The twelve phc programmes cover areas with a population of about 3*8 million. 
Mogadishu (say 750,000) four nomadic provinces (about 750,000) and Lower Juba 
(around 200,000) are not covered. Five governments plus UNICEF/WHO and two 
Catholic agencies are involved at a total cost of perhaps $7 to 10 million a 
year. A central basic drug revolving stock and purchasing mechanism is 
operated by WHO/UNICEF.
The basic dynamic of these systems involves:
a. agency provision of drugs, supplies, transport and distributing points to 
community health workers;
b. some use of Somali Ministry of Health provincial and district personnel 
to store, transport, distribute and monitor - in return for a
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responsibility allowance from the agency;
c. agency/health personnel training (apparently varying from 6 to 24 weeks)
of village or mobile community selected community health workers and
traditional birth attendants who then operate in their communities 
without direct supervision;
d. collection of at least some payment for drugs from the communities via 
the chw's;
e. limited field monitoring and followup by agency/health personnel;
f. community payment of chw's and tba's on any basis acceptable to both.
This system is doubtless not ideal. But it does provide an approach to 
ensuring access to basic health care which is generalisable both for the 
nomadic population and in the absence of any minimally adequately funded 
government health service. It can be linked to preventative programmes (e.g. 
health education by chw’s, iron tablets and maternal education by tba’s, 
immunisation teams collecting or being led to their cleints by chw's) and to 
diagnostic - drug distribution - advanced care level disease specific 
programmes.
The first steps toward generalisation would appear to be:
a. mobilising sponsors for the eight provinces not now effectively covered
at all;
b. extending existing programmes (the largest and oldest has about 120 chw’s 
of whom 30 are nomads in a pair of regions in which an optimal number 
might well be 700, i.e. 1 per 1,000 non-nomadic and 1 per 500 nomadic);
c. coordinating training (perhaps using the six near dormant Adult Education 
nomad training centres) and production of visual diagnostic, prescriptive 
and health education materials - areas in which there appear to be 
economies of scale.
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Among the potentially interested sponsors would be Denmark and Norway (under a 
Nordic aegis since Sweden and Finland are already in the health sector), the 
Netherlands, France (perhaps via a voluntary agency), Canada and the UK (which 
in fact as the then admninistering authority initiated this community based 
health care system in the five northwestern provinces in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s). Whether the operating agency should be governmental or a 
government financed voluntary agency requires some thought - the more
bureaucratic bilateral agencies might well consider "privatising" or 
"contracting out" to their national branches of such bodies as CARE, SCF, 
Catholic and/or Protestant church medical aid/development agencies.
The training bottleneck may be the greatest single barrier to expansion. If 1 
traditional birth attendant per 2,500-3,000 persons and 1 community
health/veterinary worker per 1,500 urban, 1,000 settled rural or 500 nomnadic 
population is needed then 2,000 trained traditional birth attendants and 7,500 
trained community health workers are needed. These ratios need rechecking but 
appear reasonable in the context of Somalia remembering that tba's and chw’s 
are part time. The present number is probably on the order of 1,000. To date 
there has been no lack of local enthusiasm for selecting and rewarding tba’s 
and chw's. However, in provinces without a prior history of this approach and 
especially in Mogadishu (whose neighbourhoods are by no means all communities 
and where the presence of pharmacies and some standard care may reduce the
perception of need), it may take time for demand to build up.
Given that except in cities, and a fortiori in nomadic communities, the 
workers will have to act without direct supervision up to the minor operation, 
diagnosis and basic drug prescription, normal childbirth and referral levels, 
a substantial training course is needed. As literacy is not a practicable 
entry requirement (especially, but not only, for nomadic community workers), 
special problems in course design and provision of followup materials for 
diagnosis, prescription and health education arise. However, experience seems 
to suggest that a course of not over six months can be designed and lead to 
competent graduates who are respected by their communities, stay on the job 
and are able to collect back drug costs.
If it is desired to move from 1,000 to 9,500 community level workers in 5 to 7 
years, then 1,250 to 2,000 trainees a year (say 625 to 1,000 places) are 
needed. To have 18 separate programmes may not be wise. If so, concentrating
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courses in the six little used nomadic education centres of Adult Education 
might make good sense; especially if courses were also mounted in them for 
training community chosen and based, water and adult education workers.
It is hard to estimate costs. Assuming most drug costs are recovered, a rough 
estimate might be about $1 million per province annually or perhaps $20 
million nationally. This includes a limited agency administrative and 
monitoring capacity; transport and distribution (including vehicles); paying 
perhaps 500 Ministry of Health staff responsibility allowances for 
distribution, training, monitoring, plus preparation and publication of visual 
materials.
An expanded programme of immunisation under Somalia - Italy - UNICEF auspices 
is in preparation (and is funded). As a one-off initial effort, it can make 
use of phc/community links where they exist and be free standing elsewhere. 
However, annual followup for infants and pregnant women can - except in cities
- neither be comprehensive nor cost efficient without phc links to educate 
demand and to facilitate the logistics of bringing immunisation personnel 
(including chw's and tba's) to communities and (less optimally) communities to 
immunisation posts. It is worth stressing that immunisation - like literacy - 
can be started as a one-off, free standing campaign but to reap the benefits 
of that campaign requires an ongoing institutional followup.
The situation in respect to tuberculosis is relatively similar. The 
diagnostic and referral levels for five provinces (perhaps 2.5 million 
population) are adequately provided by the Finnish programme. It is - except 
in Mogadishu - linked to chw identification of suspect cases for diagnosis; 
for delivery of drugs in the majority of cases in which hospitalisation is not 
indicated and for reporting on their progress as well as post discharge 
monitoring of those hospitalised. Its expansion to national coverage is not 
practicable without a national phc/chw system.
Two additional basic health care programmes are desirable: district clinics 
(not full fledged hospitals) for referral of cases beyond chw or tba 
competence and a mobile eye clinic service led to its clients by chw's. 
Neither is impracticable - as demonstrated by experience in Kenya and 
Tanzania. But in Somalia both probably should follow - not be substitutes for
- firm phc foundations. Thus in provinces - e.g. West Galbeed/Audal the
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Shabelle's - with fairly well established phc/chw networks the phc sponsors 
might well seek to establish what form cost efficient district clinics could 
take and to collaborate with some of the international agencies/voluntary 
bodies providing quick primary eye care.
The total expenditure implied is of the order of $30-35 million ($20 million
phc, $7.5 million tuberculosis, $2.5-7.5 million clinics/eye care). As donors 
are now providing up to $25-35 million for capital projects and direct 
programmes, an increase of 20? plus some reallocation from capital projects 
whose use the Ministry of Health cannot finance should allow meeting the cost. 
This cost level depends on community selection and payment (on whatever basis 
is acceptable to the communities and health workers) of the community level 
personnel and on community/user payment for drugs (again on any basis the
community desires that covers the drug cost). Meeting those costs centrally 
would add say $20-25 million or more per year ($1,500 times 10,000 community 
workers and $5-10 million for drugs) to the cost and render financing well 
nigh non-feasible.
Over time, greater responsibility can and should be shifted to the Ministry of 
Health. But at present all it can do is take a full role in planning and 
"second" selected staff members to help handle delivery, training, supervision 
and monitoring. As - when - its real resources revive, its logical first
priorities would probably be to revive district clinics (of which not over 20?
are functioning) and to raise its pay scales toward the level necessary to
live (a 10 fold increase in the face of it and at least 5 fold even allowing
for allowances and private practice on the side if tied to phasing out
decentralised, privatised user fees). Until that can be accomplished -
realistically a goal for 1995 not 1990 - the basic primary health care -
immunisation - birth attendance - tuberculosis link should probably remain 
donor/community. Premature return to the government (as demonstrated in the 
two provinces in which it has been tried) is likely to cause a relapse not
accelerated convalescence for the Ministry of Health’s provision of health
services.
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And Primary Veterinary Care?
Animal health is not usually grouped with human. In Somalia there may be good 
reasons to make an exception to this rule in respect to community health 
worker based approaches. Certainly Somali nomads and agro-pastoralists think 
community health services should provide basic drugs for their flocks as well 
as their families because they see no other channel (public or private) likely 
to do so.
A limited range of known basic livestock drugs could sharply reduce livestock 
mortality. This is especially true during and at the end of a drought. 
Limited water and forage weaken but kill more often by reducing disease 
resistance than by literal starvation (a situation comparable to human drought 
deaths). With rains - and lower temperatures - respiratory diseases and 
diarrhoea (whose treatment for livestock is directly analagous to that for 
children and apparently was developed rather earlier) carry off large numbers 
of animals whom a limited rage of drugs and injections plus salt cakes could 
save.
Pastoralists can diagnose many of the diseases and have accurate ideas as to 
what drugs, injections and/or salt they need. They are willing - and on the 
whole able - to pay. But neither the public nor the private (legalised in 
1985) sector has the drugs to sell as brutally demonstrated during the 1987 
drought.
Readily avoidable livestock losses lead directly to lower nutritional 
standards (loss of milk and meat), lower incomes (loss of animal and products 
sales), more illness (from weakened resistance) and more work for women (to 
tend the ill). Evidently there is a clear human and social as well as 
economic imperative to act.
In part of the northwest a few districts still have a community veterinary 
worker system (apparently a survival from the protectorate). The cvw collects 
(and pays for) drugs from a district headquarters; distributes to (and 
collects payment from) nomadic households; reports back with the cash and 
empty tins for a new lot.
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Livestock Population and Losses Drought-Affected Regions, 1987 
(000 beasts)
MIDDLE LOWER
TABLE 27
T0DGHER SANAG NUGAL BARI SOOL MUDUG GALKAY0 HIRAN SHABELLE SHABELLE BAK00L GED0 TOTALS
Camels
1975 Census 320 137 103 160 200 751 359 461 205 293 192 784
1987: ♦ 13% 362 155 116 181 226 849 446 521 232 311 217 784
Drought losses 54 23 17 27 34 127 67 78 35 50 33 133
1987 Stock 308 132 99 154 192 721 379 443 197 281 184 753 3,843
Cattle
1975 Census 44 49 8 10 34 340 218 170 382 419 100 528
1987: + 14% 50 56 9 11 39 388 249 194 435 478 114 602
Drought losses 18 20 3 4 14 136 87 68 152 167 40 211
1987 Stock 33 36 6 7 25 252 162 126 283 310 74 391 1,795
Sheep
1975 Census 917 1,014 149 925 1,044 1,136 588 287 325 90 79 500
1987: + 20% 1,100 1.217 179 1,110 1,253 1,363 706 344 390 108 95 600
Drought losses 605 669 98 611 689 750 388 189 216 59 52 330
1987 Stock 495 648 80 500 564 613 318 155 176 49 43 270 3,811
Goats
1975 Census 852 443 407 1,397 1,123 2,744 1,734 1,159 720 200 274 725
1987: «■ 28% 1,891 567 521 1,788 1,437 3,512 2,220 1,484 922 256 329 928
Drought losses 600 312 287 983 791 1,932 1,221 816 507 141 181 510
1987 Stock 491 255 234 805 647 1,581 999 668 417 115 148 418 6,778
Total Stock 1,327 971 419 1,466 1,428 3,167 1,858 1,392 1,071 755 449 1,832 16,137
Drug Requirements
Acaracides(gl) 1,327 971 419 1,466 1,428 3,167 1,858 1,392 1,071 755 499 1,832 16,137
Anthelmintics 
(tabl) 4m 2.9m 1.3m 4.4m 4.3m 9.5m 6.5m 4.1m 3.2m 2.3m 1.3m 5.5m 50.000.000
Antibiotics
(ltrs) 7,962 5,826 2,514 8,796 8,568 19,002 11,148 8,352 6,426 4,530 2,694 10,992 97,000
Salt licks(T) 66 49 21 73 71 158 93 70 54 38 22 92 800
MULTIVIT(ltrs)13,270 9,710 4,910 13,660 14,280 31,670 18,580 13,920 10,710 7,550 4,490 18,320 160,000
Average Drug Distribution Key
Consumption of Acaracides: 1 gallon for 1,000 animals 
Consumption of Anthelmintics: 3 tablets per animal
Consumption of Salt licks: 0.05 kg per a n im a l
Consumption of Antibiotics: 6 ml per a n im a l
Consumption of MULTIVIT (oral): 10 ml per animal
Animal losses (officially announced): Camels: 15%; Cattle: 35%; Small Ruminants: 55%
Source: Donors' Drought Action Committee, "Report On Drought Situation" based on data from the Ministry of Livestock,
Forestry and Range, Mogadishu, May 1987 (mimeo).
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Primary health care systems based on chw’s should be able to add on basic 
veterinary drug distribution at low cost. This would involve:
a. a national veterinary drug revolving fund and purchasing channel
analagous to the basic human drug one operated by WHO/UNICEF. The 
initial cost might be $3 to $5 million with sales of drugs covering 
replenishment;
b. an additional two weeks training of chw’s to be cvw’s - partly in
diagnosis but also in relating drug packets/markings to diseases. This 
should have a relatively low cost - i.e. two weeks per newly trained
worker board plus fees to veterinary personnel to prepare and give 
lectures;
c. preparation of simple visual (not written as most cvw's will be
illiterate) materials to assist in diagnosis and selection of the
appropriate drug. Probably up to $50,000 preparation and $10,000 a year 
printing;
d. channelling the veterinary drugs through the phc drug transport and
distribution system and the drug cost collection payments back via the 
same route. As most of the costs are fixed the additional volume should 
not raise them - paying up to 100 veterinary officers $1,000 a year
veterinary allowance (about 1 per province plus 1 per district) for a 
total of $100,000 to monitor and supervise might be prudent both in its 
own right and to gain ministry blessing for the programme.
The cvw’s would be the same persons as the chw’s and would therefore be
village or mobile community selected and remunerated. So long as they do 
their job, have a low wastage rate and enjoy community backing, 
standardisation of (or central intervention in) the local selection or 
remuneration processes would be counter-productive, especially since payment 
would probably be largely in kind varying in makeup and amount geographically 
and seasonally.
The total operating cost of this programme - if integrally linked with primary 
health care and providing for drug cost recovery (except perhaps during 
drought crises in severely affected districts) - should not exceed $2 million
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a year. As livestock and rural (primarily livestock) water capital support 
for 1987 is estimated at over $50 million (and historically has a very poor 
cost/benefit ratio not unrelated to high animal mortality), the economic case 
for additional (or reallocated) expenditure of this order of magnitude would 
appear very hard to refute.
Water: Access, Quality, Reliability
The estimated access to safe water is 33% s 58% for urban residents and 22% for 
rural resident. It is not at all clear what these figures are to be 
interpreted as meaning.
In most urban areas perhaps 10/6 of households have piped water connections, 40 
to 60Í collect directly from public taps and 20 to 40Í buy from water carriers 
collecting from public taps. Use (or buying from) private wells or - a 
fortiori - open bodies of water (which most of the year are non-existent) is 
not common except in some small towns.
Therefore, arguably 80 to 90/6 of urban Somalis have access to safe water. The
problem is lack of nearby public taps/standpipes. Their absence either 
increases the workload on women and girls to collect and carry water or weighs
heavily on budgets of poor people who - almost by definition - are usually
those not near standpipes. As 40 gallons of piped water cost 1 Shilling but 
in outlying unorganised areas 1 gallon from a water carrier costs Sh 40 (which 
for what it is worth is a day's wage for a clerk) the cost issue is not
trivial. In either case the cost in time or money holds down water
consumption with negative implications for cleansing, washing and bathing and 
therefore for environmental sanitation and health.
The rural total is presumptively an average of very different district totals 
(not necessarily divided on nomadic/settled lines as some rangelands have 
fairly extensive borehole networks and some riverine districts have few 
protected sources). It almost certainly excludes community built wells and 
commercially built birkets and improved ponds in nomadic areas. Further, it
is not clear what is meant by safe - wells and boreholes as well as birkets,
ponds and rivers can be polluted.
- 1 0 9 -
Yet further complexities arise seasonally and operationally. Nomadic access 
to water (pure or otherwise) varies seasonally both for availability reasons 
in any place and because nomads - by definition - are in different places at 
different times of year. Dryland agricultural area (e.g. Bay) access is very 
seasonal. The 21Í is apparently based on installed capacity. A - probably 
conservative - estimate is that 20/6 of boreholes and pumps are out of 
operation at any time because of lack of spares and/or fuel.
TABLE 28
Time Spent In Water Provision In The Bay Region
Village
Wet Season 
Roundtrip
Dry Season 
Roundtrip
Sarman Dheere \ hour 6 hours
Hareero Jiifo 1¿ hour 6 hours
Shabelle Dugsilo \ hour 8 hours
Warta Jaffay \ hour 4 hours
Buulo Hawo \ hour 8 hours
Bootis \ hour up to 6 hours
Robay Gaduud 5 hour 3-6 hours
Gaduudo Dhunte 1 hour 6 hours
Buulo Fur \ hour 1¿ hours
Durei Ali Galle 5 hour 5 hours
Buulo Gaduud 1 hour 3 hours
Kurman 1 hour trucked from Diinsoor
Dodole 10 minutes 10 minutes
Shiidalow \ hour 5 hour
Source; Bay Region Exploratory Report; Socio-Economic Section, Water 
Development Agency, (Mogadishu, 1983), pp.6-51.
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Purity is not the only relevant consideration. More water is of itself 
desirable even without safety improvement. Cleansing, washing and bathing are 
related to availability of water and have a positive impact even if the water 
is not optimally pure. Water used in cooking is (more or less by definition) 
boiled and drinking water can be. Thus the first priority in most of rural 
Somalia is probably reliable access to adequate quantities of water with 
absolute safety (beyond steps to avoid pollution by livestock or by runoff 
into potentially safe sources) a subsequent consideration. This may not be so 
true in riverine areas where river or shallow well water is frequently 
available in adequate quantity but is also not infrequently polluted.
The fiscal position of the public water sector is unsound. The apparent 
recurrent budget for 1986 and 1987 is of the order of $750,000 to $1,000,000. 
In practice perhaps $1,500,000 described as local development expenditure is 
in fact recurrent. Even so, the total can hardly exceed $2.5 million.
The capital stock of the water sector is at least $200 million. Using a 
standard SSA recurrent to capital ratio the minimum adequate recurrent budget 
would appear to be of the order of $10 million. With $175 million (excluding 
sewage) capital works slated for 1987-1991 by 1992 the recurrent budget should 
rise to the order of $20 million (a calculation broadly in accord with 
Government of Somalia planning estimates).
The results of an inadequate recurrent budget are clear and costly. Normal 
maintenance is not done; spares are not to hand; fuel supply is undependable. 
Therefore water supplies are not reliable and expensive facilities frequently 
reach a condition requiring total rehabilitation or replacement in 5 to 10 
years. Then it is frequent to replace (e.g. drill new deep boreholes) rather 
than rehabilitate even when the latter would be technically feasible, cheaper 
and faster. That criticism is not captious, it has been made by USAID, the 
largest source of borehole programme design and management.
Clearly a reordering of total public sector resources from new capital 
projects to rehabilitation and - a fortiori - operation and maintenance would 
increase economic efficiency and actual availability of water. To do this 
donors/lenders will need either to build five year maintenance components into 
all water projects or to provide direct support to the ministry for its 
operational and maintenance budget.
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Water - especially urban and rangeland deep borehole water - is not a sector 
in which do-it-yourself, small is beautiful approaches have universal 
applicability. However, even in these sub-sectors certain community/user 
contributions could help:
a. nomadic community simple maintenance of boreholes and 
construction/management of access and drainage to avoid pollution by 
mixed livestock and human use of the same point and/or reflow of drainage 
water into the borehole;
b. urban community contribution (in labour or hiring it) to building 
trenches for secondary distribution pipes to provide a properly 
articulated standpipe system in low income urban areas.
Shallow well, birket, pond and spring based water supply is within the range 
of activities communities can undertake with limited external training, 
technical advice, design and equipment/spares support. The cost of shallow 
wells with hand pumps tends to be around $500 or less if the community 
provides labour inputs. Once appropriate designs are developed, community 
selected personnel (including women) could be trained in 3 to 6 week courses 
to lead construction and maintenance. The case for involving women is very 
strong:
a. women and girls are the water carriers. In dryland provinces in the dry 
seasons they may spend up to 8 hours a roundtrip (and often spend 3 to 6) 
collecting water;
b. women and girls are responsible for cleansing, cooking, washing, bathing 
children - i.e. they are the main users of water for human (as opposed to 
livestock watering) purposes;
c. maintenance - as opposed to construction - tends to fall on the female 
side of the gender division of labour albeit there is more gender overlap 
in tasks performed in rural Somalia than in many other SSA rural areas.
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Two types of shallow wells are relevant:
a. standard ones especially in riverine areas or ones with relatively high 
water tables;
b. underground check dams in "dry" seasonal watercourse beds with perforated 
plastic pipes behind the dam to lead water to a pump on the bank.
Birkets (runoff catchment basins) and improved natural or artificial ponds are 
also relevant to many rangeland areas. Indeed large numbers have been 
constructed by nomads and - interestingly - by traders both to water animals 
they have purchased and to induce nomads to concentrate herds in areas 
convenient for merchant procurement. However, there do appear to be gaps in 
coverage, deterioration of ponds and avoidable pollution by livestock of human 
water supply. A simple set of spot studies should allow firmer identification 
of what agency/community cooperation on which of these topics in what 
districts deserve priority attention.
One innovation which may be worth testing is the use of sand filled ponds with 
offtake pipes instead of open ones. This - the analogue to the underground 
dam fed wells - is a technique used in parts of Namibia and Botswana 
apparently comparable to Somalia's central rangelands to reduce evaporation 
loss. A review of their experience and - if it appears promising - a pair of 
pilot sandfill ponds plus two comparable open ponds to test (and if successful 
demonstrate) potential greater water recovery by this technique would be worth 
undertaking.
Small scale community oriented water work could well be organised on a basis 
analagous to primary health care. Again one agency per province (ideally the 
same one as for phc) should take responsibility for coordinated planning 
together with communities and the Somali government. Its inputs would include 
pumps and spares, perhaps cement and hand tools if they are not readily 
commercially available, transport, liaison and monitoring (ideally by Ministry 
personnel paid responsibility allowances) and training community selected 
water workers. The latter would need to be trained in: well or pond or dam 
design and construction, maintenance (including simple pump and borehole 
maintenance), pollution protection (both techniques and reasons).
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It appears likely on the basis of small scale community water project support 
experience that communities would raise labour and some cash for spares, 
tools, materials and would be interested in selecting trainees for 4 to 12 
weeks basic skills and approaches courses. Nationally a prepositioned 
revolving stock of spares would be needed analagous to the WHO/UNICEF one for 
basic drugs.
Sanitation: Sewers, Latrines and Environmental Health
Sanitation is an increasing problem in urban areas (especially Mogadishu) and 
in some settled agricultural areas. Even with the proposed $50 million 
1984-1991 central Mogadishu sewer system, over half the capital’s population 
will have no access to piped sewerage systems. There is virtually no
municipal (and surprisingly little private) refuse collection with rotting 
piles even in middle and upper income areas. The situation in other towns is 
less severe - not because there are more services but because the towns are 
smaller.
Even in urban areas pit latrines are apparently less than common; in settled 
agricultural areas they are rare and in nomadic ones virtually unknown. The 
stated reasons are inappropriateness because of lack of water and
non-adaptability to the needs of shifting household groups.
If improved sanitation - which is important to environmental sanitation and 
health especially in a hot climate and in a clinical context of high incidence
of diarrhoea and parasitic infestation - is to be achieved, the basic means
for the foreseeable future must be some variant on the pit latrine. Action is 
particularly urgent in urban and riverine areas because of denser population 
and the pollution of ground and river water sources flowing from random 
defecation.
The lack of water claim is perplexing. Pit latrines are widely used in dry 
areas of, e.g., Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Ghana. A first step would be 
to contrast extant Somalia designs with those used in these countries to 
identify possible modifications. Then pilot (and if successful full scale) 
skills training/adult education programmes possibly linked both to radio 
programmes (dealing concretely with why and how) and to community health
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workers’ educational efforts could be mounted.
Full scale pit latrines do represent too large a labour investment for too 
brief a use period for nomadic communities except in respect to "base camps" 
occupied at least six months a year and returned to annually or virtually 
annually. For small nomadic groups with stays in one location of two weeks or 
less, formal latrines may not be necessary (and almost certainly will not be 
accepted). For larger groups with longer stays, experiments toward developing 
a less elaborate, short use oriented, less labour intensive analogue might be 
desirable.
Refuse collection in urban areas will in practice need to be largely private 
or community sector. The most municipalities can realistically hope (and find 
resources) to do is to have strategically placed skips collected once a week 
into which private dustmen (for middle and upper class areas) and community 
financed small scale rubbish collectors (poor and unorganised areas) can 
dump their collections.
Fuel - Questions But What Answers?
Somalia does face growing household fuel supply problems. First, in urban 
areas charcoal prices are rising and do strain low income household budgets. 
Second, in settled agricultural and nomadic areas a substantial proportion of 
women and girls' work overload represents gathering branches, twigs, shrubs 
and dead trees for fuel (probably up to 6 hours a day in extreme cases and 
quite possibly 2 to 3 average). As population increases and nearby woods are 
cleared/bush cut down, this workload rises. Third, forests are being cut more 
rapidly than they grow primarily to meet the Mogadishu demand for charcoal. 
Fourth, there is some evidence of spot degradation of savannah and bushland 
environment from over-trimming or cutting out of live tress and bushes because 
the supply of dead limbs and/or whole dead trees and bushes is no longer 
adequate to meet household needs.
Posing the problems is relatively straightforward. Even tentative answers are 
much more difficult to identify. Mogadishu (as well as Kisamayo and Hargeisa) 
are virtually certain to remain dependent on commercially produced and 
transported charcoal. No substitute is likely to prove technically feasible
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and economically competitive. Increasing supply/lowering cost/avoiding 
deforestation requires a transition to forest plantations of some appropriate 
tree (which may or may not be one of the 200 odd species of eucalyptus or arid 
zone pine) and, perhaps, their location nearer to the major markets (e.g. in 
the Afgoi area) than present natural woodland sources. However, tree cutting 
rules and fees to encourage transition are likely to raise, not lower, 
charcoal prices even if largely ploughed back into plantation development.
In settled agricultural areas, encouragement of selective village and/or 
household woodlots, windbreak and multi-purpose (fruit, fodder, fuel from 
trimmings) orchards could be included in adult education (not least its radio 
broadcasts). This would require prior research and testing as well as 
nurseries for and stocks of seedlings. On the rangelands it is not evident 
what if anything can be done to raise supply except around base camps (such as 
those in West Galbeed/Audal and Bay) where approaches similar to those in crop 
areas may be practical.
Use reduction turns on efficiency of fuel combustion. In respect to charcoal 
it may be that simple study and extension would yield a more efficient burning 
kiln or rick which could increase charcoal per cubic metre of wood and lower 
unit cost of charcoal. For cooking the basic routes are improved three stone 
fires and improved stoves/braziers. The former - if tested, demonstrated and 
included in rural adult education - are likely to be popular if they really do 
reduce fuel (and thus fuel collection time) required.
On stoves it is necessary first that they reduce fuel use enough to pay for
themselves in a few months - at least that is Sahelian experience. Second
they must produce the kind of heat/flame appropriate to Somali cooking. It is 
not clear that the improved meerschaum stove developed in Somalia does meet 
these criteria. It tends to produce a high/hot flame whereas a low/cooler one 
is more commonly sought for Somali cooking. There do not seem to be reliable
tests on fuel savings under actual household operating conditions.
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CHAPTER 4 
EDUCATION: HOW TO REVERSE COLLAPSE
The Trend 1979-87
In 1975 Somalia mounted the first full scale national literacy drive in SSA 
and in 1975 began a serious programme to move to universal primary education. 
By 1977 it was believed male literacy was approaching 60$ and female 45$ with 
the national level above 50$. In that year initial enrollment in primary 
school was about 70$ of the age group. With modest further growth from that 
level and a moderate dropout rate, total enrollment should by 1984 have 
reached 500,000 or 40$ of the age qohort.
In fact, by 1987, nominal first year primary school enrollment had fallen from 
68,256 to about 40,000 or at most 25$ of the age group and total primary 
enrollment to barely over 200,000 or barely 15$ of those of primary school 
age, under 20$ for boys and under 11$ for girls. 40$ of primary schools were 
officially closed; books and writing materials were nearly non-existent in 
most schools; primary teacher salaries were at or under $6 a month at the free 
market exchange rate.
Similarly literacy had probably fallen to 20-25$ of the adult population - 
perhaps slightly over 50$ urban (60-67$ male and 30-33$ female); 15-20$ 
settled agricultural (25-30$ male, 5-7.5$ female); 5-10$ nomadic (10-15$ male, 
1-3$ female). With not more than 25$ of children ever receiving any primary 
education and a least one third of them completing four years or less and 
probably failing to acquire permanent literacy, the proportion of functionally 
literate can only be expected to fall if present trends continue. Many of 
these who became literate in the 1975 campaign - some sample surveys suggest 
up to two thirds - have relapsed into illiteracy because of lack of follow-on 
continuing education or anything to read.
These primary education and literacy trends are the worst in the world and are 
particularly devastating after the high hopes and good start of 1975-1979. 
They relate directly to the collapse in real government revenue and especially
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TABLE 33
Per Cent Literate By Age Group And Sex, Settled 
Population In Three Regions, 1980
10+ 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50+
46 64 60 51 43 35 36 33 32 32
63 72 73 70 65 57 61 55 54 42
29 55 49 35 25 15 13 10 10
This population is not representative because it excludes nomads (very 
low literacy) and has an urban (high literacy) bias.
Census Study for Benadir (Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle, and Bay Regions, 
Ministry of National Planning and North Carolina University, (1981), 
Table 11.11.
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in real social service spending. In 1979 the recurrent education budget 
(which excludes the university) was of the order of $20 million. By 1985 it 
was of the order of $2.5 million and has declined further since then.
The official figures, horrifying as they are, understate the desperateness of 
the situation. Official spot checks indicate that up to 5056 of teachers and 
pupils on the books are not, in fact, normally present (admittedly at a peak 
agricultural labour demand period) while one unofficial study in a riverine 
province found 25 of 25 nominally operating schools effectively closed and 
silent. The quality of primary education is very low with a disastrous
knock-on effect. Secondary education (and lower level teacher training) must 
spend much of its efforts doing what should have been achieved in primary. 
Despite a pre-university makeup year, the National University in many 
departments must operate at higher secondary school level.
The adult education picture is even bleaker. There is - despite official
endorsement and desire - no mass literacy programme. Main line adult 
education consists largely of a few thousand part time students doing what 
amounts to a substitute primary course. A similar - smaller - women's
education programme concentrates in its first year on household skills and
only later on income enhancing subjects. Nominally seven adult
technical/artisanal education centres exist but only two have buildings, of 
these only one is equipped. Six short residential course nomadic education 
centres exist physically but appear to be largely unstaffed and even more
largely unpupilled. A well done adult literacy newspaper oriented to settled 
farmers exists - but with only 1,000 to 1,500 copies an issue. So does a 
radio programme directed to the same audience. Pilot on the ground programmes 
to which these are linked exist in parts of two riverine provinces.
The problems of adult education can be summed up concisely:
a. in most cases there is no curriculum related to and tested against
potential student needs and wishes;
b. even if there were, neither specialised, trained teaching cadres nor
appropriate materials (books, equipment, inputs into artisanal or craft 
training) exist; and
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c. even were the first two problems overcome there is no money. The 
mainline government adult education budget is Sh 1,000,000 (say $6,000 to 
7,000) and even counting other national and donor contributions the 
recurrent funds available are apparently not over $100,000.
Efforts To Reverse Decline
Donor efforts first to consolidate or expand and later to rebuild Somalia's 
primary and adult education system have to date been piecemeal and - as can be 
seen plainly in retrospect - not only inadequate but so structurally flawed as 
to be foredoomed. Capital spending has risen from $3*5 million in 19811 to 
$8.3 million in 1986 despite the patent inability to maintain, staff or 
operate existing facilities. Capacity development support (e.g. to the 
curriculum development, educational planning, adult education and textbook 
units) has kept innovation and ideas flowing and produced some pilot results. 
But with a negligible recurrent budget these cannot be generalised, e.g. even 
the new texts developed remain largely unprinted (paper and press capacity), 
undistributed (transport bottlenecks) and/or ill conserved (lack of cupboards 
and monitoring). Similarly without improved salaries the strengthened lower 
level teacher education programme (especially as it stresses both Arabic and 
English) is more likely to improve the quality of teachers in the Gulf 
countries than in Somalia.
Parents are deeply concerned at the decline in educational access and quality. 
In an increasing number of cases (documented in particular in West 
Galbeed/Audal and Middle Shabelle but known to be wider spread) they have 
raised money to supplement teachers' salaries, repair buildings, restore 
furniture, acquire writing materials. Over 1986-87 the government has moved 
to full backing of this community support approach which may be a key to 
halting and reversing decline.
Three Special Problems
Somali primary school terms are ill adapted to the seasonal patterns of 
agricultural labour requirements. For example in early 1987 only about 5% of 
the pupils of a riverine province primary school refurbished and largely
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financed by its community were present despite there being teachers, some 
furniture and materials and self-evident ($1,500-2,000 recent community 
finance) support. They were needed for ground preparation and planting.
This problem appears to be general. It used to exist in Europe and North 
America too. There as recently as the 1930s many rural schools set their 
terms and term breaks so that children could augment family labour in peak 
demand periods without missing classes. There is tentative interest in
pursuing a similar approach in Somalia, i.e. allowing provincial education 
officers in consultation with parents to revise the timing of terms and
breaks. This might result in two to three different regional academic years 
and a certain discontinuity with secondary school years. Its potential 
benefits in enhancing attendance, reducing the opportunity cost of education 
to rural households and increasing parent/community support for primary 
education greatly outweigh these real but manageable bureaucratic
considerations.
Education for nomads by definition must either be nomadic or residential; i.e. 
it must either follow the pastoral communities as they migrate or provide
places in which nomadic pupils/students can live throughout the school year 
outside their households. The former approach has not proven practicable in 
Somalia. The latter exists but on a private sector or intra extended family 
basis. Nomadic household children are placed with town or city relatives to 
attend school. However, while much larger than the perhaps 1$ of nomadic
children enrolled in rural schools (largely in the northwest where a more
permanent base location for women and young children is common), the % of 
nomadic children enrolled in urban schools is probably under 5/6.
What can be done is not clear. Large scale residential education at state 
expense is not feasible. Whether an expanded and higher quality primary
system would significantly raise the proportion of nomadic household children
(and especially of girls, under 1Í of whom are likely to receive any primary 
education) placed with sedentary household members to attend school is 
problematic.
Two lines of inquiry are worth pursuing. What are the experiences of other 
SSA countries with substantial pastoral populations, e.g. Botswana, Mali, 
Sudan, Niger? How many children of Somalian nomadic households do attend
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school while residing with relatives and what are the constraints on expansion 
of their numbers?
Somalia is seeking to advance education in four languages: Somali, Arabic, 
English and Italian. Somali is central as the national language. Arabic is 
the language of Islam, of the Gulf countries and of the Arab League. English 
is a regional as well as global lingua franca. Italian has a role because of 
former colonial and present financial and technical links.
However, the problems of seeking to achieve literacy and operate education in 
up to four languages are severe. For example, primary school systems seeking 
to achieve reasonable fluency and literacy in two languages often fail in one 
(e.g. Botswana and Tanzania where Tsetswana and Swahili competence is adequate 
but that in the second language, English, usually is not) or both (Puerto Rico 
where primary leaving standards in both Spanish and English are too low).
A possible approach in Somalia would be along the lines of:
a. developing Somali as the main medium of instruction at all levels 
including the basically Somali staffed departments at the University;
b. encouraging and assisting Koranic schools to teach Arabic (in addition to 
memorising the Holy Koran) and introducing Arabic as an optional subject 
in secondary, adult, teacher training and university education (as well 
as the language of instruction in appropriate university faculties) and 
subsequently perhaps in the final two years of primary school;
c. introducing English as an optional subject in secondary, teacher 
training, adult and university education as well as a secondary language 
of instruction (with stress on reading ability) at university level and 
subsequently perhaps in the final two years of primary school. In 
secondary and teacher training schools students should be required to 
study either Arabic or English.
While evidently difficult to implement fully, this approach would at the least 
provide a coherent framework and access to Arabic and English to those who 
need/wish to learn them while preserving and building up the primacy of the 
national language.
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Koranic Education - Success and Limitations
About half of Somalia's children receive some Koranic education - i.e. twice 
as many as receive any primary education. Total enrollments are now probably
approaching 400,000 of whom about 35Í are girls (the same proportion
interestingly as in formal primary education).
Koranic education appears to encompass most formal primary school students,
i.e. they attend one in the morning and the other in the afternoon. However, 
it encompasses more students in all population groups and especially among
nomads. Koranic teachers load up their camels and follow their pupils.
Because it uses locally made materials - erasable wood slates, writing sticks 
and ink made from milk and soot - Koranic education is better equipped than 
formal primary. Similarly because parents pay Koranic teachers (in cash or - 
especially in nomadic and settled agricultural communities - kind) teachers 
can afford to, and do, appear regularly for classes. Whether most of the 
10,000 odd teachers (of whom perhaps 2/6, concentrated in one area, are women) 
are full time is unclear. A survey suggests that they are, but casual
evidence suggests that at least a large number do have herds, crops or a wide 
variety of jobs (e.g. night watchmen and other domestic occupations in 
Mogadishu).
Koranic education fills a very clear religious and social role in Somalia. 
The overwhelming majority of Somalis are practising Moslems. Knowing and 
being able to recite the Holy Koran (or at least key texts from it) and to
comprehend its basic teachings is of great importance to them.
Unfortunately Koranic education in Somalia has distinct limitations. First, 
the overwhelming majority of classes teach memorisation and reproduction of 
Koranic texts, not actual ability to read or write them in Arabic. Second, 
only a minority include Koranic study in the sense of explanation and
reflection on the meaning of passages. Third, there is very little
inter-penetration of the Koranic, the formal and the adult education systems. 
For example, the latter do not identify, reflect on and use relevant Koranic 
texts (although curriculum development is now taking initial steps in this 
direction). Fourth, instruction in literacy and numeracy in Arabic is very 
unusual (significantly under 5/6 of all schools).
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The reasons for this pattern are complex but the main barrier to altering it 
is the level of education of the teachers. A majority are illiterate in any 
language. Only a small minority have pursued formal Koranic studies 
themselves (other than memorisation). They are in the main not able to deepen 
or broaden their teaching unless they are able to deepen and broaden their own 
linguistic and theological education.
To approach this challenge requires both sensitivity and the integral 
involvement both of Somali Islamic scholars and leaders and of Islamic 
educational experts with experience in more fully developed Koranic education 
systems.
It appears likely that after dialogue the Islamic leadership of Somalia would 
wish to see deeper and fuller Koranic studies grounded on a knowledge of 
Arabic and training in Koranic thought developed. If this proves to be the 
case, technical assistance of Islamic scholars - from other Islamic 
educational systems and/or relevant Pan-Arab professional bodies - will be 
needed.
The optimal primary source of technical assistance may be the Arab Republic of 
Egypt. Egypt has a fully developed Islamic education system from primary 
through postgraduate (at the intellectually rigorous, ancient and 
internationally renowned A1 Hazar University) levels. Its Islamic scholars 
could advise on curriculum development and teacher training and provide help 
in building up teacher training capacity in Somalia as well as making places 
available for more Somali Koranic scholars to pursue advanced studies in 
Egypt.
Primary Education - Toward Revival
Revival of primary education requires six elements:
a. community support;
b. external funding of some recurrent as well as of capital costs;
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c. completion, printing and distribution of new textbooks;
d. primary school rehabilitation and re-equipping;
e. substantially - say 10 fold - higher teacher pay;
f. a distribution (of texts and materials) and monitoring/inspectorate 
system with adequately paid and mobile staff.
Broad agreement on this approach has been reached among the Somalia Ministries 
of Education and of Planning, potential external supporting agencies 
(including UNICEF) and - in the sense that micro examples exist - Somali 
communities.
The World Bank has drawn most of the threads of this discussion together in 
its paper "Action Programme for Primary Education". The broad parameters of 
that paper seem sound - especially in contrast to past pumping of funds into 
buildings that stood idle and supporting service units which had little 
ongoing programme to support.
The key - and novel - elements are community involvement (including payment of 
up to 40Í of teachers' pay) and a near ten-fold increase in teachers' monthly 
salaries to the Sh 7>600-8,550 range. The latter are to be financed: 10%
present wage, 50% additional food aid, 25 to 40% community (or parents in 
World Bank version), 25% special donor grant to rural teachers only. 
Presumably the pay levels (which are in 1987 prices) are first approximations 
and the question of whether the (lower) urban one is indeed high enough to 
secure full time, motivated teachers will be explored in greater depth.
The programme is conceptualised to last seven years (with review and decisions 
on possible extension in year six). This is to provide continuity, accepting 
that Somalia government takeover of primary funding responsibility is not 
possible before year eight and, indeed, may need to be phased in over a period 
beginning in year eight.
The enrollment goals of the programme is 20% of the age group by year four and 
25% by year seven. Even the latter is low by SSA standards, but it is a 
marked increase on the present nominal 14-15% and up to three times the 
probable actual present functional enrollments defined as regular attendance 
of pupils and teachers.
- 1 2 9 -
Most of the World Bank paper's formulations are unexceptionable - at least at 
this stage. Some, however, require elaboration or comment.
Organisation needs to be designed with some care to preserve both coherence 
and flexibility. Centrally the Ministry of Education (including planning, 
primary education, curriculum development and - if there is to be a link to 
continuing education - adult and women's education), all supporting agencies 
and representatives of provincial/district education teams and supporting 
communities need to have a forward planning, strategic coordination and 
monitoring team backed by a small specialist monitoring and bottleneck 
breaking unit.
Provincially there should be one lead agency to work with Ministry and 
community representatives. If primary health and water work is also 
characterised by agency specialisation by province, it could usefully be the 
same agency as is active in health and water in all or most provinces. That 
agency would report back to the central coordinating unit on the provincial 
sub-programme's progress. As rapidly as possible there should be some 
involved primary schools in each province and district. Pedagogical, equity 
and political reasons point in that direction as does the need to see this 
programme as a first step toward reviving primary education and reintegrating 
it into the core Somali government education system. Evidently the number of 
schools per province will vary widely, but some communities in each will wish 
to participate and should not be turned away indefinitely in the name of some 
province by province phased bureaucratic model.
As noted elsewhere, nomadic children's participation - except in areas in 
which nomads have base camps where women and children remain most of the year 
- is likely to be largely by placing children with urban relatives. However, 
once the programme is established, discussions with nomadic communities on 
how/whether mobile schools (portable on 2 or 3 camels) would be feasible and 
desired, might usefully be pursued.
Specialised, dedicated printing capacity in the ministry - as opposed to a 
nominal share in a unitary government press - is desirable. Since there 
apparently is an ongoing project to supply women's and/or adult education with
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separate printing capacity a review to coordinate is needed. Possible 
programmatic components would include:
a. printing capacity linked to curriculum development (including layout, 
graphic and decision capacity) for all primary texts and teaching 
materials;
b. a parallel capacity for adult and women’s education linked to those two
departments and to curriculum development for texts, booklets, posters,
teaching materials and the literacy newspaper;
c. commodity aid programmes with appropriate countries (perhaps Canada,
Finland, Sweden, Norway and/or Hungary) to provide paper and printing ink
over five years to underwrite the books/teaching materials availability
side of the programme;
d. a transport unit (of modest size) to handle distribution from Mogadishu 
to district centres breaking the present bottleneck which causes texts 
once printed to pile up in Mogadishu warehouses.
The provincial level aspects require further thought. To use Ministry of 
Education personnel to underline that this is Somalian primary education and 
is to be phased back into the government education system is sound. In 
general competent inspectors and administrators exist.
The problem is the assumption that these personnel can be expected to play a 
key role in the revived, decentralised primary education system without
providing them with additional emoluments and transport. That assumption is 
pretty clearly wrong. What appears to be needed includes:
a. a responsibility allowance equal to 125 % to 150% of the additional 
emoluments paid to teachers;
b. a form of mobility - perhaps one motorcycle per provincial and district 
education officer participating which he (she) is to maintain but which 
he (she) may buy at the end of three years for - say - Sh 2,000;
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c. 6 to 8 week special courses for officers involved focussing on their work 
in relation to the new primary programme.
Payment to teachers from food aid poses no problems at the programme level if 
it is in the form of money from monetised food aid. It does pose a macro 
problem as maize food aid should be phased down or out now that Somalia is 
probably self-sufficient. Replacing that source of government revenue and 
adding finance for primary education does require identifying additional food 
aid levels or items that really will be saleable and will substitute for 
commercial imports. The obvious choice is sugar. There are sugar mountains. 
Triangular food aid (sourcing in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Swaziland, Mauritius or 
Kenya) could be envisaged. Somalia does import up to 100,000 tonnes a year 
commercially and is unlikely to reach self-sufficiency in less than a decade. 
Sugar (most of which in Somalia as elsewhere in SSA is drunk in tea and 
coffee) does provide quick energy and for that purpose is a perfectly 
nutritionally respectable component in a nutritionally balanced (grain, milk, 
meat, beans, oil, etc.) diet. Another possibility is cooking oil (vegetable 
or butter, albeit the latter might depress the price of domestically produced 
ghee).
What should not be done is to put the primary education project in the 
wholesale/retail grocery business. Putting up and distributing thousands of 
boxes of mixed foods for teachers all over Somalia would be a nightmare and a 
folly. There is a perfectly good private commercial sector food distribution 
system. Money is much easier to distribute than food. Teachers can readily 
convert money to food (and the wholesale sector can convert - e.g. - sugar aid 
into money). To propose to distribute food literally is in this case either 
commodity fetishism or that ultra rigid, fossilised form of material balances 
central planning usually referred to perjoratively as "Stalin planning".
A compromise would be monthly "payments" in rice. This would preserve the 
form of direct food aid distribution and greatly simplify logistics of 
oversight and delivery. In practice teachers could and would sell much of the 
rice to buy the food they wanted to achieve a preferred dietary pattern.
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Community payment to teachers is an area for community/teacher agreement not 
centralised bureaucratic rules:
a. if a community and a teacher agree on payment in sheep, goats, milk, 
grain plus providing - repairing - furnishing a house this is (should be) 
acceptable and outside quibbling over form or valuation of payment is 
inappropriate;
b. if (as is likely) a community agrees among itself that poor households
will pay less - or in goods and labour - this is neither helpfully
regulated from outside nor a bad idea. Cross subsidisation from richer 
to poorer family or community members is firmly based in Somali culture 
and should be supported not hampered by a rigid fee per pupil structure.
Community resource mobilisation toward school and furniture provision and
maintenance deserves attention. Communities can - and both in some cases in 
Somalia and more broadly in, e.g. Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania do - repair and build 
classrooms and teachers houses and do build or repair cupboards, desks and
chairs. This approach should be explored on a case by case level among
communities, the Ministry of Education's provincial personnel and lead 
external agencies. In some cases it will need inputs of, e.g., cement and 
wood so the community can put in work.
Given the extreme shortage of writing materials the idea of switching to 
wooden blackboards and slates plus writing sticks and local milk/soot ink 
should be considered seriously. These serve well in Koranic schools, are 
locally provideable and have cost advantages. On the face of it they offer an 
appropriate indigenous technology solution to a serious problem.
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Taking these items into account and filling in blanks in the World Bank 
paper's costings a rough external funding requirement might be (in $000,000):
TABLE 34
Costings - Community Linked Primary Education
Recurrent Year 1 Year 7
Food Aid 2.5 5.0
Rural Salary Uplift 0.6 1.2
Teacher Training 0.5 1.0
Provincial/District Officers
and Inspectors Salaries 0.2 0.4
Printing Materials 0.2 1.8
Mobility (Vehicle Operating) 0.2 0.4
Total 4^2 9.8
(Plus any technical assistance personnel required)
Capital
Printing Plant 1.5 - 2.5
*Vehicles for Distribution and Mobility 1.5 - 2.0
* *Classroom Rehabilitation and Re-equipment 1.2
* * *  ./T ONew Classrooms 1b.o
Total Over Seven Years 21 - 22.5
£ 25-40 small four-wheel drive vehicles plus up to 100 motorcycles, 
all replaced in year 4 or 5.
Possibly overestimated. Community contribution - especially to 
re-equipment - can and should be sought.
Probably seriously overestimated. Unclear as many new classrooms 
are needed as projected and with community labour and materials 
input cost per classroom should be reduced substantially.
« *
* * *
Primary education revival can usefully be pursued parallel to and interacting 
with some aspects of adult - women's - continuing education reconstruction. 
While not central to the primary programme - especially in its initial year or 
two - this potential should be kept in mind. One evident spinoff is that
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evening use of primary schools and (with an allowance for extra work) primary 
school teachers is usually a cost and personnel efficient means to operating 
continuing literacy and selected further education (e.g. numeracy, Arabic, 
English) work.
Adult Education: Notes Toward Strategic Components
Because Somalia has perhaps 20% effective literacy and under 20% effective 
(four complete years minimum) primary education, adult and continuing 
education will need to be central to overall educational strategy for several 
decades. Formally this is government policy and, indeed, a wide range of 
approaches and programmes do exist on paper. Unfortunately the gravest of 
doubts exist - by Somalis as much as by outsiders - of their user friendliness 
or even user interest and at present resources to operate them are totally 
inadequate.
Four operational principles can be set out:
1. Finding out what programmes are wanted by which adults where and 
involving the potential user communities in ongoing programme design, 
support and monitoring;
2. articulating and testing new programmes and delivery systems with 
built-in feedback and monitoring;
3. coordinating adult/continuing education with primary education, primary 
health care and water work to achieve pedagogic spread and resource 
economies of scale or complementarity gains;
4. identifying and programming a package of potentially sustainable sources 
of finance before launching major new or extended programmes.
Because most Somalians are illiterate and those outside cities live in 
contexts in which there is little to read and few occasions to write, the 
standard assumption that literacy is the basic skill and starting point may 
not be valid for all cases. For example, nomads, small scale settled farmers 
and self-employed urban women may place higher priority on specific income
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raising and/or health education than on literacy. The acquisition of these 
forms of education is - in some Somalian contexts - more likely to create a 
demand and foundation for literacy than the other way round.
There is already evidence in support of this contention from what adults have 
said and done (e.g. relapsed into illiteracy, set up their own adult education 
courses for women with income raising skills up front, not responded to 
nomadic education residential short courses). However, systematic study of 
what specific (by occupation, location, gender) groups of Somalis wish and 
would support (by enrollment and by community or individual supply of 
resources) what types of courses both as to content and form is a priority. 
Adult and women’s education divisional research in this area does have a good 
case for support.
Problems with delivery systems are very real and will remain so. For example, 
poor urban residents (especially women) find it hard to make time available; 
nomadic life styles pose considerable access (or continuity) problems; hi- or 
even middle- tech adult education workshops may not be very relevant to the 
artisanal rural or informal urban sectors of Somalia; literacy programmes need 
both ongoing backup with relevant materials to read and a continuing education 
programme to enhance the perceived value of knowing how to read and write.
Coordination has two aspects. Primary health care (including primary 
veterinary care) and water programmes have both direct (community worker) and 
indirect (education in community by community worker) adult education aspects. 
These should be seen both as integral to those programmes and as an integral 
part of adult education. For example health, sanitation, nutrition and water 
production/use education can be advanced by focused radio programmes linked to 
discussion groups led by community workers.
The other aspect is financial. Some coordination - e.g. in use of nomadic 
training centres, in development and use of radio programmes and video-tapes, 
in broadening coverage and widening distribution of the adult education 
newspaper - should save money. Most crucially the lowest cost way to mount a 
broad front adult education process is to use primary school facilities in the 
evening and to utilise primary school teachers and other relevant public 
servants as instructors who receive an initial course in how to teach adults 
and whose work is regarded by an honorarium which tops up their basic
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earnings. The proposed rehabilitation of Somalian primary education set out 
above would lay the groundwork for such coordination in Somalia.
Finance will be a problem. The need for a general approach of external donor 
plus user (or user community) provision of the bulk of resources seems to 
apply even more strongly to adult education than to primary education, health 
and water. Nor - even assuming a successful process of government revenue 
restoration - can an early phaseout be envisaged. Secondary, teacher 
training, advanced technical and tertiary education rehabilitation and 
development will need all or almost all the additional state resources likely 
to be won for education over the next several years.
The main topical areas under adult education are:
a. specifically desired applicable skills;
b. technical and artisanal;
c. literacy linked to continuing education;
d. women's (listed separately as now a separate division);
e. agricultural;
f. nomadic;
g. supporting media (radio, books, newspaper).
The first group should include community workers but also more general access 
classes if demand for specific skills courses - either for evening, day or (in 
the cases of nomads or isolated farmers) short residential courses - can be 
identified. One test of demand is willingness to pay some fee (not full cost 
or low income households will be excluded). Pilot schemes will be needed to 
test topics and approaches.
Nominally there are six or seven adult education technical/artisanal schools. 
All have some equipment but only two actually have buildings. Assuming the 
Kisamayo one proves to meet a real demand, funds should be sought to complete 
those without buildings and activate all of them. Different courses are 
likely to be appropriate for urban workers and rural artisans. The latter in 
particular need a basic tool kit as their 'diploma' to be able to put what 
they have learned to use.
While Somalia is committed - as it has been since 1974 - to a mass literacy
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campaign there is no ongoing programme. Over the next two years a strategy 
needs to be devised and materials (including teacher training and course guide 
elements) prepared. On the face of it, linking the literacy work to the 
primary education rehabilitation programme using primary classrooms in the 
afternoon or evening and - for an honorarium of (say) Sh 2,000 a month - 
employing primary teachers as its base level cadres.
Successful literacy education - in any lasting sense - needs followup. What 
this should be depends on user wants and needs which should be determined by 
asking present and potential students. Possible examples include
arithmetic/bookkeeping, Arabic, English, tailoring as well as 
technical/artisanal topics and agriculture. Successful pursuit of new courses 
will require preparation of books and visual materials since few, if any, 
currently exist in simple Somali suitable for the newly literate.
The one clear exception to that generalisation is agriculture which has a 
pilot programme of literacy and applied skills in the Shabelle Valley. This 
programme - which is backed up by adult education radio programmes and a 
specially designed newspaper - can usefully be evaluated for insights into 
what does and does not work (including interviews with continuing, potential 
and dropped out students).
Women*s education is logically - if not currently institutionally - part of 
adult education. Here two issues arise: Should literacy come first? Is a
highly structured two year programme with income generating skills in the 
second year appropriate? There is some evidence to suggest both questions can 
be answered in the negative:
a. the low enrollment - including in all three main cities;
b. the statements by low income women heads of household that they need
courses taking up less hours a week and immediately relevant to 
augmenting incomes;
c. the emergence of a number of shorter, less structured, skill oriented
courses with teachers paid by students - courses clearly modelled from, 
but also diverging significantly from, the official format and syllabus.
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This evidence suggests a need to evaluate (in conjunction with present 
potential and former students of both official and unofficial classes), 
redesign and then to run a pilot series of new courses.
Nomadic education has reached a dead end. A full evaluation of why present
approaches do not attract students and an exploration of what - if any - adult 
education courses would be effective is needed before a restart. In the
meantime the existing centres and (to the extent they are both present and 
suitably trained) staff could usefully be redeployed to other sub-sectors of 
adult education.
Supporting media - preparation and printing of texts and other materials,
newspapers for the newly literate and production of specialised radio
programmes is (admittedly on a small scale) one of adult education's
strengths. This capacity should be built up. For example, if - as is
believed - a second printing unit is to be given by a major donor to women's
education it should, at the least, be shared and preferably the supporting
media functions of adult and women's education merged.
In addition primary health care, water and - probably - primary education 
could benefit from specialised radio (or recorded cassette or video-tape)
programmes and all but primary education from a variety of posters, 
illustrations and check sheets which are basically adult education in form 
whatever their specific content. Given the scarcity of both specialist
personnel and funds, coordination of this work and its joint carrying out by
adult education would appear desirable.
At present no serious cost estimates for revival and expansion of 
adult/women's education can be given. Too many sub-sectors require restudy 
and reformulation before startup of even new pilot programmes. A possible 
first year level would be $1 to $1.5 million largely on technical/artisanal, 
agricultural, supporting media and evaluation/design. However, if the two 
functioning sub-sectors went well, a basic literacy tied to primary education 
was shown to be feasible and one or more other sub-sectors defined user sought 
programmes an increase (excluding capital projects) to $5 million a year by 
year 5 might well be justified. As it is hard to see how more than $1 million 
can be raised at that date from the government and users (who pay perhaps 
$10,000 together now) substantial funding from external adult education bodies
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(e.g. in the Federal Republic of Germany) or bilateral agencies with a record 
of adult education support (e.g. especially Sweden but also Canada, Germany, 
Holland) would be needed.
However, the combined primary and adult education projection for annual 
external resources needed, looks manageable at perhaps $15 - $17.5 million 
(recurrent and capital) maximum in year 5. That is well under 10% of present 
annual concessional finance flows to Somalia (or, indeed, less than capital 
project funding and less evidently useful technical assistance to the 
education sector in several recent past years). At least part therefore could 
be sought via reallocation and the rest from marginal increases in total 
support whether from present or new external funding sources.
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CHAPTER 5 
VULNERABILITY REDUCTION - THE CASES OF DROUGHT AND WOMEN
Volatility, Nutrition, Income, Poverty
Vulnerability has many aspects. In Somalia two stand out - drought and 
women's incomes and work loads especially in female headed households. The 
latter is partially comprehended in the former as the nutritional and health 
consequences and the water collection as well as the extra migration and herd 
or crop preservation (or failed attempts at preservation) labour consequential 
on droughts fall particularly heavily on women and their children.
Drought is an ever present threat and a frequently recurring reality in 
Somalia. With its low basic rainfall, uncertain riverine runoff - largely 
from across the border - and great annual and intra-year variations in 
rainfall levels and distribution both spatially and by month, that is 
inevitable. What is not inevitable - indeed is humanly and economically 
unacceptable - is that the costs of droughts should remain as high as they are 
now.
Women's vulnerability - other than to drought and disease - relates primarily 
to their limited access to skills and resources needed to earn incomes/produce 
household inputs and their very heavy combined economic and domestic 
workloads. Neither can be removed overnight, but both could be alleviated.
Drought - Institutional Response/Human Disaster
Private sector (household and kinship) structures for limiting drought damage, 
mitigating its consequences and providing means to rehabilitate livelihoods 
are well developed but in the absence of public sector complementary measures 
are necessarily inadequate.
Public sector - and especially external cooperating partner - response to 
drought in Somalia (indeed in SSA more generally) could be viewed as a comedy 
of the absurd were its consequences not writ large in deprivation,
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pauperisation, exhaustion, misery, illness and death. The problem is not one 
of lack of goodwill but of astounding institutional inability to perceive, 
conceptualise and act on the nature of reality despite its repetitive nature.
In Somalia reasonably good early warning of drought danger by district exists 
- serious drought damage requires at least two consecutive failed or seriously 
delayed rains. (There are two a year roughly in April/May and 
September/October.) Damage reduction requires ensuring that hand pumps, 
boreholes and water tankers are in working order, that additional spares and 
tankers are positioned in Somalia, that food reserves including supplementary 
feeding items are in the country, that veterinary drugs (especially for the 
diseases which inevitably follow the onset of rains when stocks are 
debilitated) are positioned in both centrally and also in at-risk districts, 
and that the same is done for human health drugs and vaccines. Similarly it 
requires that institutions and networks are in existence long before the
drought to channel resources speedily to human beings in need. Rehabilitation 
requires followup attention to continuing human and animal health and human 
income and nutritional recovery problems (rain will not - as a mournful nomad 
in the Bay region said in 19 8 7 - bring dead camels back to life nor restore 
the milk they would have provided for nomads’ staple diets) and to means of 
rebuilding herds for those households wiped out.
All these observations seem fairly self-evident. None is new (either
generally or to the present authors, one of whom said much the same thing in 
the Tanzanian context in 197*0. Unfortunately none is part of present
operational conventional wisdom. Most disaster coordination committees are 
episodic even though the disasters are repetitive - Somalia’s was not
reconstituted until March 1987, although the probability of a severe drought 
had been clear six months earlier. Action is regularly begun too late. The 
May 1987 UNDP report on the on-going drought and response is in large part a 
litany of needs which could and should have been met months earlier and by May
could not be met in time. Drought related action ends too soon. Even as
emergency missions flocked to Mogadishu (and in fairness, to drought stricken 
districts) the sense of an immediate crisis was dissipating with no parallel 
commitment to systematic rehabilitation nor to ensuring that the same mistakes 
were not repeated in 1989 or 1990 or 1991 (when the next drought is likely on
historic patterns) and so on until the end of time.
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Bureaucratic patterns play a large part in this tragedy. The leader of one 
well intentioned and observant mission explained that disasters and immediate 
relief were its bread and butter. Therefore it could not really do much about 
prevention, institutional channel development, or rehabilitation. That is 
often the nature of bureaucratic reality; but unfortunately it does not 
address the nature of the human needs and costs resulting from disasters. It 
is past time bureaucratic reality conformed to human needs as the latter 
cannot be conveniently reprocessed to fit bureaucratic habit or structure. In 
all candour while UNICEF perceives the totality of disasters and 
conceptualises how to face them better than many institutions, the speed and 
effectiveness of its responses is by no means always fully reflective of those 
perceptions or concepts, and so it was in Somalia in 1987. Equally, however, 
the WHO/UNICEF primary health care essential drug revolving store was the only 
case of pre-positioning of stocks needed for drought relief well in advance of 
the crisis.
As suggested, the basic requirements for future vulnerability reduction and 
drought cost containment/alleviation are fairly straightforward:
a. a permanent government based disaster coordinating group associated with 
external cooperating agencies;
b. receiving and acting in good time on Early Warning System reports;
c. acting in normal periods to pre-position stocks of basic and 
supplementary foods; human and veterinary drugs; pump, borehole and water 
tanker spares and standby transport;
d. ensuring that existing water facilities and health and veterinary 
transport are in full working order;
e. building up the community based operational and delivery systems 
necessary if state and external responses and resources are to be 
delivered promptly to those most in need when disaster strikes;
f. as a drought develops, pinpointing the location, nature and evolution of 
needs and putting resource flows in gear in time to avert - not react to 
- the worst consequences;
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g. issuing requests for additional, specified resources to replace those 
used - on an emergency basis, when extent, duration or severity of 
drought causes real risk of stocks running out and in any event promptly 
so that the reality of the drought is still remembered when the request 
is processed;
h. identifying rehabilitation (of, e.g. nutrition, herds, seeds and water 
supplies) needs to be met through the same or related channels after the 
immediate drought crisis is passed.
These points would need to be articulated and programmed concretely, but that 
should pose few conceptual or technical problems once the approach can be 
agreed. Until that happens, all drought vulnerability reduction responses in 
Somalia will remain (as more generally in SSA) too little, too late, too 
narrowly curative and too little preventative, and at least partially 
inappropriate and badly targetted. In short they will remain case studies of 
institutional and economic inefficiency whose costs fall primarily on poor and 
vulnerable human beings, especially children and women.
Women's Overworking and Underearning
Women's income is according to fragmentary observational and survey evidence 
significant in a third to a half or more of all households and dominant in the 
up to a fifth which are female headed. Even within complete households women 
usually retain all or the bulk of their earnings (the commonest pattern in SSA 
and some other Islamic societies - indeed perhaps everywhere except in the 
stylised European bourgeoisie or proletarian household of 1850-1950). These 
incomes are likely to be used in large part for the benefit of children and of 
household nutrition.
Major income sources include sale of small stock, meat, eggs, produce, fish 
and home produced items (e.g. reed mats, containers). In settled agricultural 
and urban communities they include trade in these products (and less commonly 
in pavement, stall or barrow retail trade in imported goods) as well as home 
food processing, casual and agricultural seasonal labour and - for the 
educated - wage employment. A further 25-30,000 women are migrant workers -
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dominantly in Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and Italy.
In addition to inadequate income levels, women - perhaps especially in female 
headed households - are overworked by the combined burden of self-provisioning 
and cash income producing and household labour. This double weight very 
rarely falls on male heads of households.
TABLE 35
Female Levels Of Market Participation
Male H/H Wife Female H/H
Marketing Item N=86 N=86 N= 10
Large Livestock 38 8 5
(4456) (956) (5056)
Small Livestock 21 30 7
(2 W (35Í) (7056)
Milk Products _ 21 3
(2456) ( 3056)
Meat and Eggs 1 35 6
(1%) (4156) (6056)
Source: WED/FAO, Rural Household Survey, (1983)
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TABLE 36
Division Of Agricultural Task Labour By Sex
Male Head 
of Household 
N=85
Women Female Head
in Household of Houséhold 
N=84 N=10
Land
Clearance
Land
Preparation
Planting
Fertilizing
Weeding
Irrigation
Bird Scaring
Harvesting
Transport
Threshing
Digging pits/ 
storing
Marketing large 
quantities
Marketing small 
quantities
53
(62.5)
47
(55.2)
63
(74.1)
9
(10.5)
59
(69.4)
32
(37.6)
33 (3 8.8)
58
(68.2)
20
(23.5)
9
(10.5)
56
( 6 5 . 8 )
42
(49.4)
13
(15.2)
49 
(57.7)
48
(56.4)
66
(77.6)
10
(11.7)
60
(70.5)
11
(12.9)
30
(35.2)
67
( 7 8 . 8 )
36
(37.8)
64
(75.0)
34
(40.0)
26
(23.5)
50
(5 8 . 8 )
7(70.0)
7
(70 . 0)
9
(90 . 0 )
1
( 10 . 0 )
8(80.0)
5
(50.0)
4
(40.0) 
8
(80 . 0 )
5
(50.0)
8
(80.0)
7
(70 . 0 )
6
(60.0)
5
( 50. 0 )
Number in ( ) is a percentage,
Source: WED/FAO, Rural Household Survey, (1983).
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To act to help Somali women reduce their vulnerability and/or poverty requires 
defining specific constraints and specific means to overcome them in specific 
contexts. These will vary among nomadic, settled agricultural, fisher 
community, small town and Mogadishu women. The first step in identifying them 
in operational detail is to learn from the women directly affected. However, 
a number of the constraints can be identified now pretty clearly even if only 
roughly:
a. lack of relevant education (with initial priority probably to income 
earning skills rather than literacy or health education however important 
these may be);
b. inadequate access to inputs needed to complement their own knowledge, 
skills and labour, e.g. to land, to water, to seasonal drought power or
labour or implements and/or to the capital needed to acquire seeds and
tools or kids and calves or a sewing machine or a stock of goods to trade
or of materials for home production;
c. unmanageable time demands from watering in the absence of nearby public 
water sources; from caring for the sick in the absence of primary health 
care and health education (or indeed of being sick herself); from 
cooking, washing and cleansing especially in the absence of adequate 
water supply or (in urban areas) public sanitation services.
Certain measures can be identified in respect to all of these which can be 
pursued in Somalia today. Most are touched on in the chapters on health, 
water, sanitation and education. The main exception is access to 
complementary assets which may be approachable through acting through and 
strengthening existing women’s co-operatives and saving and credit societies. 
More detailed programmatic suggestions in respect to helping poor urban women 
raise their incomes are expected to be set out in the final version of the 
CIIR-UNICEF-OXFAM study on urban poverty in Mogadishu.
CHAPTER 6
SOME KEY POLICY PARAMETERS
An Approach
In addressing a set of key, inter-related policy issues UNICEF is not 
asserting unique competence at analysis, let alone implying any direct 
capacity to tackle them. It is well aware that the government of Somalia is 
cognisant of - and has sought to act to loosen - certain of the constraints 
identified. However, this presentation is seen as appropriate for three 
reasons:
a. the constraints and parameters addressed here have rarely been presented 
and analysed as related parts of an overall strategy/policy approach;
b. a number of co-operating governments and agencies, including the Fund and 
the Bank, appear at times overly complacent in respect to, or even 
unaware of, certain of the issues raised;
c. the mechanics and magnitudes of the paradox of public sector 
pauperisation contrasted with modest private prosperity and the probable 
minimum time frame for resolving them strengthen the general case for 
community personnel and voluntary user linked approaches to restoring and 
expanding basic public services. This is particularly valid in respect 
to human and veterinary health care, water and basic education. They 
also imply the need for a more complex and directly community base linked 
role for co-operating partners than would be needed (or even appropriate) 
in most other contexts.
Fiscal Austerity and Retreating Revenue
The conventional wisdom that Somalia faces a fiscal crisis is true enough. 
The debate is on what type of crisis. Fairly clearly it is not a crisis of 
runaway real public sector recurrent consumption. Over 1975-1979 recurrent 
expenditure (excluding debt service) rose from 121% to about 20% of Gross
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Domestic Product. But thereafter it oscillated from 13$ to 16$ until 1984, 
when it collapsed to 8$ falling further to 7$ in 1985 and slightly recovering 
to 9$ in 1986. Especially as GDP was rising (and remittance fuelled GNP 
rising faster), this is not a record of runaway spending but one of overall 
austerity over 1980—83 and disastrously large real cutbacks over 1984-86. 
Even the 1978-79 rise clearly relates to the events of 1977-78 and their 
consequences which would have forced any government anywhere to raise 
spending. What is unusual is the post-1980 cutback.
Nor has domestic credit creation via government borrowing of the central bank 
been huge. It did rise to somewhat over 20$ a year in the post 1977 period 
arguably explaining about half of the high trend rate of inflation. The other 
half of the inflation relates to a semi-boom allowing trade margins to be 
raised and to expectations of regular high price increases which were 
self-fulfilling when they bid up the Gulf market price of foreign exchange. 
Subsequently they have the same impact on inter-bank account or "free market" 
and auction markets. This has directly inflated the costs/prices of imported 
goods (including government recurrent imports other than fuel since these are 
purchased through the private sector - a rather unusual example of full
privatisation pre-dating 1980). Even the 1984 leap in domestic bank borrowing
either is not what it seems or is mysterious. According to the accounts, it
relates almost exclusively to foreign debt service (not, perhaps, a category 
the Fund opposes the government seeking to pay!). However, as actual 
transfers on that head were very small, it is not clear whether the borrowing 
was an unreal book transaction or the funds were partly used for other 
purposes.
The real bottom line problem has been the decline in real tax revenue
collected. Prior to 1978 this averaged perhaps 12.5$ of GDP. By 1979 it had 
been pushed up to virtually 20$ paralleling the rise in non-debt service 
expenditure. But it then fell abruptly to fluctuate between 10 and 12$ over 
1980-83, before plummeting to 4$ in 1984. This is the lowest known modern 
ratio of taxation to GDP breaking the Ghana record of 1983 (in a drought 
crisis year at the end of prolonged economic decline) and falling under half 
the SSA average. Even with the efforts of the Ministry of Revenue since 
mid-1985> it has only recovered to about 6g$ of GDP in 1986 and is now 
expected barely to regain the 10$ level in the near to medium term.
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The reasons for the slump and collapse are not clear. Sharp changes in the 
trade regime (certainly encouraging making imports of goods 'invisible1 and 
perhaps actually deterring them), problems of valuation and an archaic customs 
nomenclature played their part. But, even together, these factors cannot 
explain fully the pre-1984 fall, let alone the 1984 collapse. Whatever the 
causes, the performance is almost uniquely disastrous and dominates the 
recurrent budget constraints leading to public sector penury and social and 
economic service pauperisation.
Allocation of the meagre resources available has moved steadily against social 
and economic services for the past decade. Before 1978 they normally received 
about 40 to b2\% of recurrent budget non-debt service funds (about 20-25%  
social and 17—18% economic, including water). During 1978-79 this fell to 
27i% odd and thereafter declined to 1 6 5% (9% social, 7\% economic) in 1983» 
and barely 1056 (4$ social 656 economic) in 1986. In short, constant price per 
capita spending on social and economic services in the recurrent budget has 
fallen about 75% since 1977. The reason for their apparent and real decline, 
and the concomitant loss of morale, energy or even physical presence of many 
of their staff whose emoluments have been a declining share of the already 
plummeting total spending, is only too apparent. So is the reason for the 
rise of the present ubiquitous decentralised, privatised user fee sytem.
Why the shift in allocational priorities? At one level, the answer presumably 
lies in the events of 1977-78 and their aftermath. The Somalia government 
clearly believed it faced a heightened external security risk. UNICEF is not 
competent to second guess that judgement and, in any event, any non-partial 
observer would be likely to agree that objective grounds for that belief did 
exist. Furthermore, neither absolutely nor relative to GDP has Somalia gone 
on a military spending spree.
In fact, after 1979, it is not at all evident that constant price expenditure 
on security rose nor that the emoluments of the uniformed services kept pace 
with inflation (over 1984-85 they certainly did not), even if they fell less 
in real terms than those of the civil servants. 1984 saw radical real falls 
in security (as in other) spending only partially restored over 1985-86. No 
reasonable observer can suppose that Somalia has engaged in lavish expenditure 
on its armed forces. The problem is that some minimum real level of security 
spending has been and is perceived as essential out of a declining total of
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recurrent budget resources (also squeezed by rising external debt service). 
This was not an unreasonable perception - states do see survival as vital and 
a military capacity related to external threats as vital to survival. But it 
left less resources for all other state purposes. Of these, debt service - 
despite growing arrears - grew rapidly and general administration while 
falling in real terms grew as a proportion of the recurrent budget. It was 
economic, and social services which were squeezed after 1979 and were squeezed 
increasingly hard from 1984 onwards. There is no real reason to believe this 
represents actual government preferences; it is a response to quite brutal 
constraints on recurrent spending in a context of relatively orthodox fiscal 
austerity and plummeting real tax revenues.
Somalia has attempted to make good the decline in domestic resources by
securing additional transfers from abroad. The results, primarily because of 
the nature of external response and non-response, have been relatively to 
radically unsatisfactory. According to UNDP figures, roughly adjusted for 
world import price and Somalia trend population growth, from 1975 through 1985 
concessional finance was on average stagnant in total real terms and declined 
one third at the annual real per capita gross transfer level. Further, the 
share of grants fell and as a result net concessional resource transfers 
(after debt service) declined even more sharply. Attempts to use
non-concessional bank, supplier credit and IMF finance to plug the gap have
only exacerbated the skyrocketing external debt service burden on the
recurrent budget and on export earnings.
Further, the form and conditions on external finance have clearly resulted in 
a massive misallocation of overall public sector resource use. (Aid is hardly 
an appropriate term for this finance when, especially since 1980, most of it 
has been lent and has created an internal fiscal and an external forex 
millstone around the budget's and the economy's neck.) The conditional 
transfer have created a remarkable imbalance between public sector new fixed 
capital formation projects (the Priority Investment Programme) and the 
recurrent budget which presumably is supposed to operate and maintain them. 
The Somalia government has arguably been slow to see the full implications of 
this pattern, albeit its 1987-1989 National Development Strategy and Programme 
poses them squarely. But the basic cause is external - the project tying of 
the bulk of external finance and the failure to build initial period operation 
and maintenance into project packages. A secondary external cause has been
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advice to Somalia to regain fiscal balance by cutting recurrent spending, 
sometimes on the quite preposterous basis that Somalians were in general 
over-taxed.
The nature and magnitude of this discrepancy is made very clear in the 1987-89 
National Development Strategy and Programme. Using standard recurrent cost 
estimates (which seem to overstate on most items but understate on basic 
education and health) on projects recently completed or about to be completed, 
a 1988 recurrent cost consequential on PIP estimate of Sh 6,882 million at 
1988 prices (Sh 5,500 million odd at 1987 prices) is made. This contrasts 
with total 1987 recurrent spending authorised on economic and social services 
of Sh 1,346 million!
The government has secured substantial technical assistance and commodity 
assistance for resale from donors (an appropriate term for the grant component 
albeit not the commodity lenders, e.g. PL 480). This does finance some 
recurrent social and economic costs under the rubric "local development budget 
expenditure". Of the Sh 2,900 million odd under this head in 1986 and in 1987 
perhaps Sh 1,450 million is somewhat thinly disguised recurrent budget 
operations. As most are economic and a few social (notably the university) 
this does somewhat alleviate the recurrent budget spending decline noted above 
for economic services but does very little to bolster basic social services. 
But what it does is at a cost:
a. technical assistance is provided in kind (including personnel) to suit
donor preferences even when Somali sources (especially personnel) are 
available;
b. except for Saudi oil aid and the World Bank currency auction support
loan's shilling proceeds, most commodity aid shilling counterpart funds
are subject to complicated provisions which deter their use and hamper 
efficiency more than they secure specific programmatic goals;
c. the entire budgetary process loses coherence and transparency, making it
very hard for anyone to untangle what is really happening as opposed to
what one set of a series of interlocked transactions seem to imply is 
happening.
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This dynamic reached a dead end in 1984. Revenue was too low; the minimum
priority claims on it too high; debt service unhandleable; social and economic 
recurrent spending hopelessly too low; the PIP too high to use the projects 
when completed; foreign net resource transfers falling. What has been 
achieved since is to buy time with initial recoveries of revenue, the World 
Bank's $1 million a week general import/budget support auction credit, a 
partial debt rescheduling and additional commodity aid. Unless more basic 
solutions can be found by 1990, the time bought will have run out.
The easy solution of much more foreign grant aid in the form of freely useable 
cash - i.e. untied budget/import support - is unlikely to happen. The name of 
the game today - at least on the resource transferor side - is "policy 
conditionality" not "higher transfers". Further, even at present levels 
Somalia's per capita concessional finance inflows exceed those of other major 
SSA structural adjustment programme operating countries such as Ghana and 
Tanzania.
Restoring The Tax Base
Two key instruments in restoring the public sector revenue base are taxation 
and exchange rate policy. Significant starts have been made on both, e.g. by 
the initial actions of the new Ministry of Revenue created in 1985 and by 
1986-87 moves toward a unified exchange rate at near the Gulf market rate.
Especially on taxation, more remains to be done if the 12 to 15% of GDP
collected in tax revenue typical until the 1980s is to be regained. The key -
especially over the next few years - is import duty (plus excise and sales tax 
on imports). Rate modernisation for items not specifically covered in the 
1960 nomenclature and taxable only at low general or even nil rates and 
imposition of 20-30% duties on amenity goods (notably petroleum, wheat and 
rice) even when imported as commodity aid are needed. But the most crucial 
reform required is to broaden coverage and fullness of rate collection on all 
imports including those directly financed from abroad by remittances. For 
this purpose a de facto open general licence approach (excluding only goods 
financed by external credit) should be taken by customs, 1986 collection 
levels suggest customs may already be beginning to do just that. The
potential gain from modernisation of nomenclature and new duties is (at a
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Sh 150 = $1 rate) of the order of Sh 6,000 million and that from fuller 
coverage and valuation up to Sh 10,000 million - as contrasted with total 
anticipated 1987 tax receipts from all sources of Sh 9,425 million.
Wealth tax (in the form of property rates) and rental and business income 
taxation can make useful but secondary contributions. The first two are in 
hand; the third poses problems because even initial claims are now often 
risible (in one case Sh 100,000 on a net business income of the order of Sh 
7.5 million a year) and are usually negotiated downward. Expertise in 
assessment will take time to build up. Taxes on domestic production will 
remain low unless and until production other than of foodstuffs can be 
substantially expanded. These three sources together could yield perhaps Sh 
3,000-5,000 million by 1990.
Export taxes are derisory in amount, tend to drive exports (or a portion of 
their proceeds) into invisible channels, may have disincentive effects and 
distract customs' attention from the true priority of import taxes. They 
should probably be abolished. Similarly the melange of official service 
charges, quasi-official fees and ad hoc user charges now imposed on livestock 
exports (including excessive public sector quarantine and shipping charges) do 
deter legal, visible channeling of these exports, may reduce their volume and 
need to be regularised and reduced.
Even allowing for these offsets, additional tax revenue at 1987 prices 
reasonably attainable by 1990 comes to over Sh 15,000 million, i.e. 167% odd 
of projected 1987 collections in real terms. That would provide the expanded 
public sector revenue base to restore and expand basic service (social and 
economic) provision even if restoration of real wage and salary levels in 
general administration and security did require a significant share of the 
increase. This is particularly true because unifying the exchange rate - 
initially at or around Sh 150 to the $ - can raise government counterpart 
revenue from commodity aid sales by up to Sh 6,000 million.
Devaluation in Somalia - because of the porosity of borders and the 
omnipresence of remittances - is most unlikely to stimulate exports or reduce 
private sector imports more than marginally. What it can do is optimise 
government revenue from sale of commodity aid imports. Compared to that the 
nominal gains from a partially split rate covering 50% of officially
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channelled visible exports are almost trivial (see Annex to this Chapter on 
Devaluation in the Somali context).
These measures on the part of Somalia - which are in a substantial degree 
begun - both need and deserve complementary action by external sources of 
finance to be fully effective. One cluster of such responses involves 
permanently removing and preventing the re-emergence of the present 
potentially crushing burden of external debt service which hangs over Somalia.
Others include:
a. increasing budget and import support aid by including additional or 
enhanced levels of items now financed from export earnings and officially 
channelled remittances - e.g. petroleum, sugar, vegetable oils, cement, 
cotton (for textile production);
b. building maintenance capacity creation, initial period maintenance and 
initial period operating expenses (say for 3 to 5 years) into all or 
almost all fixed investment projects;
c. increasing multi-year grants in support of agreed priority social and 
economic service capacity creation and operation recurrent costs at least 
over 1988-1992 with a joint review of possible 1993-1997 phasing down 
held in 1991-92;
d. seeking to create more stable patterns of annual commitments and 
disbursements than have characterised 1980-1986 to reduce uncertainty, 
shock and stop go costs to the Somalia fiscal and economic systems.
Even within existing or slowly growing levels of real disbursement of 
concessional resource, these steps could greatly increase their effectiveness 
in terms of infrastructure and production gains to Somalia and especially of 
restoring and expanding social and economic service levels. Economic 
efficiency and especially efficiency in meeting the needs of the poor and 
vulnerable, criteria point in the same direction (as they usually do in SSA).
A certain realism is needed. The total tax and commodity resale gains of Sh
20,000 million odd posited for 1990 are not unattainable. But even with 
maximum Somalian effort, some slippages are likely. Further, without interim
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enhanced external cooperating body transfers to support recurrent and 
maintenance expenditure, restoration of basic service levels plus the 
operating (recurrent) costs of fixed investment projects now under 
construction or recently completed cannot be fully met as of 1990. Prompt 
response by resource transferrors is needed urgently to reinforce, complement 
and make possible the continuation of 1985-87 Somalia government actions.
External Debt - How Not To Pay
Somalia's external debt burden is intractable. In fact Somalia cannot pay any 
substantial portion out of its own resources now or in the foreseeable future. 
However, how that reality is faced and programmed will greatly affect the 
future of the Somali economy and especially of public services.
Debt service on already incurred obligations (including IMF) will be over $100 
million a year through 1989. With reasonable export projections and 
assumptions as to IMF redrawings plus continuation of the present loan/grant 
ratio on new resource transfers and of the recent history of Paris Club 
rescheduling pattern of rollforwards of accrued arrears and one or two years 
future payments, the ratio of debt service to exports (even ignoring 
substantial present arrears) will remain at or over 100% for the foreseeable 
future.
All of Somalia's public sector investment (including its domestic resource 
component), a substantial portion of recurrent social and economic services 
and a major share of imports for production and consumption (commodity aid, 
World Bank auction market funding) come from public sector resource transfers. 
To divert these resources to external debt service would in large part be 
impossible and even if it were it would result in the near collapse of public 
investment and services and very severe constraints on domestic private 
consumption and production.
The World Bank's not very veiled indication in its 1986 Financing Adjustment 
with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa that several SSA economies cannot on any 
conceivable assumptions generate the domestic savings, let alone the external 
currency earnings, to service all or even a substantial proportion of their 
external debt applies - as the Bank's own published data show - to Somalia.
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(Other relatively large SSA economies in this category include Madagascar, 
Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and probably Zaire.)
To date no real strategy has been adopted or even articulated. For bilateral 
debt the most realistic would be:
a. 100% writeoff of present claims (including arrears) and at least 80 to
90% grant to total future resource transfer ratios; or
b. 80% writeoff (including all arrears), 80 to 90% grant/transfer ratios
plus annual grants to cover servicing of the 20% not written off unless
and until on reasonable criteria Somalia was able to service it out of
its own resources.
A third best option would be rescheduling all arrears plus all principal
payments for ten years and all interest payments for five to ten with
repayment of the rescheduled amount over the 11th through 25th years - roughly
analagous to the recent Mozambique rescheduling. It is exceedingly doubtful
that full servicing could be resumed at the end of the grace period, but a
decade of time for achieving structural adjustment free from the overhanging
sword of an external debt crisis would be achieved. At the same time, the 
principle of massive debt write-offs could be put aside for the present and 
time given to see whether payment might become possible at a future date at a 
price which would be bearable by and acceptable to Somalia.
For multilateral debt (principally IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank 
and certain Arab or OPEC funds) greater problems arise. Here a strong
argument against even rescheduling - let alone writeoff - has been and 
continues to be made on the grounds both of precedent and of access to 
financial markets. The latter argument is much less strong in respect to IDA, 
Afdev Fund and Arab or OPEC Funds which are not market financed.
IMF drawings can in practice be wholly or largely rolled over as to principal 
(and with quota increases even as to interest) by redrawing. However, they 
are relatively expensive and rolling over is a complicated, uncertain process 
and one involving both the Fund and Somalia in negotiating broad reaching 
policy agreements indefinitely. Further, so long as Somalia's drawings are in 
the upper credit tranches, it lacks access to quick first line resources to
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meet the genuinely short term external balance shocks (e.g. drought, export 
market access limitations) which are from time to time superimposed on its 
basic external balance (imbalance) structural problem. As providing such 
resources is the prime purpose of the Fund and of membership in it, permanent 
rolling over locking Somalia into the higher credit tranches is deeply 
unsatisfactory for the Fund and for Somalia.
World Bank lending cannot literally be rolled over. In some cases import 
support credits can free export proceeds to service external payments on prior 
Bank lending rather than to raise overall import levels (albeit that type of 
juggling bears a distinct family resemblance in nature though not in intent, 
to the classic South Sea Bubble and Ponzi schemes). Somalia is not such a 
case - the auction support funding is needed for enhanced imports.
If the Bank (and the ADB and the Arab and OPEC funds) are in fact to be paid 
on time and in full, this can be done in one way and only one way. Their 
member governments will have to supply cash or cash equivalent (e.g. sugar, 
petroleum, cement, cotton or other imports substituting for present commercial 
imports) funding in excess of basic Somali public sector investment, budget 
support and import support needs specifically to repay the multilateral 
agencies. Saudi Arabia on at least one occasion has provided resources to 
repay certain debts to Arab agencies. The World Bank, understandably, has 
fairly openly proposed precisely such bilateral funding of Somalian service of 
IDA credits. The bilaterals have, equally understandably, been less than 
forthcoming. The urgent need is to avoid Somalia becoming the chicken in the 
Swahili proverb who is crushed underfoot when the bull elephants battle for 
power and prestige using the unfortunate chicken's home pasture as their 
battlefield.
Inefficiences In Investment
The allocational efficiency (inefficiency) problems arising from the imbalance 
of public sector fixed investment and recurrent resources (even including 
those included in the local development budget) have already been noted. 
However two further problems in respect to public sector fixed investment 
reduce its real value to Somalia even more. These are a tendency to view 
fixed investment projects almost as ends in themselves without much evaluation
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of their construction or operational period impact on the Somalian economy and 
to treat capital projects (including vehicles, machinery, civil works and 
buildings) as if they were semi-durable consumer goods to be used up and 
discarded rather than maintained or improved. Neither is unique to Somalia 
(nor for that matter to SSA) but each is both more prevalent and more deeply
rooted than in many other SSA countries.
During construction a fixed investment project's contribution to the Somalian 
economy (loosely speaking to GDP) is its local procurement component. In 
practice this is limited to a few construction materials, unskilled labour and 
secondary construction or consultancy contracts plus counterpart funds 
approved to bolster the cooperating services of related ministries. These are 
unlikely to exceed 10 to 15% of the gross fixed investment projects (say 
$20-30 million a year). Further items such as expatriate personnel's local 
purchases and project fuel purchases are problematic as they have a very high 
import content. Doubtless there may be certain other transfer payments, but 
these are unlikely either to appear openly in official data nor to end in 
public or directly productive private sector purses.
During operation the value of a public fixed investment project is either the
net revenues and local economy purchases it generates or the value (not the 
cost) of the social or economic services it provides. In many cases these 
appear to be abnormally low in Somalia (e.g. for quickly closed industrial 
plants, little used roads, non-operational educational establishments) and 
indeed not to have been seriously estimated either ex ante or ex post.
Maintenance is clearly a weak point in public sector performance as 
illustrated by such varied examples as the repeated resalination of irrigation 
schemes, the breakdown and abandonment of deep boreholes and the 1986-87 
accidental disabling of the main Mogadishu power generator. On the basis of 
past road and highway expenditure and climatic conditions (even including 
torrential, though brief, rains and flooding in some areas) one would expect 
Somalia to have one of the best road sytems in SSA. Unfortunately that is 
very far from being the case.
Weak (or non-existent) maintenance rapidly reduces the operating period value 
of fixed assets and leads to repeated needs for reconstruction and replacement 
as new capital (fixed investment) projects. Like lack of evaluation of
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project contribution to the Somali economy, it is inefficient not merely on 
the basis of some particular theory of development but on the basis of almost 
any set of economic and social criteria.
It is certainly valid to assert that project financers have contributed to 
this situation. Promotion of exports - or of some currently fashionable 
development fad requiring specific types of fixed investment - has often 
seemed to outweigh reasoned contextual analysis of project contribution to 
Somalia carried out together with the relevant agencies of the government of 
Somalia. Initial operation and medium term maintenance requirements have 
rarely been built into fixed capital projects. As a result - assuming grant 
or indefinitely rescheduled loan finance - building a road, letting it wear 
out and getting funds to build it again may often have been cheaper and more 
fiscally practicable to Somalia in terms of own resource costs than building 
once and maintaining.
In part this relates to a neo-Calvinist attitude on the part of external 
sources of finance that grants or loans for capital projects were inherently 
defensible but that similar support for recurrent social and economic services 
were improper pandering to recipient laziness. Further in the late 1960s many 
sources of consessional finance - not excluding the World Bank - justified low 
capital cost approaches even when their higher maintenance cost and shorter 
life made them less economically efficient than approaches which had higher 
initial capital costs but lower maintenance costs and longer lives. They did 
so on the grounds that present capital costs were their concern while 
maintenance and rebuilding were solely the concern of the recipient. Both the 
bias against recurrent cost finance and against maintenance and rehabilitation 
have diminished, at least in respect to SSA, since 1980. However, remnants of 
both remain. Further the past biases clearly condition the way Somalia frames 
requests to external resource providers and - ironically - the choice of a 
Priority Investment Programme as the centrepiece not only of the Somalia but 
of most World Bank backed SSA Structural Adjustment Programmes and 
Consultative Group Meetings. If, as the Bank has been at some pains to argue, 
foreign exchange to utilise existing capacity is as key a constraint as 
foreign exchange to rehabilitate existing or build new capacity, the central 
exercise should not be constructing a PIP but a foreign exchange sources and 
uses matrix with new (and rehabilitation) investment among the uses - the 
approach of the Tanzania 1986 and 1987 Consultative Group presentations. The
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concept of an economic programme as primarily a job lot of investment projects 
may be intellectually exploded and is wildly inconsistent with macro policy 
conditionality of structural adjustment. Nonetheless, under its new guise of 
Priority Investment Programme it appears to be alive and well in the actual 
resource allocation process. This can hardly be viewed as primarily the 
reponsibility of Somalia nor - so long as the context remains PIP biased - can 
Somalia afford to be too blunt in pointing out that fixed investment 
fetishism, however dressed up, really has no clothes.
However, political economic efficiency requires greater attention to these two 
problems by the Somali government as well as by cooperating governments and 
agencies. This is especially true in a context in which large increases of 
real concessional resource transfer increases are unlikely and the need to 
allocate a larger proportion of them to operating input import and to 
recurrent budget support widely perceived by the Somali government and some 
cooperating partners.
In particular, more pre-investment analysis of plausible gains to the economy 
during construction and operation (and how these could be increased) and of 
how the projects would or would not fit into and complement or support ongoing 
private productive and public recurrent service sector activity could have a
very high payoff. Not simply would it help to eliminate products of low or
negative domestic value (and those likely to remain or rapidly to become
non-operational in particular) but it could probably substantially enhance 
gains from those carried out.
A related exercise is needed as to adequate levels and costs of maintenance 
and their potential for increasing operating benefits and reducing repetitive 
fixed investment requirements for premature replacement. Both are likely to 
be significant for as diverse items as vehicles, electricity generation 
equipment, boreholes and roads. To be useful, such studies need to result in 
reprioritisation and reallocation of resources not only by Somalia but equally 
- perhaps even more so - by external cooperating partners. To know that the 
marginal shilling spent on road maintenance generates several times the
domestic benefits of one on a new road and also reduces future road capital 
project finance needs by several shillings is not operationally meaningful if 
external finance is available for road building but not for maintenance (and 
in particular for its import content which cannot be met from shilling
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counterpart funds resulting from the sale of food or vital inputs into other 
sectors).
Volatile, Multiple Vulnerability
Somalia’s economy is highly vulnerable and its decade of modest buoyancy at 
GDP, GNP and private consumption levels is highly insecure. Indeed it would 
be most imprudent to assume that either the recent 5-7% GNP growth rate or 
even the maintenance of present real remittance levels which underpin 
Somalia’s modest private prosperity are assured. The most evident 
vulnerability is to drought. Major droughts do recur at three to four year 
intervals and do wreak havoc with herds - the basic source of the nomadic 
population's diet and the national economy's visible exports. Cost and
vulnerability reduction approaches are only very partially developed to date 
as set out in the previous Chapter.
A second vulnerability concerns exports - both visible and also invisible
(i.e. remittances). They are highly concentrated by product - goats, sheep, 
cattle, bananas, frankincense and myrrh in the first case and labour in the 
second. They are also heavily concentrated as to markets - the Gulf States 
and especially Saudi Arabia in both cases. Alterations in Saudi demand and 
market access have radically raised visible and invisible export levels. 
Equally, however, Saudi 1983 restrictions radically damaged all livestock
exports for about 18 months and continue to hold down those of cattle.
Alternative major markets - like alternative substantial exportable
commodities - have proven difficult to build up. For bananas a somewhat 
analagous situation pertains but with Italy virtually the sole buyer and 
sectoral viability dependent on access on terms which in effect subsidise
Somalia's banana industry.
The employment of Somalis in Saudi may already have peaked. Both post 1984 
cutbacks in that economy (particularly in construction) and the growth of
Saudi professional/artisanal cadres as a result of Saudi educational 
development are likely to have the result of reducing both demand and
effective access over the next decade even if they do not appear to have done 
so significantly to date.
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Somalia’s terms of trade in existing markets are perhaps not very vulnerable. 
Minor declines in real livestock and banana prices since 1984 do not reduce 
terms of trade significantly below late 1970s and early 1980s levels - a very 
unusual result for SSA. Similarly there is little sign that real wages in 
Saudi are or are likely to fall, although their 1974-84 real rise can hardly 
be expected to continue unabated. The vulnerability, however, will be severe 
if visible or invisible exports must be redirected to new markets almost 
certainly with significantly lower prices as well as more difficult access -
e.g. Egypt and/or Kenya for cattle.
Somalia is also intensely vulnerable to volatility in flows of external 
resources (aid if one prefers). While real per capita levels have tended to 
fall, total gross resource transfers per capita are very high by SSA standards 
(e.g. about 3 times Tanzania or Ghana in respect to concessional transfers). 
They too are highly concentrated - USA, Italy, World Bank, Saudi. Should any, 
let alone all four, of that quartet decide - for whatever reasons - to reduce 
transfer levels significantly, the public sector investment programme and the 
counterpart revenues from commodity aid and auction market funding would be 
crippled and the adequacy of food and fuel supplies placed in jeopardy.
Another related vulnerability relates to Somalia’s totally unsustainable 
present levels of external debt service obligations - levels which are still 
rising. Stop gap, short term reschedulings and semi-agreed moratoria (leading 
to arrears buildups) have averted major problems to date. They cannot prove 
adequate forever, perhaps not for even so long as five years.
A final source of vulnerability is the low and declining access to public 
services and the low, and, at the most optimistic estimate, stagnant level of 
public economic infrastructure. These reduce levels of productive incentives, 
productive investment and exports, as well as of human welfare. To paraphrase 
Adam Smith: no nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose people 
are illiterate and lack access to basic education, many of whom are sick and 
lack access to basic health services, many of whose women and girls are worn 
out gathering water and fuel to which most people still have inadequate 
quantitative and qualitative access.
This list of policy issues and challenges is in no way intended to suggest 
that Somalia’s economy faces imminent collapse. Rather it is presented to
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highlight the areas in which improvements in analysis, policy and practice are 
needed to sustain and to reduce the vulnerability of the past decade's modest 
boom in Somali private incomes and to extend it to domestic production and 
even more urgent - to the very much poorer public economic and social services 
sector.
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DEVALUATION BY SOMALIA: MIRACLE, MARE'S NEST OR MODUS VIVENDI ?
In Somalia, as elsewhere in SSA, devaluation has been a hotly debated issue 
both as to desirability and results. Both proponents and opponents appear to 
have mis-stated their cases and/or mis-perceived Somalian economy and economic 
realities. In the actual 1980-87 Somali context devaluation was inevitable. 
It could have been, and as of 1986-7 may actually have become, marginally 
useful but not for the reasons usually advanced. Especially in conjunction 
with more general relaxation of certain aspects of external transactions plus 
a more inclusive and effective customs system and service, a unified floating 
(or auction) rate approximating the Gulf remittance market rate could be a 
significant building block toward raising real government revenue collection. 
As that is the sine qua non for escaping from the decade long pauperisation of 
public social and economic services, it is somewhat illogical to maintain that 
devaluation is either antithetical to - or even that it is irrelevant to - the 
interests of Somali women and children or poor and vulnerable groups more 
generally.
However, that positive conclusion is based on the special, particular 
1970-1987 economic context of Somalia - not on standard devaluation model 
analysis. Equally some of the instrumentalities employed are indeed hallmarks 
of liberalisation and privatisation. However, the end result if they succeed 
will be to make the potential import tax base more transparent and thus to 
make possible (not by itself to achieve) raising the share of Somalia's 
relative prosperity which can be collected for public purposes, thus reducing 
or reversing the penury increasingly afflicting basic social and economic 
public services. Thus their purpose arguably is more, not less, state 
intervention to support more adequate levels of public consumption or human 
investment.
Before 1980 Somalia's currency had not usually been significantly overvalued 
and exchange rate questions were not central. The rising tide of remittances 
sustained import levels and, via franco valuta (a form of no licence required 
importation for goods not financed by Somali Government/Central Bank allocated 
foreign exchange) made a modest, but not insignificant, contribution to
ANNEX - CHAPTER 6
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government revenue. The debt service problem was then largely potential or 
future because many grace periods had not expired and absolute external debt 
levels were much lower than today.
By 1980 the buildup of external debt service, the growing recurrent budget 
deficit financed through domestic credit creation and the (partly though not 
wholly consequential) high domestic inflation rate had created severe 
overvaluation problems. Overvaluation did not seriously affect remittances 
(which were and are dominantly through unofficial channels), consumer imports 
(for the same reason), or - probably - exports (whose problems could be solved 
by smuggling or under-invoicing and conversion of the balance on the Gulf free 
market to finance imports). However, overvaluation did reduce officially 
allocable resources to pay for intermediate goods (including petroleum) and 
the visible, taxable import base. It also meant that commodity aid was sold 
at artificially low prices, reducing government revenue and probably the real 
incomes of Somalian grain growers.
The initial IMF/World Bank programme measures as carried out by Somalia in 
respect to the exchange rate and external trade over 1980-85 can hardly be 
described as successful but nor - with one possible exception - did they do 
much harm. They consisted of devaluing the official rate (but to nothing like 
the Gulf market rate), seeking to force full invoicing of exports (with 50í 
odd retainable for exporter use or resale to importers), promoting
institutional channelling of remittances (through accounts similar to the 
retention ones) and suppressing the franco valuta trade. The results and 
non-results were:
a. little impact on inflation as the Gulf market rate already dominated (and 
continued to dominate) consumer goods import prices and incomes from 
remittances;
b. relatively limited shifting of remittances to officially recorded 
channels;
c. little impact on exports since probable supply response to higher prices 
is low and uncertain and volume and price are much more responsive to 
Gulf market conditions and drought than to price (which given the old mix 
of official and Gulf rates and the new official and retention account
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rates probably changed little anyhow);
d. reducing recorded consumer goods imports and driving the (growing)
balance into the uncustomed (parallel or smuggled) channel, reducing real 
government revenue;
e. continuing the existing undervaluation (in Shillings) of commodity aid 
and thus the revenue achieved from its sale;
f. doing nothing in respect to external debt service which was denominated 
in external currencies so was unchanged by devaluation (and made no 
easier to transfer as official export and remittance receipts rose little 
and harder to finance as the real Shilling revenue base was eroded).
To the extent that the fourth and fifth elements resulted from the actual
devaluation/external trade formulas adopted, these did significant harm.
However, in both cases there were other contributory factors. Otherwise the
measures amounted to sound and fury, changing appearances and causing
inconveniences but signifying little.
1986-87 instruments and results have been rather more promising:
a. the retention account rates have moved (mid-May 19 8 7) to about Sh 160 =
$1 with the Gulf market rate perhaps Sh 165 and the local parallel rate
(apparently on a thin market) Sh 165—180;
b. a World Bank financed auction rate has moved to Sh 145 = $1
(approximately mid-May) and has brought about $1 million per week into 
the market;
c. customs coverage and collection has been radically improved;
d. unification of the official rate with the retention account (termed "free 
market") and auction rates is envisaged.
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The potential results are:
a. to remove incentives to keep export earnings and - to a lesser extent - 
remittances out of official channels;
b. for that reason, plus the Bank finance, to increase access of importers 
in general - and intermediate production goods users in particular - to 
foreign exchange;
c. to increase government revenue from the sale of commodity aid by upto 
Shillings 6,000 million (40% of projected 19 87 recurrent spending and 4 
times social and economic service projected spending);
d. to facilitate import duty collection - especially if customs concerns
itself purely with valuation and collection and not with how the goods 
were financed.
Devaluation - if accompanied by removal of export taxes and unnecessary 
administrative charges and mode of transport restrictions - has some potential 
for increasing the transparency of the export trade. However, that potential 
is limited as illustrated by goat exports.
Official goat exports (largely to Saudi) are paid for by letter of credit at
$32 odd per beast (mid-1 9 8 7) less $6 shipping by government owned line vessel
and perhaps $4 quarantine/feeding fees. Of the $32, $16 is retainable in a
foreign currency account (Sh 160 odd per $) and $6 (after paying for
quarantine and (shipping) at the official rate (Sh 90 per $) for a total of 
Sh3,100. Parallel exports by dhow to the Yemens fetch about $28 per beast 
less $2 to $3 shipping costs. (This route is not practicable to Saudi Arabia
because of its quarantine regulations.) The net is $25 to $26 at the Gulf
rate (say Shl65 per $) or about Sh 4,125-4,290. The incentive to parallel
market is clear enough.
If the exchange rate were unified at Sh 160 per $ the official transaction 
would net Sh 3,520, still leaving an incentive to evade unless the high
shipping and quarantine charges could be cut by a third to a half. Even then 
if Yemeni importers find it inconvenient to pay by bank letters of credit or a 
nearby dhow port is much more convenient than Mogadishu or Kisamayo the
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parallel trade will survive at a reduced level.
Cattle exports to Kenya pose a different problem. Basically it is that most 
are parallel on the Kenya end, i.e. import licenses would not be issued nor 
foreign exchange payment approved. Thus, whatever the official exchange rate, 
the Somali exporter has little option but to parallel market his exports into 
Kenya and his return flow of goods (e.g. tinned butter, fruit squash, milk 
powder, detergent, biscuits, coffee, tea) back to Somalia. The only apparent 
way to achieve transparency would be a quasi balanced trade agreement with 
cross accounts at the Central Banks, minimal import and export licenses and 
automatic clearing of balances (if any) for a designated range of goods under 
the umbrella of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa to 
which both Somalia and Kenya belong.
The negative price impact of devaluation to a unified official rate tracking
the Gulf rate will be on petroleum product users, wheat and rice eaters, and
consumers of newly customed consumer imports. Each of these groups is an 
above average income one and even they would clearly enjoy benefits were 
social and economic services to be restored.
Thus devaluation to a market rate, which will in any case dominate remittances 
and consumer imports, plus reversion to a de facto open general licence for 
imports (except those financed by foreign borrowing) is partly a matter of 
facing reality as to what can and cannot be controlled and partly a means to 
enhancing public sector mobilisation/acquisition of resources. These 
conclusions relate to the present and medium term contextual possibilities and 
constraints confronting Somalia, not to the more abstract general cases for 
and against altering exchange rate levels and determination nor to what would 
be appropriate in other SSA economies. In Somalia today devaluation and
avoiding re-emergence of overvaluation remains a potentially valuable 
instrument and one without whose use restoration of basic services to the poor
and vulnerable is hard to envisage. On the other hand, it is no panacea and
is most unlikely to affect export or import levels, actual remittance transfer 
channels or domestic inflation rates more than marginally.
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PRIORITIES FOR THE POOR AND VULNERABLE: A REVIEW
Seven Areas
Priorities for meeting the needs of poor and vulnerable people in Somalia 
perceived and expressed by them centre on seven areas:
CHAPTER 7
1. nutrition security;
2. income security;
3. health access and security;
4. water access and security;
5. sanitation access;
6. fuel access;
7. education access.
In each case, "and appropriateness" might usefully be added since some 
nominally practicable solutions - e.g. literacy as the initial stress in 
nomadic adult eduation, improved meerschaum stoves that give a type of flame 
and heat inappropriate to Somali cuisine - fail that test.
To list priorities is - as is sometimes forgotten - neither to provide answers 
to the question of how they can actually be met nor to specify the nature of 
appropriate institutional and delivery systems which may very well serve all 
or several priority needs rather than specialising in just one. Earlier 
chapters have indicated a number of possible programmes and approaches some of 
which are cited again here in less detail. No pretence should be made that 
these are by themselves adequate or fully articulated. They could represent a 
start, a foundation, the beginning of a dynamic leading out of the present 
pauperisation of basic services.
Nutrition Security
The nutrition security challenge is basically cyclical (drought), seasonal 
(dry season) and related to specific groups of poor and vulnerable people.
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Except for pregnant and nursing mothers - where the prevailing pattern of 
anaemia would seem best approached via iron tablets - the poor group member*s 
nutrition insecurity turns primarily on income insecurity (including loss of 
land use rights) and can only be tackled on that front.
Cyclical food security is an aspect of reduction of vulnerability to drought 
discussed in more detail earlier. Creation of structures from community to 
national coordinating committee level, ready and able to respond in good time 
is the base condition. Together with it go pre-positioning of stocks of food 
and of veterinary drugs (the latter to reduce herd losses and subsequent milk 
and meat consumption falls) as well as transport to move them as soon as the 
location and nature of needs begins to be known. Because droughts almost 
always involve the failure or severe lateness of two or more consecutive 
rains, adequate warning time for action exists if it is used, as it was not in 
time for the 1973, 1977, 1980, 1983 and 1987 droughts.
Seasonal food security problems are real but how to respond is less clear. 
Milk supplies are by their nature both seasonal and not readily storeable 
(unless a popular, home produceable cheese were to be developed). Trading for 
more grain during harvest/high milk output seasons would appear to be an 
answer but is so obvious one can only assume nomads would already have adopted 
it if there were not a catch (camel carrying capacity? Wet season milk demand 
levels? Inaccessibility of markets from outlying wet season pastures?) to it.
Nutrition work is bedevilled by lack of adequate baseline data. As suggested 
earlier, a systematic sample for different population groups during food 
plenty, seasonal food scarcity and drought months is needed and should be 
practicable to implement if finance can be secured.
Income Security
For 70$ of the people of Somalia food security and income security are 
virtually synonymous. Their food production for self-provisioning and their 
commodity production for sale to raise cash income are the same or related 
products. For example, the nomad raises camels, cattle, sheep and/or goats 
from which he derives milk to drink and ghee and meat to eat (as well as 
trading these for grain) and sells animals and also hides, ghee and milk to
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meet his cash income requirements. For the fisherfolk the interaction is very 
similar as is also the case for grain growers. For some agricultural and 
agro-pastoral households the interaction is more complex, but the same basic 
principle holds - if a set of measures do indeed assure food security they 
will, at least, go a long way toward providing income security.
At a national level, food security also provides a key component in urban 
income security. Nothing drives real urban incomes down more savagely than an 
acute food shortage leading to skyrocketing nominal and real urban food 
prices. To a degree the sharp Mogadishu milk and meat price increases of 
January-May 1987 illustrate this.
For specific poverty-prone groups, however, other aspects of income security 
arise, e.g. for street children, urban female headed households, unorganised 
quarter residents, nomads who have already lost their flocks. Specific cases 
require specific programmes but two elements are general: first, education
which provides saleable skills or upgrades own employment productivity and 
second, access to complementary resources (e.g. working capital for trading or 
craft work, specific fixed capital items such as a sewing machine for a 
garment co-op or a tool kit for a carpenter).
Health
Most of Somalia's people - especially in rural areas and most especially 
nomads - have no effective access to either preventative or curative health 
care (or health education) from the standard, state medical system or its
private parallel. They cannot hope to achieve such access in less than a
decade, by which time most of the really poor and vulnerable among them will 
be dead.
Therefore the strategy for health access has to turn on community based 
primary health care. Its basic cadres will be trained traditional birth 
attendants, part time health workers selected and remunerated by the
communities they serve or they will not exist. For them to be effective they 
need training, access to basic drugs and equipment, links to expanded 
programme of immunisation (including tetanus vaccination for pregnant women) 
and major disease (e.g. tuberculosis) programmes. Their provision in turn
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requires delivery systems including district health teams and external agency 
coordinating/catalysing/planning staff. A start in providing these cadres has 
been made in most of the 12 provinces with PHC programmes but consolidating 
and building on it will be a long, hard slog in river basins, and a long, hot 
march in the rangelands - as well as a shorter but no easier trek through the 
unorganised and crumbling old quarters of Mogadishu and other towns.
A complement to these aspects of PHC would be re-establishment, as soon as 
possible, of the now virtually absent health post, clinic tier. Seeking to 
reactivate the silent majority of district hospitals is of much lower priority 
under present circumstances.
Water
Access to pure water in Somalia is low - nominally 60% in urban areas, 2056 in 
settled agricultural areas, and 5-2056 for nomads, depending on the season.
A number of community based approaches requiring limited capital assistance 
plus training work leaders chosen by their communities are available:
a. normal shallow wells and ones drawing on underground dams/percolation
channels in dry river beds - both equipped with hand pumps;
b. simple spring and stream protection and offtake systems in settled
agricultural areas in the riverine provinces;
c. community management and routine maintenance of boreholes (their
construction is beyond community skills or resources);
d. improvement and protection of quality of water in birkets and ponds -
e.g. by providing animal watering points that avoid their entering the 
water and separate offtake points for water for household use.
The benefits are numerous: more water means more frequent and thorough
cleaning, bathing and washing, and in some contexts, more adequate cooking as 
well. Quantity as well as quality is important to human health and 
well-being. Purer water reduces incidence of several common diseases
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including diarrhoea, as well as of parasite infestation. Nearer and easier to
draw water reduces the workload on women and girls.
Sanitation
Access to sanitation is very low in Somalia even by SSA standards. The 
obvious instrument (pit latrines) and obvious means to promoting it (adult 
education and community participation perhaps tied to PHC) have sometimes been
dismissed as inappropriate because of lack of water.
This is somewhat puzzling. Water is scarce in some - not all - settled 
agricultural areas, expensive in poor urban areas, unavailable in quantity 
(especially during the dry season) except at vast expense in female labour. 
But - except for the nomad case - these are not characteristics which set 
Somalia apart from certain other SSA countries (e.g. Tanzania, Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana) where pit latrines are widely accepted. More study - 
including improved 'dryf, pit latrines developed elsewhere and the actual 
reasons for rejection in Somalia - is needed. The smaller community size and 
frequent moves of nomads do rule out conventional pit latrines, but smaller, 
simpler, less permanent, less labour intensive variants should be devisable.
Urban refuse collection has almost collapsed where once it existed in 
Mogadishu. (It presumably never reached unorganised areas.) The squalor and 
health hazards resulting are severe. Nobody likes living under such 
conditions - the question is how people can act to overcome them. Waiting for 
the City to restore and extend services is hopeless. In richer areas a 
straight private sector approach - individual households paying a dustman to 
set up a route - would seem practical. In unorganised areas a communal 
voluntary fund to raise money to hire a worker to haul rubbish from designated 
deposit points (and perhaps initially to help him hire or buy a cart, a 
donkey, a broom, a bucket and shovel) might work and deserves exploration.
Fuel
Access to fuel in rural areas is primarily an issue of the burden on the time 
and energy women and girls must devote to collecting it. However, for nomads
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at some seasons/locations access is so limited that a problem in respect to 
cooking (and therefore nutrition) arises. The urban - especially Mogadishu - 
problem is rather different; the rising price of charcoal imposes a real
burden on poor household budgets and the rising demand a real threat to 
natural woodland survival.
Unfortunately this is a case in which stating the problem does not lead
directly to any answers clearly relevant to meeting it. For one thing its 
extent, specificities in different places (and at different seasons) and 
degree are not known. For another it is unclear how supply could readily be 
expanded. Village woodlots or household windbreaks may be relevant in some 
cases, but on the rangelands it is hard to see how to increase tree or woody
bush availability. Improved three stone fires (rural) and meerschaum or metal
stoves (urban) might play a role by reducing need if they could be tested for 
actual achievement of fuel use reduction, popularised (or extended) through 
adult education and added to the bread and butter lines of artisanal 
blacksmiths and metal workers (stoves that is, not stones!).
Education
Educational access in Somalia has been declining for a decade since its 
1975-77 high point. In the past few years quality and actual attendance of 
teachers as well as students has declined even more rapidly, particularly in 
primary, adult and women’s education. As a Somali educator put the problem:
a. it is quite impossible to operate any strategy on present resources;
b. in any case competent and motivated teachers to do so are not now 
available; and
c. the present package is probably not what the people need or want.
In that context concentrating on capacity building bodies - e.g. curriculum 
development and adult education radio - will probably not lead very far since 
it can do nothing much to overcome the first two obstacles. Even improved 
teacher training - especially if including more Arabic and English - is
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unlikely to enhance the teacher cadres of Somalia much (as opposed to those 
"over the water" in Gulf countries).
What is essential to get results on a broad front is community support. The
present approach to raising community support for primary school teachers is
sound albeit its recent promotion by decree may not be the best way to 
generalise it. State resources do not and will not for years exist to pay 
living wages; teachers need to eat too and parents will pay if they are 
assured their children will be taught.
Nomadic and other adult education programmes pose more complex challenges. In 
neither case is literacy self-evidently the basic building block. Desired, 
relevant skills (which may or may not include reading and writing) are. If 
community based workers are to be trained in large numbers, the dormant 
nomadic training centres could usefully be reopened for that purpose. If a 
desired skills package or packages could be identified by dialogue with 
nomads they should also train part time nomad adult education workers. The 
vocational adult education could be built up to train urban artisans at one 
centre and rural craftsmen at the other (including in the latter case 
providing successful completers with initial tool kits). In addition, the 
adult education radio broadcasting could be broadened to provide an input into 
community worker related human health, water, veterinary and sanitary 
education.
Women's education has become relatively moribund formally. Interestingly,
there has been a parallel evolution of a number of community based and 
supported groups with rather different foci and curriculi. This strongly
suggests a need to explore the nature of the latter. There is reason to 
believe that while literacy is a desired skill - at least in urban areas - it 
is by no means the only nor always the most desired one. Similarly, topics 
such as nutrition and child care while viewed as desirable and enjoyable are 
also seen as less crucial than learning skills which would help the women 
raise their incomes. (What these may be will vary - food preparation and 
nutrition courses in the North are pursued as a step to preparation for jobs 
as cooks in North Yemen.) It is on insights such as these, discussed with 
women would-be students, that curriculum reconstruction should be built. In 
this case community/student support of teachers may prove unusually difficult 
in poor urban quarters. Many female household heads have no shillings at all
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to use on anything but immediate necessities. Therefore, some cooperating 
agency wage funding may be needed.
Koranic education is an area in which strengthening and broadening is
desirable. Fifty per cent of Somalia’s children (65$ of boys, 35$ of girls)
do receive at least some Koranic education versus perhaps 25$ (32$ of boys, 
18$ of girls) who ever attend primary school. Teachers are supported by 
parents. Locally produced writing materials are available, while chalk, paper 
and pencils for the formal education sector are not.
But distinct limitations exist. Most teachers have limited training, not 
including literacy in Arabic nor Koranic studies beyond textual memorisation. 
Topics beyond Koramic memorisation, e.g. explanation of texts, literacy in
Arabic, numeracy, while not unknown, are rare. These are weaknesses from the
perspective of the system’s specific religious and value system educational 
goals as well as from its broader ones. Therefore, there is no inherent 
reason Islamic leaders should oppose help in overcoming them. Nonetheless to 
do so will take time, patience and experimentation. These must be conducted 
in full dialogue and cooperation with and guidance/initiative from Somalia's 
Islamic scholars and leaders. On the part of external agencies they should be 
carried on as far as possible by personnel who are Arabic speaking and Muslim.
In the reverse direction other educators - including basic service extenders 
- should study the Koran to identify its teachings in respect to issues of 
concern to them. For example, verses on breast-feeding and child spacing are 
highly apposite to PHC and education. The CDC is interested in, and beginning 
to pursue, this approach.
Population Policy?
A rather different priority often advanced - usually, perhaps exclusively in 
the Somalia context, by external bodies - is reduction of population growth by 
reduction of birth rates. This topic is peculiarly prone to lead to polemics 
(pro and con) which generate heat and sound but not light nor discourse. A 
few common sense points may be worth making.
A continued 3$ population growth rate implies a doubling of Somalia's 
population around the year 2010. That rate would make rapid movement toward
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universal access to basic education, health, water and food security 
significantly harder to achieve. With known techniques, it is hard to see how 
Somalia's agricultural or pastoral bases could support doubled populations at 
current levels of household output/income. Environmental degradation - 
overgrazing, overdrawing on water resources, erosion and salination, tree and 
bush denudation would be very real dangers. Nor can it be seen clearly how 
the urban employment/meaningful self-employment levels can readily be doubled 
to absorb more workers and meet the needs of present poverty groups. Still
ft
less can one count on doubling numbers of migrant workers and levels of 
remittances.
But to sketch the drawbacks of rapid population growth - in a somewhat 
abstract fashion - is not, as sometimes seems to be supposed, either to devise 
a population policy or to win actual support by actual people in favour of 
their having fewer children. Without that support no policy can work in the 
absence of levels and types of coercion that raise very grave moral issues and 
are, in any event, patently impracticable in Somalia. Kenya for example, has 
what is usually regarded as the most well defined, articulated and resource 
backed population policy in SSA. It also has the highest and most rapidly 
rising (not falling) birth rate in the continent.
Historic experience shows that support is likely when four conditions are met:
a. infant and under five mortality is declining significantly and steadily;
b. education level of mothers is rising;
c. old age security is decreasingly seen as dependent on having a large 
number of living children by the time one reaches retirement;
d. basic living standards of the broad majority of households are steadily 
rising.
Somalia clearly does not meet the first two conditions. Probably it does not 
meet the third, although arguably it may just about have achieved the fourth. 
In such a context an elaborate population policy - whatever one may think of 
its inherent merits or demerits - is likely to be a total waste of time and 
misallocation of scarce resources.
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However, one major exception exists - even if it might better be viewed under 
the rubrics of health and child and mother welfare than of population policy 
as such. That is child spacing. Too frequent pregnancies exhaust mothers, 
tend to increase the proportion of underweight and illness-prone children and 
are causally related to high infant and child as well as high maternal 
mortality.
Advocacy of extended breast feeding (justifiable quite independently of child 
spacing) and adult (as well as more specific women’s) education on the 
importance of spacing children at least three years apart for their own and 
their mothers' health is justified and will increase the health and welfare of 
infants, young children and mothers. It will tend to reduce maternal, infant 
and under five mortality significantly. These are important gains. If they 
lay the basis for a change in attitudes resulting in smaller families, then an 
actual population policy will become appropriate.
Community Participation and External Support
The three pillars on which action now to benefit the poor and vulnerable of 
Somalia can be built are:
a. community participation and support including community involvement in 
programme design, personnel provision and financial (or relevant 
commodity) support. The last amounts to a programme of self-imposed, 
voluntary (except for social pressure) user fees;
b. cooperating partner supply of complementary inputs including technical 
knowledge, training, delivery systems, imported inputs (e.g. drugs, paper 
for texts) and supplementary financial resources;
c. government participation in programme design, authorisation, coordination 
and operation, including building up facilitating institutions (e.g. in 
curriculum development, educational radio, medical survey and research) 
and personnel capacity (e.g. district health teams) if necessary using 
cooperating partner finance for most of the additional costs until its 
own revenue position can be significantly improved.
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As a basic strategy approach, this is highly unconventional. However, it has 
a reasonable chance of success in Somalia, whereas neither a government 
centred and financed nor an outside agency dominated, centralised, top down, 
neo-colonial approach has any chance of success for financial reasons, quite 
apart from any others which may be adduced.
What is proposed is not an easy approach. If communities are to choose and to 
pay basic level workers in health, water and education, they must be sure 
that they want the programmes on offer and/or see those initially offered 
adapted to meet their needs. Paternalism and coercion will simply not work - 
the support in terms of personnel and finance will evaporate like a birket in 
a drought.
Nor is great speed of programme buildup possible. This is partly a matter of 
cooperating agency resources - not least constraints on numbers competent, 
experienced personnel and the amount of contextually relevant, locally tested 
knowledge. Ultimately however, it is a matter of the numbers of community
workers needed, the time for communities to decide they want to nominate and 
to support them and the time to train them. It is quite reasonable to set a 
goal of perhaps 15,000 community workers (say 2,000 trained traditional birth 
attendants, 7,500 community health and veterinary workers, 5,000 community
adult education workers (including water and women’s education). The largest, 
longest running, most successful PHC provincial programme - West Galbeed - has 
about 120 CHW’s now (of whom 30 are nomads).
There will always be tensions in this approach. Outside agencies will face
severe strains in being responsible and accountable at one and the same time
to their own structures, to Somalian communities and to the Government of 
Somalia. The need to coordinate multiple external bodies with each other and 
with the Government of Somalia will place strains on all concerned. These 
tensions can be healthy or they can tear the efforts apart, but there is no 
way of avoiding them.
In the medium to long term the precondition for this strategy’s success is 
that it works itself out of a job (or at any rate its initial job). The 
nearly unique high profile operational role down (or up!) to community level 
for outside agencies is neither inherently desirable nor permanently
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However, one major exception exists - even if it might better be viewed under 
the rubrics of health and child and mother welfare than of population policy 
as such. That is child spacing. Too frequent pregnancies exhaust mothers, 
tend to increase the proportion of underweight and illness-prone children and 
are causally related to high infant and child as well as high maternal 
mortality.
Advocacy of extended breast feeding (justifiable quite independently of child 
spacing) and adult (as well as more specific women's) education on the 
importance of spacing children at least three years apart for their own and 
their mothers' health is justified and will increase the health and welfare of 
infants, young children and mothers. It will tend to reduce maternal, infant 
and under five mortality significantly. These are important gains. If they 
lay the basis for a change in attitudes resulting in smaller families, then an 
actual population policy will become appropriate.
Community Participation and External Support
The three pillars on which action now to benefit the poor and vulnerable of 
Somalia can be built are:
a. community participation and support including community involvement in 
programme design, personnel provision and financial (or relevant 
commodity) support. The last amounts to a programme of self-imposed, 
voluntary (except for social pressure) user fees;
b. cooperating partner supply of complementary inputs including technical 
knowledge, training, delivery systems, imported inputs (e.g. drugs, paper 
for texts) and supplementary financial resources;
c. government participation in programme design, authorisation, coordination 
and operation, including building up facilitating institutions (e.g. in 
curriculum development, educational radio, medical survey and research) 
and personnel capacity (e.g. district health teams) if necessary using 
cooperating partner finance for most of the additional costs until its 
own revenue position can be significantly improved.
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As a basic strategy approach, this is highly unconventional. However, it has 
a reasonable chance of success in Somalia, whereas neither a government 
centred and financed nor an outside agency dominated, centralised, top down, 
neo-colonial approach has any chance of success for financial reasons, quite 
apart from any others which may be adduced.
What is proposed is not an easy approach. If communities are to choose and to 
pay basic level workers in health, water and education, they must be sure 
that they want the programmes on offer and/or see those initially offered 
adapted to meet their needs. Paternalism and coercion will simply not work - 
the support in terms of personnel and finance will evaporate like a birket in 
a drought.
Nor is great speed of programme buildup possible. This is partly a matter of 
cooperating agency resources - not least constraints on numbers competent, 
experienced personnel and the amount of contextually relevant, locally tested 
knowledge. Ultimately however, it is a matter of the numbers of community 
workers needed, the time for communities to decide they want to nominate and 
to support them and the time to train them. It is quite reasonable to set a 
goal of perhaps 15,000 community workers (say 2,000 trained traditional birth 
attendants, 7,500 community health and veterinary workers, 5,000 community 
adult education workers (including water and women's education). The largest, 
longest running, most successful PHC provincial programme - West Galbeed - has 
about 120 CHW's now (of whom 30 are nomads).
There will always be tensions in this approach. Outside agencies will face 
severe strains in being responsible and accountable at one and the same time 
to their own structures, to Somalian communities and to the Government of 
Somalia. The need to coordinate multiple external bodies with each other and 
with the Government of Somalia will place strains on all concerned. These 
tensions can be healthy or they can tear the efforts apart, but there is no 
way of avoiding them.
In the medium to long term the precondition for this strategy's success is 
that it works itself out of a job (or at any rate its initial job). The 
nearly unique high profile operational role down (or up!) to community level 
for outside agencies is neither inherently desirable nor permanently
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sustainable, necessary as it is now. Most of it should, over time, be 
absorbed by the communities and by the Government of Somalia. Similarly while 
voluntary community support for schools is a good thing - especially when it 
enhances community participation and professional accountability to users - 
government finance should expand its role, e.g. with respect to teacher 
salaries.
For this to happen the Government of Somalia will need to succeed in its 
present efforts to restore its domestic tax base. In addition external 
cooperating governments and agencies will need to accept the necessity of 
writing off the unsustainable debt burden hanging over Somalia and of 
re-orienting their resource flows to meet the actual needs of Somalia and its 
people rather than either capital and commodity or pre-cooked economic policy 
export goals. However, the payoffs from meeting these requirements lie some 
years down the road. The present potential lies in the three legged strategy 
sketched as a means to beginning to meet the priority needs of poor and 
vulnerable Somalis set out above.
Can It Be Financed?: A Preliminary Costimate
TABLE 37 
($000,000) Programme Costs
Programme Gross Present Reallocable Support Net New
Area Cost Support To Same Sector Responses Needed
Health 30* 15 5 10
Education 15 2 8 5
Veterinary 2** - 7 2
Water/Sanitation 5 1 2 2
Fuel 2*** negl ? 2
54 18 15 21
Includes tuberculosis programme.
Initial year cost higher to establish basic veterinary drug 
revolving stock.
Pure guesstimate as to possible small scale forestry (including 
bush) and fuel efficiency promotion programmes which might be 
developed.
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The programmatic approach sketched in Chapters 3 to 5 and above is low cost in 
two crucial senses. It could provide basic services at a low annual capital 
and operating cost; less than alternative methods of providing the same 
services. That said its absolute costs are very substantial - possibly $55 
million a year by the fifth year. A rough breakdown appears at Table 37*
The gross cost is about $10 per resident of Somalia. The net additional cost 
should be very substantially lower. In the first place up to $18 million is 
already being provided in support of partial programmes in the areas and of 
the types advocated. On a fairly cautious estimation another $15 million of 
resources devoted to lower benefit projects in the same sectors could be 
reallocated. That would reduce the net or new resource cost to $21 million a 
year or perhaps 10Í of present gross annual concessional transfers to Somalia.
Of that appropriate commodity aid to be monetised to meet shilling costs could 
provide up to $10 million in the form of paper (for educational printing), 
rice, wheat, vegetable oil, cotton and sugar. Except in the case of paper the 
commodities should be sold to produce shillings not used directly in the 
programmes. This approach would have the useful by-product of increasing 
foreign exchange resources available for intermediate goods imports 
including those needed to improve the levels and quality of economic 
infrastructure maintenance.
An additional aid requirement (on grant or IDA terms) of about $11 million a 
year would remain. That does not appear to be an impossibly high target. 
Some existing sources of external resources have evinced potential interest in 
raising support levels if these enhanced resource transfers would lead 
directly to halting and reversing the decline in basic service quantity and 
quality. Some additional bilateral donors might be recruited to support 
certain of the proposed programmes. $11 million a year is not a small amount 
but even over five years it comes to $55 million or less than several single 
PIP capital projects which are proving financeable.
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To Summarise
The challenge in Somalia with respect to personal poverty is not its 
prevalence but rather the need to ensure that those trapped in pockets of 
poverty are helped to win their way out of them. With respect to 
vulnerability - especially to drought - the challenge is to identify and 
implement more timely and effective means to reduce losses, both nationally, 
and for poor nomadic and peasant households in particular.
Only with respect to basic public services is the present situation both 
desperate and worsening. This calamitous situation is largely the result of 
the state's inadequate revenue base and of the pattern of assistance provided 
by cooperating governments and agencies. The need to rethink, to utilise and 
to build up low cost community-linked channels and as well as to augment the 
resources which the state can and does allocate to basic social and economic 
services is both acute and urgent. Until this is done, poor households and in
particular their mothers and children will be severely deprived (of access to
health, water and education) and overworked (in part to collect water). To 
that challenge the poignant warning of Omar Khayyam from The Rubaiyat does 
apply:
The bird of time has but a little way to fly -
and, lo, the bird is on the wing.
STATISTICAL ANNEX
All Tables from Somalia Democratic Republic, Ministry of 
National Planning, National Development Strategy And Programme
1987-1989> Mogadishu, February 19 87
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NOTE ON INFLATION AND EXCHANGE RATES
S o m e  o f  t h e  i t * * »  c o m p r i s i n g  t h e  e c o n o m i c  f r a m e w o r k  a r e  
n o r m a l l y  s t a t e d  i n  c u r r e n t  S o m a l i  s h i l l i n g s  ( e . g .  t h e  
b u d g e t  a n d  G o v e r n m e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  e x p e n d ! t u r e s )  w h i l e  s o m e  
o t h e r  a r e  n o r m a l l y  s t a t e d  i n  c u r r e n t  d o l l a r s  ( e . g .  t h e  
p u b l i c  i n v e s t m e n t  p r o g r a m m e  a n d  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s ) .  
T h e r e f o r e  a  m e t h o d o l o g y  h a s  b e e n  a d o p t e d  f o r  n o m i n a l l y  
c o n v e r t i n g  f i g u r e s  f r o m  o n e  c u r r e n c y  t o  a n o t h e r .
S h i  1 1 i n g / d o l l a r  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  o f  7 0  f o r  1 9 8 8  a n d  1 O 0  f o r  
1 9 8 7  h a v e  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  o f f i c i a l  G o v e r n m e n t  
b u d g e t a r y  p r e s e n t a t i o n s .
A  d o m e s t i c  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  o f  3 5 . 7 7  p e r  c e n t  o c c u r r e d  i n
1 9 8 6 .  O u r  o f f i c i a l  e s t i m a t e  f o r  1 9 8 7  i s  2 5  p e r  c e n t ,  
t a k i n g  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  g r e a t e r  s t a b i l i t y  m a n i f e s t e d  s i n c e  
t h e  a d v e n t  o f  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  a u c t i o n s .  I n f l a t i o n  r a t e s  
o f  2 0  p e r  c e n t  f o r  1 9 8 8  a n d  2 0  p e r  c e n t  f o r  1 9 8 9  a r e  
p r o j e c t e d .
A s s u m i n g  w o r l d  i n f l a t i o n  o f  3  p e r  c e n t  p e r  a n n u m r  t h e  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  i m p l i e d  b y  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  d o m e s t i c  
i n f l a t i o n  a n d  w o r l d  i n f l a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  a s  f o l l o w s !
D o m e s t i c  i n f l a t i o n  i n d e x  1 0 0 . 0 0  1 2 0 . 0 0  1 4 4 . 0 0
1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9
W o r l d  i n f l a t i o n  i n d e x  
S h i l l i n g / d o l l a r  r a t e
1 0 0 . 0 0  1 0 3 . 0 0  1 0 6 . 0 9
1 0 0 . 0 0  1 1 6 . 5 0  1 3 5 . 7 3
T h e s e  p r o j e c t e d  f i g u r e s  a r e  i n t e n d e d  o n l y  f o r  p r e s e n t  
a n a l y t i c a l  p u r p o s e s  a n d  d o  n o t  r e p r e s e n t  a n y  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  
G o v e r n m e n t  r e g a r d i n g  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s .
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la a il  lions of current sh illings la a il lio a s  of c a rr ta t dollars
Table 1 NhCMECOW IC F t M O O K
1183 1184 1187 1188 m i a z 1 » 1 * 2
O P at aarket prices 30113 130700 141400 213700 241300 1414 1834 1184
Coaiuaptioa
Investaeat
Not iaports foofs 1 a-f svcs
17431
12374
•8120
131424
23334
-24080
172718
37302
-40300
212343
41141
-48814
243127
43331
-31178
1728
373
-403
1824
421
-4 11
1133
447
-434
OP at Mrkot prices 10113 130700 141400 213700 241300 j 4 K 1834 1281
Coasuaption 
Boaestic u r i q f
87431
3454
131424
-724
172718
-3118
212343
1133
243127
4173
1728
-32
1824
10
1133
31
lavestaeat 12374 23334 37302 41141 43331 373 421 447
Gross fixed capital foraata 
Change ia stocks
11101
1273
21324
1830
34128
2374
44137
2112
51581
3770
341
20
403
24
431
28
Gross fixed capital foraatioa 11101 21524 34128 44137 31581 341 403 431
Public
Private
7010
4011
14111
4333
23400
1328
34133
12822
42074
17303
234
13
213
110
310
121
Resource pap -8120 -24080 -40300 -48814 -51178 -m -411 - i £
Iavestaaat 
Goaostic savings
-12374
3434
-23334
-724
-37302
-3118
-41143
1133
-43351
4173
-373
-32
-421
10
-447
31
Resource yap -8120 -24080 -40500 -48814 -51178 -403 -419 -434
Exports
Iaports
Noa-factor services
3720
-11200
-1440
4380
-24740
-3120
10700
-43700
-3300
13413
-57435
-4174
-70715
-8331
107
-457
-33
133
-493
-31
148
-521
-43
Public iavestaeat propraaae 8010 18041 21700 43121 53070 217 _377 311
Core PIP
Technical assistance
7010
1080
14111
3130
23400
4100
34133
1784
42074
10114
234
41
213
84
310
81
Core PIP 7010 1 4 1 U 23400 34135 42074 m m 212
Foreign coapoaeat 
Doaestic coapoaeat
3440
1370
12110
2801
23800
1800
21824
4311
34311
3343
238
18
234
37
241
41
Gross national product 81833 128880 148700 213817 271200 1487 m 1228
6IP at aarket prices 
Factor incoae
10113
-1080
130700
-1820
141400
-100
213700
117
241300
1100
14%
-1
1834
1
1184
14
Population (thousands)
6NP per capita (000 sh or 1)
8244
10817
8300
15142
8744
11241
1034
23443
1314
21111
8744
112
1034
203
1314
214
Eickaape rato «killiag/dollar 40.00 70.00 100.00 114.30 133.73 100.00 114.30 133.73
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In percentages of GDP
Table 2 NACROECOWMC FRAMEWORK
70-84 80-64 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
GDP at market price s MA i & o 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Consumption
Investment
Net imports goods t  n - f  svcs
96.9
16 .1
- 1 3 .0
96.2
1 3 .1
- 1 1 . 3
96.2
13 .6
- 9 . 8
100.5
1 7 . 9
- 1 8 . 4
10 1.9
22.0
-2 3 .9
99.4
23.4 
-2 2 .8
98.5
2 3 .5  
- 2 2 . 0
GDP at M r k e t  prices 100.0 100.0 10 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 M A
Consumption 
Domestic savings
96.9
3 .1
96.2
3 .8
96.2
3 .8
100.5
- 0 . 5
10 1.9
- 1 . 9
99.4
0.6
98.3
1 . 3
Investnent 16.1 1 5 .1 13.6 1 7 . 9 22.0 23.4 2 3 .5
Gross f i x e d  c a p ita l  fornatn 
Change in  stocks
1 4 .7
1 .4
1 4 .2
0 .9
1 2 . 2
1 . 4
1 6 .5
1 . 4
20.6
1 . 4
22.0
1 . 4
2 2 .1
1 . 4
Gross fix e d  c a p i t a l  fo rn a tio n 1 4 .7 1 4 .2 1 2 .2 1 6 .5 20.6 22.0 2 2 . 1
Public
P r i v a t e
10.8
3.9
7 . 1
7 . 1
7 . 7
4 .5
1 1 . 3
5 .0
15 .1
5 .5
16.0
6 .0
1 5 .6
6 .5
Resource gap - 1 3 .0 - 1 1 . 3 - 9 . 8 - 1 8 . 4 -2 3 .9 -2 2 .8 - 2 2 . 0
Investnent 
Domestic savings
- 1 6 . 1
3 .1
- 1 5 . 1
3 .8
- 1 3 . 6
3 .8
- 1 7 . 9
- 0 . 5
- 2 2 .0
- 1 . 9
- 2 3 .4
0 .6
- 2 3 . 5
1 . 5
Resource gap - 1 3 .0 - 1 1 . 3 - 9 . 8 - 1 8 . 4 - 2 3 .9 - 2 2 .8 - 2 2 . 0
Ex p o rts
In ports
N on-fa ctor services
9 .1
-2 0 .9
- 1 . 2
5 .0
- 1 6 . 3
0 . 2
4 . 1
- 1 2 . 3
- 1 . 6
5 .0
- 2 0 . 5
- 2 . 9
6 .3
-2 6 .9
- 3 . 3
7 . 3
-2 6 .9
- 3 . 2
7 . 5
- 2 6 . 3
- 3 . 2
Pu blic investnent programme 12.4 6 . 1 8 .9 13.9 1 7 . 5 20.6 1 9 . 7
Core P IP
Technical assistance
10.8
1 .6
7 . 1
1 . 0
7 . 7
1 . 2
1 1 . 5
2 . 4
15 .1
2 . 4
16.0
4 .6
1 5 .6
4 . 1
Core P IP 10.8 7 . 1 7 . 7 1 1 . 4 15 .1 16.0 1 5 .6
Foreig n component 
Domestic component
8.3
2.3
5 .4
1 . 6
6 .2
1 . 5
9 .3
2 . 1
14 .0
1 . 1
14 .0
2 . 0
1 3 .5
2 . 1
Gross natio na l product 101.8 10 2.5 98.8 98.6 31A 100.1 1 0 0 .7
G I F  a t market price s 
Fa c to r income
100.0
l . B
100.0
2 . 5
100.0
- 1 . 2
100.0
- 1 . 4
100.0
- 0 . 5
100.0
0 . 1
100.0
0 . 7
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Table 3 Gross doaestic product by i n d u s t r i a l  orig in
(in  B i l l i o ns  o f s h i l l i n g s  at 1977 prices)
1985 1986 1987 m . 1989
Livesto ck 2406 2502 2577 2654 2734
Crop production 1376 1404 1474 1548 1625
F ore stry 385 397 417 430 443
Fish e r ie s 35 36 37 41 46
Mining and quarrying 21 21 21 21 21
Manufacturing 348 376 406 438 473
E l e c t r i c i t y  and water 8 9 9 10 11
Construction 233 256 276 293 311
Tra de/h otels/r estaura nts 674 741 800 824 849
Transport 1  coaaunicatns 472 496 521 552 585
Finance/insur/real estate 409 450 486 496 506
Government services 474 479 484 532 585
Other services 189 191 193 197 201
Adjustat fo r  fi n a n  svcs -80 -88 -89 -5 9 -30
GDP at factor cost 6950 7270 7612 7977 8360
In d ire c t taxes 353 464 416 452 490
GDP at market p rice s 7303 7734 8028 8429 8850
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Table 4 Gross doaestic product by in d u s tr ia l  o ri g i n
Per cent growth per annua
77-8 0 81-85 m . 1987 1988 1989
Livesto ck 0 .2 10 .2 4.0 3.0 3 .0 3 .0
Crop production 6 .5 1 7 .3 2.0 5.0 5 .0 5 .0
F o r e s t r y 7 . 8 4 . 1 3 .0 5.0 3 .0 3 .0
F i s h e r i e s 2 9 .6 9 .2 2 .0 3.0 1 0 .8 1 2 .0
Mining and quarrying - 1 2 . 5 1 . 2 - - - -
Manufacturing 2 . 0 2 . 4 8.0 8.0 8 .0 8 .0
E l e c t r i c i t y  and water - 1 5 . 8 8 . 7 10.0 10.0 1 1 . 0 1 1 . 0
Construction 1 3 .4 - 2 . 7 10 .0 8.0 6 .0 6 .0
Trade/h otels/r estau rants 13 .9 1 . 4 10.0 8.0 3 .0 3 .0
Transport  & coaaunicatns 6 . 1 7 . 9 5 .0 5.0 6 .0 6 .0
Finance/insur/real estate 8 . 1 2 . 0 10.0 8.0 2 .0 2 . 0
Governaent services 1 . 1 2 . 0 1 . 0 1 .0 10 .0 10 .0
Other service s 5 . 1 3 .0 1 .0 1 .0 2 .0 2 . 0
Adju stat for finan svcs 1 8 . 7 6 .5 - • —
GDP at factor cost 3 .3 6 .2 4 .6 4 . 7 4 .8 4 .8
In d i re c t  taxes 3 .6 0 . 7 3 1 .4 - 1 0 . 3 8 . 7 8 .4
GDP at aarket prices 3 .4 5 .3 5 .9 3 .8 5 .0 5 .0
Gross doaestic product by in d u s tr ia l  o r i g i n  
Per cent of t o t a l
77-80 81-85 1986 1987 w 1989
Livesto ck 36.3 34.3 3 4.4 33.9 33.3 3 2 .7
Crop production 12.6 1 5 .9 19.3 19.4 19 .4 1 9 .4
F ore stry 5 .4 6 . 2 5 .5 5 .5 5 .4 5 .3
Fish e r ie s 0 .4 0 .5 0 .5 0.5 0 .5 0 .6
Mining and quarrying 0 .5 0 .4 0 .3 0 .3 0 .3 0 .3
Manufacturing 6 .3 5 .6 5 .2 5 .3 5 .5 5 . 7
E l e c t r i c i t y  and water 0 .5 0 .4 0 .1 0 .1 0 . 1 0 . 1
Construction 5 .3 4 .4 3 .5 3.6 3 . 7 3 . 7
Tra de/hotels/restaurants 1 1 . 1 1 0 .1 10 .2 10.5 10 .3 10 .2
Transport 1 coaaunicatns 6 .5 6 .2 6 .8 6.8 6 .9 7 . 0
Fina nc e/insur/real estate 6 .9 6 .5 6 .2 6 .4 6 .2 6 . 1
Governaent services 7 . 9 7 . 8 6 .6 6 .4 6 . 7 7 . 0
Other services 3 .0 3 .0 2.6 2 .5 2 . 5 2 . 4
Adjustat for finan svcs - 2 . 7 - 1 . 3 - 1 . 2 - 1 . 2 - 0 . 7 - 0 . 4
GDP at factor cost ifiSLP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET RESULTS AND PROJECTIONS, 1985-1989 
(in millions of shillings)
At current prices At constant 1986 price s
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Total revenues 10348 16658 17919 24221 32658 14049 16658 14335 16148 18143
Ordinary budget revenues 5222 9506 10200 14959 21544 7090 9506 8160 9973 1196B
Tax revenues 4577 8389 9425 13815 19888 6214 m . 7540 9210 11048
Goods and se rvices 1626 1974 2095 3058 4369 2208 1974 1676 2037 2427
¡■ports 2520 5450 6250 9029 12804 3421 5450 5000 6019 7 1 1 3
Expo rts 120 150 100 151 223 163 150 80 101 124
Direct taxes 311 815 980 1579 2492 422 815 784 1053 1384
Non-tax revenues i H 1117 775 1144 1656 876 1117 620 763 920
Ex tra o rd in a ry  revenues iron 5126 7152 7719  9262 1 1114 6960 7152 6175 6175 6175
s h illin g -g e n e r a t in g  aid
Total expenditures 10483 16437 17919 37873 48001 14233 16437 14335 25248 26665
Ordinary budget expenditures 9041 13496 15017 33516 43101 12275 13496 12014 22343 23943
Debt service 2527 1949 4300 13048 13980 3431 1949 3440 8699 7766
General services 5425 10441 9371 11244 13493 7366 10441 7497 7495 7495
Economic services 433 675 810 973 1167 588 675 648 649 648
Social services 656 431 536 644 772 891 431 429 429 429
Recurring costs - - - 6882 12007 - - - 4588 6671
liage b i l l  adjustments - (226) (424) 725 1682 “ (226) (339) 483 934
Developmt budget expenditures J i l l 2941 j m 4357 4900 m . 2941 2322 2905 _ ¡ 7 2 2
Investment 1370 2801 2411 3180 3733 I860 2801 1929 2120 2074
Technical assistance 72 140 491 1 1 7 7 1167 98 140 393 785 648
Ov era ll  balance -135 221 0 -13652 -15343 -183 221 - -9100 -8522
Current d e f i c i t -3819 -3990 -4B17 -18557 -21557 -5185 -3990 -3854 -123 70 - 1 1 9 7 5
Development expenditure -1442 -2941 -2902 -4357 -4900 -1958 -2941 -2322 -2905 - 2 7 2 2
S h illin g -g e n e ra t in g  aid 5126 7152 7719 * 9262 1 1 114 6960 7152 6175 6175 6175
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Table 6
Current account
Ex p o rts f . o . b .  
L i v e s to c k  
Bananas 
Other
I i p o r t s  c . i . f .
Foreign exchange 
Food
P e t r o l e u i
Other
Cokiodity aid 
Food
Petroleum
Other
PIP
Non -fa cto r services 
PIP 
Other
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(in « i l l i o n s  of d o l l a rs )
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
93 94 107 133 148
66 65 75 93 103
13 15 17 20 22
14 14 15 20 23
-M  '.222. -Í5 I -i21  321
-J l -M . -J0£ -122.
-1 8  -25 -20 -1 0  -5
-38 - 1 8  -3 7  -40 -45
- 1 7  -60 - 4 7  -7 0  -83
-J l -_M  zlt llf l ~J3
- 4 7  -55 -50 -51 -53
-24 . - 2 7  -1 8  -22 -24
-23 -58 -95 -95 -96
-113 -122 122 121 i n
-JL 12 1  ü
-28 -34 -48 -51 -54
-8 -22 - 7  -8 -9
In terest pay»ents due 
M u l t i l a t e r a l  
B i l a t e r a l  
OECD
Other countries 
Debt r e l i e f  
IMF charges 
AHF charges 
Special
Other fa ctor income 
P r i v a t e  tra ns fe rs 
Other in ve s tie n t  income
Balance on current account 
(excluding grant aid)
Capital account and financing
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Balance goods/non-factor svcs - J 2 I  H i  1 2 L  1 1 2  1 2 2
12 12. H  12 H
-  - 7  -6 .  -6 - 7
-3 -3 -3 -3
-  - 1 9  - 1 9  - I B  -1 6
-  -8 -5 -3  -3
-  - 1 0  -5  -5 -4
-  - 1 3  - 1 0  -8  -5
-  -3  -3  -3
- (-2) (-2 ) (-2 ) (-2)
22 37 42 47 52
20 35 40 45 50
2 2 2 2 2
-250 -370 -  414 112 122.
Loan repayments due 1 2 - 1 1 1 5 _ 1 2 1 2 .
M u l t i l a t e r a l -9 - 1 1 - 1 3 - 1 2
B i l a te r a l - 7 -1 0 -1 0 - 1 0
OECD -22 -21 -22 -25
Other countries -1 8 -16 - 1 4 - 1 4
Debt r e l i e f - 7 -7 - 7 - 4
Special (- 1 4 (-19 ( -2 2 (- 2 2 )
P r iv a te  capita l movements 1 1 - 1 2 1 2 1 5
Overall  balance ( e x d  aid) 1 2 2 -433 -J6 4 -464 -462
Aid grants in kind i l l 201 282 282 i n
Food 22 35 39 41 43
Other co B io d itie s 45 62 61 62 64
PIP reasonably assured 82 104 182 • 129 107
PIP to be funded * * 50 63
Aid grants in cash i L J L r - -
Aid loans in kind 1 2 i l l i l l i l l 165
Food 25 20 11 10 10
Other coBBodities 2 23 52 55 56
PIP reasonably assured 59 69 56 55 72
PIP to be funded “ • 22 27
Aid loans in cash - L - - - -
Other financing, items 1 2 J i J I - 7 9 -5 7
IMF purchases 35 5 - “
IMF repurchases -2 -29 -30 -38 -38
AHF purchases •
AHF repurchases - 1 -3 -23 -22 •
Other Central Bank -4 15 •
Commercial Bank -32 -8
Arrears -98 101 -19 - 1 9 - 1 9
Paris Club 152 —
Financing gap J L . A . 1 3 2 J i L  J l
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Table 7
CASH FLOU BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ESTIMATES 
(in  M i l l i o n s  of do llars )
m . 1986 1987 1988 1989
Current account i i i zSL ¿ 1 1 J .
Exports 93 94 107 133 148
Foreign exchange in ports -7 3 -1Ó3 '  -104 -120 -133
Non-factor services -8 -22 - 7 -B -9
In terest payients due -49 -63 -51 -46 -38
Other factor incoie 22 37 42 47 52
C apital  account -JL -50 ^46 -40
Loan repaynents due -45 -63 -65 -66 -65
P r iv a t e  ca pita l Movements - 3 7 - 15 20 25
Cash grants 41 39 - - -
Cash loans 6 - - -
Financing 50 - S i - 7 2 -7 9 -5 7
IMF 33 -24 -30 -38 -38
ART - 1 -3 -23 -22 -
Other Central Bank -4 15 - - -
Connercial Bank -32 -B - - -
Arrears -98 101 - 1 9 - 1 9 - 1 9
P a ris  Club 152 - - - -
Gap 0 135 119 77
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Table 8 DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS DUE 1986-1989
(in millions of dollars)
1988
In terest
1987 1988
M u lt ila t e ra l  agencies 6.8 5.9 6.4
African Devit Bank 0 .4 0.6 0.5
African Devat Fund 0 .3 0.3 0 .4
Arab Fund 3.9 2 . 7 3.3
EEC/EIB - - -
IDA 1 .8 1 . 7 1 . 7
IFAD 0 .2 0.2 0 .2
IDB 0 .2 0.2 0 .2
OPEC Fund 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1
B i l a te r a l  agencies 2.8 2.9 2.9
Kuwait Fund 1 . 2 1 .4 1 . 4
Saudi Fund 1 .6 1.5 1 .5
OECD countries 19.6 18.9 1 7 . 7
France 3.5 3.5 3.0
I t a l y 6 .4 6.0 5 .4
United States 9.6 9.2 9.0
Japan - 0.2 0.3
Other c o u n t r i e s * 8 .2 4.6 3 .4
Abu Dhabi 2 .9 2.5 2.0
Algeria - -
Iraq 3 .3 1 .0 0.8
Roaania 1 .8 0.9 0.5
Yugoslavia 0 .2 0 .2 0 .1
Debt r e l i e f 9 .9 M 4.6
France 0 .8 0 .6 0.5
I t a l y 2 . 5 1 . 7 1 . 7
United States 2 . 1 la 8 1 .8
United Kingdoa 4 .5 1 . 1 0.6
1MF/AHF charges 15 .8 13 .3 1 1 . 4
IMF 12.9 10.4 8.4
AHF 2 .9 2.9 3.0
Total 6 3.1 50.8 46.3
Prin cipal
1989 1986 1987 1988 1989
6 .8 M 1 1 .5 1 2 . 7 1 2 .4
0 .4 0.4 0 . 7 0 . 7 0 . 7
0 . 4 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .2
3 . 7 3.8 5.6 6 .5 5 .8
- - - 0 .2 0 . 2
1 . 8 0.9 1 . 1 1 .3 1 . 4
0 .3 - - - 0 . 1
0 . 2 0.4 0.4 0 .4 0 . 4
0 . 1 3.5 3.5 3 .5 3 .5
2 . 8 A l J i i _LL JxL
1 . 3 1 .3 3 . 7 3 . 7 3 . 7
1 . 4 5.9 5.9 5 .9 5 . 9
1L i 20.8 Í2 J. JiA
2 . 7 2 .3 2.8 3 .5 3 .6
4 . 7 1 6 .7 15.0 14 .9 1 7 . 4
8 .6 3 .0 3.0 3.6 3 .6
0 .4 - - • *
2 .8 18.4 15.6 1 4 .4 1 4 .1
1 .6 10 .1 10 .1 1 0 .1 1 0 .1
- 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 . 1
0 . 7 2 . 4 2 . 1 2 . 1 2 . 1
0 .4 4 .8 2 .2 1 . 1 0 .8
0 . 1 1 .0 1 .0 1 .0 1 . 0
4 . 1 7 . 1 7 . 1 7 . 1 4 . 2
0 .5 0 . 1 0 .1 0 .1 0 . 1
1 . 6 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 1
1 . 8 0 .2 0 .2 0 .2 0 .2
0 . 1
5 .4
5 . 7 5 . 7 5 . 7 2 . 9
5 . 4
38.2 6 3 .7 64.6 65.9 64.9
* Primarily Bulgaria, China, USSR
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T a b l e  9 SUMMARY OF CORE INVESTMENT PROGRAMME BY SECTORS
( in a i l l i o n s  of d o l l a rs )
1987 1988 1989 Total
Productive sectors 3 7 1 . 3 385.1 3 7 7.9 1134.3
Bardhere daa 3 . 7 4 .8 9 7.5 106.0
Livesto ck 3 1 .5 34.9 22.5 8B.9
Ag ricu ltu re 48.6 6 7 . 7 56.1 1 7 2 .4
F o r e s t r y / v i l d l i f e 3 .3 3 .9 3.9 1 1 . 1
F is h e r ie s 1 4 . 7 39.6 33.9 88.2
Mineral resources 2 . 0 2 . 7 1 .0 5 . 7
Manufacturing 40.4 28.6 15.0 84.0
Energy 23.3 3 2 .1 26 .1 8 1.5
Hater resources 3 7 . 7 49.3 52.5 139.5
Transcoas 166.1 1 2 1 . 5 69.4 357.0
Social/adain sectors 1 L 2 3 2 .7 35.2 89.6
Education 5 .0 5.5 4 .9 15.4
Health 1 1 . 9 15 .1 13 .2 40.2
Govt services 0 . 1 - - 0.1
Reg/rur/urb devat 4 . 7 1 2 . 1 1 7 . 1 33.9
Total 393.0 4 1 7 . 8 4 1 3 .1 1223.9
1987 1988 1989 M i l
Total 393.7 4 1 7 . 8 4 1 3 .1  1224.6
I ta l ia n  eaerg prog 160.1 5 1 .4 5.0 2 1 6 .5
Bardhere daa 3 . 7 4 .8 9 7.5 106.0
Other 229.9 361.6 310.6 9 02.1
Total 39 3 .0 4 1 7 .8 4 1 3 .1 1 2 7 3 .9
Foreign loans 86.0 7 8 . 2 96.2 260.4
Foreign g ra n ts 279 .6 184.0 142.5 606.1
To be funded 0.0 102.8 1 1 9 .3 22 2.1
Soaali dev budget t 19.4 38.9 3 6 .7 95.0
Other d o aestic 8.0 13 .9 18 .4 40.3
E stia a te d  I s lip p ag e  35.0 30.0 25.0 2U.
Total a f te r  slip p ag e 23LL 309.8 8 5 7 . 7
Foreign loans 55.9 5 4 .7 7 2 . 2 182 .8
Foreign g ra n ts 1 8 1 . 7 128.9 106.8 4 1 7 . 4
To be funded 0.0 7 2 . 0 89.5 1 6 1 .5
Sob devat budget 1 2 .6 2 7 . 3 2 7 . 5 6 7 . 3
Other d o aestic 5 .2 9 . 7 13.8 2 8 . 7
Exchange r a t e ,  sh/$ 100.00 135.73
Doaestic coaponent
a f t e r  slip p a g e , Sh ■ 4310 U S X
Sob devat budget
for core P IP  p ro js  1260 3180 3733 8173
Other doaestic 520 1130 1873 3523
¡ " T h I s ’ üoüíd~coá¡"tó So sh 1S40 B i l l i o n  in 1987 at So sh 100 t o  the d o l l a r .  The actual developaent 
budget for 1987 is So sh 2902 a i l l i o n ,  o f  which So sh 2411 B i l l i o n  for core PIP  p ro je c ts  and 
So sh 491 a i l l i o n  for technical assistanc e.  This presentation excludes So sh 471 a i l l i o n  o f  80S 
disburseaents prograaaed in the developaent budget to aeet re cu rrin g costs o f  coapleted P I P  p r o j e c t s .
9
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Table 10
SUMMARY OF CORE INVESTMENT PROGRAMME BY SECTORS 
(in  percentages of t o t a l )
72-76 7 7 - 8 1  82-86 1987 1988 m . 87-89
Pr oductive sectors 8 5.4 8 7.9 94.5 92.2 9 1.5 9 2 .7
Bardhere dan - - 0.5 0 .9 1 . 1 23.7 8 . 7
Lives to ck 5 .2 5 .9 8.3 8.0 8.4 5.4 7 . 3
A g r i c u l t u r e 1 2 . B 1 7 . 6 2 1.9 1 2 .4 16.2 13.6 1 4 .0
F o r e s t r y / w i l d l i f e 0.8 0 .3 2.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 0 .9
F i s h e r i e s 1 . 3 4 .8 5.0 3 . 7 9.5 8.2 7 . 2
Mineral resources 2 . 4 0 .9 2.8 0.5 0 . 7 0.2 0 .5
Manufacturing 19.9 2 4 .2 9 .4 10.4 6.8 3.6 6 .9
Energy 6 .0 1 . 6 4 .2 5.9 7 . 7 6.3 6 . 7
Mater resources 4 .9 4 .0 13 .1 9.6 1 1 .8 1 2 . 7 1 1 . 4
Transp 1  coaaunic 32.5 2 6 .1 20.2 42.3 29.1 16.9 2 9 .1
Tourisa 2 . 1 0 .2 - - - - -
Trade t  coaaerce 1 . 3 2 . 1 1 .8 - • - -
Social/a dain  sectors 10.8 U L 1 10.3 5.5 1A 8.5 J L i
Education 6 .8 5 . 7 3.9 1 .3 1 .3 1 .2 1 . 2
Health 2 .0 0 .5 2.8 3.0 3.6 3 .2 3 .3
6ovt services 2 .0 2 . 8 0.6 - - - -
Reg/rur/urb devat - 2 . 4 3.0 1 . 2 2.9 4 .1 2 . 7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.Q
ESTIMATED LOAN DISBURSEMENTS FOR CORE PIP PROJECTS 
( i n  B i l l i o n s  of d o l l a r s )
Before
1984 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
A f te r
1991 Total
T o ta l  T o ta l  
87-89 8 7-9 1
Abu Dhabi Fund 96.0 0 .0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0.0 0.0 96.0 0 .0 0 .0
06FB01 Juba sugar % . o 96.0 0 .0 0 .0
ADB i x l 4 .9 4 .5 3.8 2 . 2 2 .9 0 .0 0.0 0.0 1 9 .1 8 .9 8 .9
02IR02 6en-Bulo H-Oory 0 .3 0 .5 3 . 7 2 .5 0.6 - - - - “ 7 . 6 0 .6 0 .6
09TL11 Panaftel Kenya - - 1 . 2 1 .5 2 .2 2 . 2 2 .9 - - - 10 .0 7 . 3 7 . 3
13HC07 J i l i b  hospital - - - 0 .5 1.0 - « - * 1 .5 1 .0 1 . 0
ADF 15 .9 i i l J L i 6 .1 3.6 2 . 6 3 .1 0 .0 0.0 45.2 9 .3 __9.3
02AD02 Bay region agrie 6 .9 - 1 . 7 1 .0 - - - - - - 9 .6 J > . 0 0 .0
02IT04 Afgoi-M ord inle 0 . 7 0 . 7 3 .5 3 .5 3.6 2 . 6 3 .1 - - - 1 7 . 7 9 .3 9 .3
02IDO2 Ag extension 8 .2 5.8 0 .3 1 4 .3 0 .0 0 .0
08UU02 Hog sewerage 0 . 1 1 .3 0 .6 1 .6 3 .6 0 .0 0 .0
ADF/ADB 4 . 1 0 .3 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 AA 1 ± 0 .0 0 .0
09R001 Nabadid-Borata rd 4 . 1 0 .3 4 . 4 0 .0 0 .0
Arab Fund Í 2 J 3 .9 5 .4 1 . 7 1 1 1 i d 10.6 0.0 1 1 62.6 2 1 . 3 3 1 . 9
OOJVOl Bardhere dan 10 .0 10 .0 - - 20.0 10 .0 20 .0
01AH07 Tsetse eradicatn 4 .6 1 . 7 6 .3 0.0 0 .0
07EP08 J e s i r a  power I I I - - - 1 . 7 - 4 . 7 6 .4 0 .6 - - 1 3 .4 1 1 . 1 1 1 . 7
08UU01 Mogadishu water 9 .3 1 . 7 2 . 7 1 3 . 7 0 .0 0 .0
09TL07 Arabsat - - 0 .1 - 0 .1 - - - - - 0 .2 0 . 1 0 . 1
09TL09 Nedarabtel 0 .8 0.5 2 .6 - 0 .1 - - - - - 4 .0 0 .1 0 . 1
09R001 Nabadid-Borana rd 5 .0 5 .0 0 .0 0 .0
China 42.9 2 .0 1 .6 3 .8 6.0 1 2 .6 4 .0 2 .8 0.0 0.0 7 5 . 7 22 .6 2 5 . 4
02JV04 Fanole i r r i g 4 1 .9 0 .1 - 2 .5 2 . 7 5 .6 - - - - 52. B 8 .3 8 .3
08RV01 Deep borewells 1 .0 0.5 0 .5 2 . 0 0 .0 0 . 0
08UU04 Hargeisa water - 1 . 4 1 . 1 1 .0 2.8 7 . 0 4 .0 2 .8 - - 20 .1 1 3 .8 1 6 .6
08UU10 Hater Sabi ley • " * 0.3 0.5 * “ • • 0 .8 0 .5 0 . 5
Dentark J U L JA 0 .0 1A 1 1 1L _ L i 11 J L i M 1 L 5 1 1 1 0 .5
04ID08 F is h  dev NE coast - - - - 2 .0 3 . 2 - - « - 5 .2 5 . 2 5 . 2
07EP06 Regl c t rs  e l K - - - 1 .0 1 . 2 1 . 1 1 . 1 1 . 3 - - 5 . 7 3 .4 4 . 7
09P024 Snail  po rts study - - - “ “ 0 .3 0 .3 “ — ** 0 .6 0 .6 0 .6
France 1 L P 11 1A 13.0 n 10 .0 10 .0 J L i 0.0 111 3 1 . 3 46 .3
OOJVOl Bardhere dan - - - - 10 .0 10 .0 5.0 - 25.0 10 .0 2 5 .0
06BH01 Berbera cenent 1 7 . 0 1 . 5 5 .0 8 .0 4 .9 - - - • - 36.4 4 .9 - 4 . 9
09TL23 I n t i  exch/donsat - - 0 .2 1 .0 8 .1 8 .3 * • * • 1 7 . 6 1 6 .4 1 6 .4
IDA 23.6 9 .4 1 2 . 1 1 7 . 8 111 213 1 4 .6 1 11 1 1 JLL J 2 Í L 1 Rfl-1 - B L . 7
OOJVOl Bardhere dan - - - 0 .3 3 .0 3 .0 - • - - 6 .3 6 .0 6 .0
01AH09 Vet f i e l d  sves - - - - 1 . 0 2 . 0 0 . 1 0 .4 0 .4 0.6 4 . 5 3 . 1 3 .9
021002 Ag extension 3 .6 - 1 . 7 1 .9 - - - - - • 7 . 2 0 .0 0 .0
02AD02 Bay region 2 . 4 3 .3 1 . 7 1 . 5 3 .0 0 .6 - - • • 1 2 . 5 3 . 6 3 .6
02A001 m ag I I 1 .0 0 .6 0 .2 1 . 5 3 .0 3 .0 3 .0 1 . 4 • • 1 3 . 7 9 . 0 1 0 .4
02JV06 Juba val stn dies - 0 .4 - - - - •r • • 0 . 4 0 .0 0 .0
02IR11 I r r i g  rehabil - - 0 .2 0 .8 - 3 .0 5 .0 5.0 5.0 - 19 .0 8 .0 1 8 . 0
04ID08 F is h  dev NE coast - 0 .4 3 .0 4 .9 2 .5 3 . 7 - • • • 1 4 .5 6 . 2 6 . 2
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Table 11 continued
Before A f t e r  Tota l T o ta l
1984 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1991 Total 87-89 _ 8 M l
07AS08 Geotheraal -  “  -  0 .9  1 . 0  1 . 9  1 .0  1 . 0
07AS09 O i l  p r o a o t i o n ..........................................................................................  0 .5  0.5 0 .5  0 .4  -  1 . 9  1 .0  1 . 9
07EP13 T ra n s /d is tr  rehab 1 . 0  2 .0  2 .0  2 . 0  2 . 0  1 . 0  10 .0  5.0  9 .0
0 7EP11  Power rehabil  -  ~ '  2 .0  -  -  -  -  2 . 0  2 .0  2 .0
081W01 Hog water extensn 9 .8 1 .5  2 . 4  0 .9  1 . 2  15*8 1»2 1 * 2
09P030 P o rt  iaproveaent -  -  1 .5  4 .0  4 .0  4 .0  0.5  4 .5  18 .5  9.5 1 4 .0
09R001 Nabadid-Boraaa rd 6 .4  2 .3  0 .3  - - - - - -  9 .0  0.0 0 .0
12FE06 Fourth education -  1 . 6  2.0  0 .5  4 . 1  2 .5  2 . 5
12FE02 Beneral sec educ 0 .4  1 . 3  0 .3  0 .4 .................. ..................................................................................................... 2 . 4  0.0 0 .0
12EP07 Multipurpose ed -  1 . 9  3 . 1  2 .0  -  -  -  "  7 . 0  2.0  2 . 0
IDA/IFAD J L !  J J _  1 . 2  0.5  0.6 0 .0  0.0 0 .0  0 .0  0-0 1 2 .9  0 . 6 ,  _ 0 ¿ 6
01RD02 C en tral range 8 . 7  1 .9  1 . 2  0.5  0 .6 1 2 .9  0.6 0 .6
idb J ¿ 4  J i L  A L  A L  J L S  A i  A L  A L  A L  A i  J1A 2 L . J
06FB07 Pasta factory -  -  -  2 .0  2 .0  -  -  -  4 .0  4 .0  4 . 0
08WW2 Hog sewerage -  1 .0  0 . 1  1 .0 ........................................................................................................................ .........  2 . 1  0 .0  0 .0
09R001 Nabadid-Boraaa rd 5 .4  -  -  -  -  -  -  ~ -  -  5 .4  0.0 0 .0
09R047 A f g o i -Señale rd -  -  -  -  -  2 . 1  -  -  -  -  2 . 1  2 . 1  2 . 1
09PO32 R e e fe r ,  lvsk ves 15.0 - - - - -  15,0 15.0 15 .0
IFAD J J j  A !  A !  A S  A i  A i  A L  A L  A L  A 3  - 2 6 * 3  J A J L i
01AH09 Vet f i e l d  svcs -  -  -  -  1 .4  0 .2  -  1 . 5  1 .6  1 . 6  6.3  1 .6  4 . 7
02AD02 Bay region 1 . 5  0 .9 2 . 5  2 .0  0 .6 0 .3  1 . 3  1 . 3  1 .0  1 . 7  1 3 .1  2 . 2  4 .5
02AD01 NM ag dev I I  -  -  0. 1 1 .0  1 . 4  1 .5  1 . 5  2 . 0  -  -  7 . 5  4 .4  6 .4
Japan 0.0  0 .4  5 .3  13 .5  9 .8  10.8 J U )  J J  _0¿0 J U .  J M  - I L &  - J S - 6
08UU09 Balad rd well fid  -  -  -  1 . 5  2 . 6  -  -  -  -  ~ 4 . 1  2 .6  2 . 6
08RU16 Groundwat Doryole 2 .0  3.9  4 .6  10.5 8 .5  8 .5
09TL03 Hog t e l / t e l  -  0 .4  5 .3  10.0 3 .3  6 .2  -  25 .2  9 .5  9 .5
Kuwait Fund A L  A L  A !  A L  A l  A L  J L S  20.0 J 0 ¡ 0  _0¿S Í 4 J  JM J>  _ 6 1 ¿5
00JV01 Bardhere dan 0.2 0 .1 -  - 0 .2  0 .2  20.0 20.0  20.0 -  60.7 20.4 60.4
02JV05 Hogaabo i r r ig  1 .9  4 .9  3 .9  2.0 - 1.1 -  -  -  ~ 13.8  1 . 1  1 . 1
L i b y a  (share c a p i t a l )  A i  A i  A l  A L  A L  A S .  A S .  A S .  A S -  A S .  A i _  A S -------- L 0
02IR04 Afgo i-Hord  i rg  0 .6 - - - - - -  0 .6 0 .0  0 .0
North Korea 26J) J U ) _  A L  A L  A L  A L  A L  A L  A L  A S  A S ____ S A
O6BH01 Berbera ceaent 26.0 -  - -  - -  - -  - -  26.0 0.0  0 .0
OPEC J S J  A L  A L  A L  A L  A L  A L  A L  A S ___ L L  10*5___ L L  - A S
06FB01 Juba sugar 10.5 -  - -  - -  - -  - -  10 .5  0 .0  0 .0
Saudi Arabia A S  A L  A L  5.0  A L  A S -  A L  A L  A L  A L  A L  A S — L S
08RH11 Rur wat 6edo -  5 .0  5 .0  -  -  ~ “  '  10 ,0  0 .0  0 .0
Saudi Fund 84.0 0 .0  0 .0  0.0  2 .0  2 . 7  2 1 .0  2 0 .0  20.0 0 .0  1 4 9 .7  2 5 . 7  6 5 . 7
O0JV01 Bardhere daa - - - - - -  20.0 2 0 .0  20.0 -  60.0 20.0 6 0.0
05SU04 Surv ains/grdwat -  2 .0  2 . 7  1 .0  5 . 7  5 . 7  5 . 7
06FB01 Juba sugar 8 4 . 0  B4.0 0 .0  0 .0
T o ta l 3 5 7 .7  3 4 .6  53.4 69.5 86.0 7 8 .2  96.2 8 2 .8  55.9 9 .4  9 2 3 .7  260.4 3 99 .1
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Table 12
ESTIMATED GRANT DISBURSEMENTS FOR CORE PIP  PROJECTS 
( i n  M i l l i o n s  of do lla rs )
Belgiua
17IR01 Integ rur dev 
EEC
OOJVOl Bardhere dai 
01AH06 Panafr rin derp est 
02JV07 Bard exp f a r i  
02AD01 NH ag dev I I  
02CP03 G r a p e fr u i t  plant 
02ID02 Ag extension 
08UU01 Nog va t extensn 
09R013 J i l i b - B a r d  design 
09R030 Juba-Sheb bridges 
09R035 Road saint/rehab 
09P028 Nog old port
E E C / I t a l y
060P03 Phariaceut indust 
Finland
02ID15 Grain storage 
07EP06 Regl c t r s  e le c tr
Genany
OOJVOl Bardhere dan 
01AH01 Vet lab svcs 
01AH08 T ry panosotiasis 
01RD02 Cent range dev 
02JV0S Nogaibo i rg  
02JV07 Bard exp f a n  
02JV08 Juba val studies 
02IR13 Duduble o f f s t r e a i  
02CP13 Hid Shebelle ag 
02CP14 S i a l l h l d r  L  Sheb 
04FP19 Lover Juba fish  
08RW01 Deep b o re v e lls  
08RM10 Pu tps,  renev en 
08UW03 Urb vat sup I I  
08UU06 Urb va t  sup I I I  
08UU06 S t o r t  vat drain 
09TR01 Trans Master plan 
09R035 Rd Maint/rehab 
09P033 6en cargo vessel
Before A fter Total Total
1984 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 m i m 1991 Total 87-89 87-91
0 .0 0.0 0.0 1 .0 1 .0 3 .0 3.5 0.0 0 .0 0.0 7 . 5 _ 7 ¡ 5
- - - 1 .0 1 .0 3 .0 3.5 - - - 8 .5 7 . 5 7 . 5
¿ 1 i i i Jbl 5.5 2 L i J l l i 10.5 0.0 85.9 35.9 J U
2 .0 0 . 7 1 .0 0 .3 0 .4 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 - 3 4 .4 10 .4 30.4
. - - 0 .2 - 0 .4 0.5 0.5 0.5 - 2 . 1 0.9 1 . 9
0 .2 - 0 .1 1 .5 1 . 2 1 . 2 - - - - 4 .2 2 .4 2 . 4
- - - i . O 0 . 7 1 .0 1.0 1 . 4 - - 5 . 1 2 . 7 4 . 1
4 .5 0 .1 0 .1 0 .8 0 .9 0 .9 1 . 1 - - - 8 .4 2.9 2 . 9
0 .2 - 0 .3 - - - - - - - 0 .5 0.0 0 .0
1 .0 1 .2 1 .3 1 .8 0 .3 - - - - - 5 .6 0.3 0 .3
- - 0.6 0 .6 - - - - - - 1 . 2 0.0 0.0
_ . - - 2 .0 2 . 4 - - - - 4 .4 4 .4 4 .4
_ _ 0 .1 . - 2 . 8 8.8 8.0 - - 1 9 . 7 1 1 .6 19 .6
_ . _ - 0 .3 - - - - 0 .3 0.3 0 .3
_ _ _ _ - - - - - - 0 .0 0.0 0 .0
0.0 1A M J L f i 0.0 J L f i . _ f i J L 0 .0 0.0 _ L i _ . o.o _ J L Q
- 1 . 4 - - - - - - • 1 . 4 0.0 0 .0
0.0 0.0 l . i 2 .0 6 .4
1 .0
2 .9
1 . 4
6 .1
1.0
1 .2 0.0 0.0 1 9 . 7
3 .4
15.4
3 .4
16 .6
3 .4
- - 1 . 1 2 . 0 5 .4 1 . 5 5 .1 1 . 2 - - 16.3 12 .0 1 3 .2
24.0 8.8 1 4 .8 26.6 2 7 .0 32.1 15.2 1 0 .7 13.0 1 7 7 . 8 8 5.7 1 1 1 . 6
_ - - - 10.0 12.0 10.0 13.0 45.0 10.0 32.0
3.6 - - - - - - - - - 3 .6 0.0 0 .0
_ - _ - - 1 .0 0 .7 0 . 7 0 . 7 - 3 . 1 1 . 7 3 . 1
0 . 7 0 .8 2 .0 0.8 1 . 5 1 .5 1 .5 1 . 7 - - 10 .5 4 .5 6 .2
0.5 2 .8 4 .2 1 .0 2 .6 0.5 - - - - 1 1 . 6 3 .1 3 . 1
_ _ 0.5 - - - - - 0 .5 0.5 0 .5
. 0 . 7 0 . 7 1 . 6 2 .2 0.6 0.3 - - 6 . 1 4 .4 4 . 7
- 0.5 8 .0 8.0 9.0 - - - 25.5 25.0 25.0
• - . 0 .1 2 . 1 0.9 1 .0 - - - 4 . 1 4 .0 4 .0
_ - 0 .3 0 .4 0 .4 0.5 - - 1 . 6 1 . 1 1 . 6
14.2 1 . 2 1 . 1 3 .0 3 .8 - - - - - 23 .3 3 .8 3 .8
1 . 4 • - - - - - - - 1 . 4 0 .0 0 .0
_ 0 .2 0 .1 - - - - 0 .3 0 .3 0 .3
0 .1 _ 1 .5 1 .8 3 .5 2 . 2 - - - 9 .1 7 . 5 7 . 5
3.6 0 .6 - - - - - - - - 4 .2 0 .0 0 .0
0 . 1 0 .8 0 .2 0 .3 - - - - - 1 . 4 0 .3 0 .3
t  “ _ - 0 .4 - - - - - 0 .4 0 . 4 0 . 4
_ _ . 8.9 6 . 7 - - - 1 5 .6 15 .6 15 .6
. - - 7 . 0 3 .5 - - - - - 10 .5 3 .5 3 .5
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Table 13
SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME BY SECTORS
In ai 11 ions of d o lla r s  In per cent of to ta l
1987 1988 1989 T o ta l 1987 1988 1989 Total
Pr od uctive sectors 1 5 .2 4 L 1 1 L ¿ 96.5 3 7 .4 48.0 50.6 46.9
Lives to ck 0 .8 1 .6 1 . 0 3 .4 2.0 1 .9 1 . 2 1 . 7
A g r i c u l t u r e 7 . 7 2 4 .1 2 7 . 1 58.9 18.9 28.9 33.3 28.6
F o r e s t r y 0 .6 4 .2 3 .9 8 . 7 1 .5 5.0 4.8 4 . 2
Mineral resources 0 .2 0.5 0 .5 1 . 2 0.5 0 .6 0.6 0 .6
Manufacturing 3 .6 3 .2 2 . 1 8 .9 8.8 3 .8 2.6 4 .3
Energy 0.8 1 .3 1 . 4 3 .5 2 .0 1 . 6 1 . 7 1 . 7
Hater resources 0 . 7 2 . 1 1 . 7 4 .5 1 . 7 2 .5 2 . 1 2 . 2
Transport 6 coaaunications 0.8 3 .1 3 .5 7 . 4 2.0 3 . 7 4 .3 3 .6
Social/ada in sectors 25.5 4 M i f i i l 10 9 .1 62.6 HA i l l ! 53.1
Education 6 .8 15 .1 1 4 .9 36.8 1 6 .7 18 .1 18.3 1 7 .9
Health 7 . 4 10 .1 8 .9 26 .4 18.2 1 2 . 1 10.9 12 .8
Manpower and eiploynent 2 .6 9.3 8 .6 20.5 6.4 1 1 . 1 10.6 10.0
Planning and s t a t i s t i c s 8 .6 7 . 7 7 . 3 23.6 2 1 . 1 9 .2 9.0 1 1 . 5
Regional/rura l/u rban devat 0 .1 1 . 2 0 .5 1 . 8 0 .2 1 . 4 0.6 0.9
Total 4 0 .7 83.5 8 1 . 4 205.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources of funding
Foreign loans 4 .9 8.0 8 .9 2 1 . 8 12.0 9.6 10.9 10.6
Foreign grants 30.8 33.0 25 .4 89.2 7 5 . 7 39.5 3 1.2 43.4
To be funded - 3 2 .2 38.2 7 0 . 4 - 38.6 , 46.9 3 4.2
Soaali developaent budget 4.9 1 0 .1 8 .6 23.6 12.0 1 2 . 1 ' 10.6 1 1 . 5
Other doaestic 0 . 1 0 .2 0 .3 0.6 0.3 0 .2 0 .4 0 .3
Total 4 0 .7  83.5  8 1 . 4  205.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 14
ESTIMATED DISBURSEMENTS OF COMMODITY AID
AND CASH 6RANTS, 1985-1987 AND AFTER 
(in  B i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )
Total 1985 1986 1987
1987
A fte r
1987
Food aid 151.6 4 7 .1 5 4.5 50.0 0.0
United S ta te s loan 56.3 25.3 20.0 1 1 .0 -
United S ta tes grant 24.0 - 1 2 .0 12 .0 -
I t a l y 18.0 5.0 8 .0 5.0 -
HFP 3 1 .2 8.9 10 .9 1 1 . 4 -
EEC 10.6 7 .9 - 2 . 7 -
Japan 3.6 - 3 .6 - -
A u s t r a l ia 0.3 - - 0 .3 -
To be funded 7 .6 - - 7 . 6 -
Petroleum 69.6 24.0 2 7 . 2 18.4 J L P
IDA A IP  I 3.9 - 3 .9 - -
IDA ISAC I 13.4 - - 13.4 -
I t a l i a n  reg prog 1985 9.0 - 9 .0 - -
I t a l i a n  reg prog 1986 3 . 7 - - 3 . ; -
I t a l i a n  emergency prog 7 . 4 - 6 .1 1 .3 -
Saudi Arabia 15.0 15.0 - - -
United S ta te s 1985 CIP 1 7 .2 9.0 8 .2 - -
Other c o n o d i t i e s 185.3 23 .1 58.5 94.5 J L 2
IDA A IP  I 5 . 7 2 . 1 3 .6 - -
IDA ISAC I 55.0 - 1 6 .0 39.0 -
I t a l i a n  reg prog 1985 25.0 9.0 1 6 .0 - -
I t a l i a n  reg prog 1986 ' 12.6 - - 7 .9 4 . 7
I t a l i a n  emergency prog- 18.5  - - 1 4 .9 3.6 -
S e n a n  AIP 14 .0 - 8 .0 6.0 -
6eraan 1985 CIP 2 . 2 2 . 2 - - -
Seraan 1987 CIP 3 .0 - - 2.0 1.0
EEC 3 .5 - - - 3.5
United S ta te s  1985 CIP 9 .8 9 .8 - - -
United S ta te s  1986 CIP 1 1 .0 - - 1 1 . 0 -
United S ta te s 1987 CIP 20.0 - - 20.0 -
I t a l i a n  auction 1987 5.0 - - 5.0 -
Total c o u o d i t i e s 406.5 9 4.2 140 .2 1 6 2 * 1 -S L1
Cash grants 7 9 .5 4 1 .0 0.0 0.0
Saudi Arabia 40.0 40.0 - - -
Batar 1 .0 1 . 0 - - -
I t a l i a n  eaerg prog 28 .5 - 28 .5 - -
United S ta te s 10.0 - 10 .0 “ -
TA conponent o f  CIPs 3 . 7 0 . 7 1 .5 1 . 2
IDA A IP  I 0 .4 0 .2 0 .2 - -
IDA ISAC I 1 . 6 - 0 .8 0.8 -
I t a l i a n  reg prog 1985 1 . 0 0.5 0.5 - -
I t a l i a n  reg prog 1986 0 . 7 • — 0 .4 0.3
6RAND TOTAL 489.7 135.9 180 .2 164.1 9.5
íA SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
-200-
Central Bank of Somalia Annual Report 1985, Mogadishu, 1985.
FAO, Report of the High-Level WCARRD Follow-up and Lagos Plan of Action, 
Strategy Review Mission, Rome, 1982.
Hobden, A., Harris J_., et al, Somalia: a social and Institutional Profile, 
Boston University Center for African Studies for USAID, Boston, 1984.
IEES (Improving The Efficiency of Educational Systems), Somalia Civil Service 
Study, Tallahassee, Florida, 1984.
  Somalia Education And Human Resources Sector Assessment, Tallahassee,
Florida, 1984.
Jamal, V., Nomads and Farmers, Incomes and Poverty in Rural Somalia in D. Ghai 
and S. Radwan, Agrarian Policies and Rural Poverty in Africa, ILO, 
Geneva, 1983.
  Somalia: Economics for an Unconventional Economy, ILO. Geneva, 1987
(mimeo).
Lewis, I. M., Somali Culture History and Social Institutions, LSE and PS, 
London, 1981.
Masood, M. J., Women in Somalia, Women's Education Department, Mogadishu, 
1983.
Ministry of National Planning. Five Year Development Plan 1982-86, Mogadishu, 
1982 .
  Analytical Volume, Census of Population 1975, Mogadishu, 1984.
  National Development Strategy and Policy 1987-1989, Mogadishu, 1987.
  and UNICEF, Women And Children In Somalia: A Situation Analysis,
Mogadishu, 1984.
  A Programme for Women and Children in Somalia - Plan of Operations Mid.
1984-1987, Mogadishu, 1984.
RAPID (Resources for Awareness of Population In Development), Somalia: The
Effect of Population Factors on Social and Economic Development, 
Mogadishu, 1985.
Samantar, M. S., Somalia's External Debt: Whose Problem, Mogadishu, 1987 
(mimeo).
UNDP, Somalia Annual Development Report 1985 and 1986, Mogadishu, 1986 and
1987.
World Bank, Financing Adjustment With Growth: Sub-Saharan Africa 1986-90,
Washington, 1986.
